Immunity of a Former Head of State General Pinochet and the House of Lords: Part Three

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Bröhmer

The third decision of the House of Lords in the Pinochet matter is significant, because the House of Lords upheld the majority view taken in the first decision: heads of state can, under certain circumstances, be held responsible for gross violations of human rights in the criminal courts of a foreign country. The decision is based on three main pillars. The Lords had, first, to clarify what constitutes an extradition crime under the Extradition Act 1989; second, to construct torture as an international crime; and, finally, to reject the plea of immunity of a former head of state in the context of the international crime of torture.

1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-371
Author(s):  
Jürgen Bröhmer

This decision of the House of Lords is significant because it is the first decision of a major court of an important country refusing to grant a former head of state immunity from adjudication in the context of alleged gross violations of human rights. It is shown that state immunity, diplomatic immunity and head of state immunity are to be distinguished and the rules pertaining to head of state immunity are explained. Whereas the author agrees with the result of Lords' decision, he disagrees with the reasoning because the majority circumvented the immunity question by artificially qualifying the alleged human rights violations of General Pinochet as private acts.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Warbrick ◽  
Dominic McGoldrick ◽  
Hazel Fox

The decision of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, given on 24 March 1999,1 confirms, by the impressive vote of 6 to 1, the earlier majority ruling that a former head of state enjoys no immunity in extradition or criminal proceedings brought in the United Kingdom in respect of the international crime of torture.


2018 ◽  
pp. 108-127
Author(s):  
SELMAN OZDAN

This paper presents an unspoken aspect of Head of State immunity, namely that such immunity is at odds with the expectation that international law should be applied to challenge resistance to and promote respect for human rights. It considers the question of whether Head of State immunity gives rise to de facto impunity in the case of violations of human rights recognised as peremptory norms (jus cogens) committed by such Heads of State. While this paper emphasises the critical role of Head of State immunity in the context of international relations, it argues that Heads of State should not exempt from punishment when violations of those human rights are at stake.


2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 463
Author(s):  
Sarah L Murphy

This article analyses the groundbreaking 1999 judgment of the House of Lords on the question of the extradition of Pinochet from the United Kingdom to Spain for crimes committed during his time as Head of State of Chile. It examines the two main components of the judgment:  that Pinochet's status as former Head of State of Chile did not allow him to benefit from sovereign immunity for acts of torture committed during his reign; and that he could be extradited to Spain for acts of torture committed after 1989, when the United Kingdom codified its obligations under the Torture Convention.  It supports the conclusion that the laws against torture override the immunity of former Heads of State, and suggests that the reasoning could be extended to apply to other crimes against humanity, and where the accused is an incumbent Head of State.  On the question of extradition, it argues that the Law Lords had several avenues open under which Pinochet could have been extradited to face all counts of torture. It concludes with an analysis of the New Zealand legislation and case law on sovereign immunity, the prosecution of crimes against humanity, and extradition, and suggests several law reforms to bring New Zealand legislation in line with evolving international obligations to prosecute or extradite the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 


2006 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 65-85
Author(s):  
Gideon Boas ◽  
Timothy L.H. McCormack

One noticeable coincidence in 2006 involved the deaths of three former heads of state: Saddam Hussein, Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milošević. Many past calendar years have marked the passing of multiple former heads of state but these three particular former leaders had all been subjected to judicial processes of one sort or another in respect of alleged widespread and systematic violations of human rights, arbitrary killings and – for two of them – genocide of their own or other peoples. In all three cases the deaths were linked in some way to the legal proceedings and evoked widespread dissatisfaction – Pinochet because he escaped trial, Hussein because the proceedings against him were fundamentally flawed and Milošević because he died before the four-year trial proceedings against him could be brought to a conclusion. Despite the obvious differences in judicial proceedings against all three accused, an emergent and common refrain has been to query whether any satisfactory trial of a former head of state is indeed possible.


Author(s):  
Sarah Song

Chapter 6 examines three rights-based arguments for freedom of movement across borders. Three rights-based arguments have been offered in support of freedom of international movement. The first claims that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. The second adopts a “cantilever” strategy, arguing that freedom of international movement is a logical extension of existing fundamental rights, including the right of domestic free movement and the right to exit one’s country. The third argument is libertarian: international free movement is necessary to respect individual freedom of association and contract. This chapter shows why these arguments fail to justify a general right to free movement across the globe. What is morally required is not a general right of international free movement but an approach that privileges those whose basic human rights are at stake.


Author(s):  
Samantha Besson

As a companion to the five regional reports in this volume, this chapter’s aim is a double one: first, to bring the comparison up to the regional level, and second, to analyse the international and domestic institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that affect how international human rights instruments influence domestic law. The chapter is therefore both a study in comparative international human rights law and a contribution to its methodology. Its structure is four-pronged. The first section clarifies the aim, object, and method of the comparison. The second section presents a comparative assessment of the Covenants’ domestic influence across regions and develops a grid of comparative analysis. The third section addresses the authority of the Committees’ interpretations of the Covenants, relying on a bottom-up comparative law argument. The fourth section discusses the role of human rights comparison and of regional human rights law in enhancing the legitimacy of the Committees’ future interpretations.


Author(s):  
Chinmayi Arun

This chapter details how AI affects, and will continue to affect, the Global South. The term “South” has a history connected with the “Third World” and has referred to countries that share postcolonial history and certain development goals. However, scholars have expanded and refined on it to include different kinds of marginal, disenfranchised populations such that the South is now a plural concept—there are Souths. The AI-related risks for Southern populations include concerns of discrimination, bias, oppression, exclusion, and bad design. These can be exacerbated in the context of vulnerable populations, especially those without access to human rights law or institutional remedies. The chapter then outlines these risks as well as the international human rights law that is applicable. It argues that a human rights–centric, inclusive, empowering context-driven approach is necessary.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis G ARNOLD

AbstractThe claim that corporations have human rights obligations remains contentious and can be fraught with confusion. This article synthesizes existing corporate human rights theory and responds to objections to the idea that transnational corporations (TNCs) have human rights obligations. The argument proceeds in three stages. The first section describes the different forms TNCs take and explains why TNCs are properly understood as moral agents responsible for their policies and practices. The second section reviews and explains different philosophical theories of corporate human rights obligations. The third section articulates and responds to objections to the idea that corporations have human rights obligations. The main conclusion of this article is that there are multiple, compelling and overlapping justifications of corporate human rights obligations.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 207-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Warbrick ◽  
Dominic McGoldrick ◽  
Hazel Fox

The case of Pinochet has aroused enormous interest, both political and legal. The spectacle of the General, whose regime sent so many to their deaths, himself under arrest and standing trial has stirred the hopes of the oppressed. His reversal of fortune, loss of liberty with a policeman, on the door, has been heralded by organisations for the protection of human rights as one small step on the long road to justice. For lawyers generally, the House of Lords' majority decision of 1998 that General Pinochet enjoyed no immunity signalled a shift from a State-centred order of things.1 It suggested that the process of restriction of State immunity, so effectively begun with the removal of commercial transactions from its protection, might now extend some way into the field of criminal proceedings. And it further posed the intriguing question whether an act categorised as within the exercise of sovereign power, so as to relieve the individual official of liability in civil proceedings, may at the same time, as well as subsequent to his retirement, attract parallel personal criminal liability.


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