The Law against War or Jus contra Bellum: A New Terminology for a Conservative View on the Use of Force?

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 747-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE

Inter-state use of force has always attracted much attention from international legal scholars. Many articles have been written on the subject. However, there are still a limited number of books addressing all the aspects of the contemporary prohibition on the use of force in a systematic way. Those written by Yoram Dinstein, Christine Gray, and Thomas Franck are certainly the best known in the English-speaking literature. This literature is now enriched following the publication of a new book entitled The Law against War by Olivier Corten. It is a translated and updated version of a book published in French and entitled Le droit contre la guerre, which explains why it has been published in the French Studies in International Law collection of Hart Publishing.

This Oxford Handbook is a comprehensive and authoritative study of the modern law on the use of force. Over 50 experts in the field offer a detailed analysis, and to an extent a restatement, of the law in this area. The Handbook reviews the status of the law on the use of force and assesses what changes, if any, have occurred as a result of recent developments. It offers cutting-edge and up-to-date scholarship on all major aspects of the prohibition of the use of force. Part I reviews the history of the subject and its recent challenges, and addresses the major conceptual approaches. Part II covers collective security, in particular the law and practice of the UN organs, and of regional organizations and arrangements. Part III considers the substance of the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-defence and associated doctrines. Part IV is devoted to armed action undertaken on behalf of peoples and populations, including self-determination conflicts, resistance to armed occupation, and forcible humanitarian and pro-democratic action. The possibility of the revival of classical, expansive justifications for the use of force is addressed in Part V, followed by Part VI which considers new security challenges and the emerging law in relation to them. Part VII ties the key arguments developed in the book into a substantive conclusion. The Handbook is essential reading for scholars and students of international law and the use of force, and legal advisers to both governments and NGOs.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter traces the development of the law of belligerent occupation in order to identify trends relevant to the regulation of internationalized armed conflicts. It observes that despite the general grounding of this body of law in a state-centric paradigm, several isolated developments have contemplated the possibility of non-state actors becoming belligerent occupants of a portion of state territory. Moreover, the chapter highlights that the law of belligerent occupation has undergone a fundamental transformation as part of a general trend of individualization and humanization of international law. Therefore, it is no longer simply a brake on inter-state relations and a protector of states’ interests and institutions. Instead, the law has gradually brought individuals’ interests to the fore, putting persons before institutions and individuals before states. Overall, the chapter uncovers the historical reasons that support an extensive view of the applicability of the law of occupation to modern internationalized armed conflicts.


Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

The chapter discusses the philosophical foundations of the current regulation of the use of force. The chapter argues that, in correspondence with the emergence of a sphere of substantive rules protecting common interests of humankind, international law is also gradually developing a system of protection against egregious breaches of these interests. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of the law and practice governing the action of the UN Security Council as well as the law of state responsibility concerning individual and collective reactions to serious breaches of common interests. This system is based on positive obligations imposed upon individual states as well as UN organs, and it appears to be still rudimentary and inefficient. However, the chapter suggests that the mere existence of this system, these shortcomings notwithstanding, has the effect of promoting the further development of the law in search for more appropriate mechanisms of protection.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malgosia Fitzmaurice

The subject-matter of this article are the issues of treaty law as expounded in the Judgment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. The following problems are discussed: unilateral suspension and abandonment of obligations deriving from the binding treaty; the principle of fundamental change of circumstances; unilateral termination of a treaty; applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in this case; legal status of so-called ‘provisional solution’; impossibility of performance and material breach of treaty; the application of the principle of ‘approximate application’; and the principle pacta sunt servanda. The issues arc discussed at the background of the Drafts of the International Law Commission.


Asian Survey ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stein Tønnesson

The article looks at three ways in which international law has affected government behavior in the South China Sea. It has exacerbated disputes. It has probably curtailed the use of force. And it has made it difficult to imagine solutions that violate the law of the sea.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Paweł Majka

<p>The subject of the study is to outline the boundaries within the legislator may sanction the obligations to provide information to tax authorities using tax sanctions. The author analyzes tax sanctions as instruments guaranteeing the effectiveness of legal norms related to information obligations in the light of the protection of the taxpayer’s rights. In the author’s opinion, there is a clear outline of the possible shape of the sanction, which limits the legislator in excessive interference with the rights of taxpayers. These limits, both in national and international law, are determined primarily by the principle of proportionality, which is decisive for the degree of discomfort associated with the application of sanctions. It should be indicated that the shape limits of these sanctions, characterized in this study, guarantee, in turn, the protection of the rights of these entities. At the same time, it should be emphasized that tax sanctions are, in principle, a complementary element of the system of the guarantees of the law effectiveness and the legislator deciding on their wider use should properly balance the degree of “saturation” of tax law with sanctions taking into account its nature.</p>


1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dunn

There are at Least Three Possible Types of View about the justifiability of the use of force by states or private individuals on behalf of other private individuals or groups who are the victims of brutal and gratuitous coercion by another state. The first type of view is that no human being, and a fortiori no state, can be justified in using force under any circumstances and for any purpose, because (and only because) force is an intrinsic evil. This unflinchingly deontological view is generous but practically absurd. The second type of view is that states (or even private individuals) can be, and often arc, justified in using force against the brutally coercive actions of another state when, but only when, the latter is acting outside its own territorial jurisdiction. At least in the case of states what grounds that justification is their entitlement to defend themselves against foreign (as against domestic) aggression, and to defend also any other states with whom they have linked themselves either by standing alliances or by solemn common undertakings to secure each other's safety and sovereignty within the bounds of international law. In the case of private individuals, the corresponding justification would lie in their several personal entitlements to defend themselves as best they can against aggression.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-489
Author(s):  
Haris Jamil

Abstract The arbitral award in The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India) brings to the fore the issue of assigning a name to a case. To contextualise India’s contention regarding the name, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, in this article, I outline the law and practice regarding assigning names to cases by different international judicial bodies (ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and PCA). Examining India’s objection to the name, I argue that the name of the case does not capture the subject matter of the dispute accurately and emanates from the mainstream view of international law. The name prioritises an Italian flagged vessel, owned by a company engaged in international commerce and navigating under the protection of the Italian navy, over a fishing vessel owned by private individuals. The name reinforces a state-centric view of international law in which the victims of the incident do not picture.


Author(s):  
Torremans Paul

This chapter examines the distinction between movables and immovables under English private international law. The first task of the court in a private international law case when required to rule on the question of a proprietary or possessory nature is to decide whether the item of property in dispute is movable or immovable. The legal system that will be applicable to the case depends on this preliminary decision. This chapter first considers the classification of the subject matter of ownership into movables and immovables by the law of the situs before looking at some examples relating to mortgages, trusts for sale, and annuities. It also discusses the relevance of the distinction between realty and personalty and concludes by explaining the distinction between tangible and intangible movables.


Author(s):  
Ben Saul

International law has struggled to regulate terrorism for over a century, beginning with efforts to cooperate in the extradition and prosecution of suspects, including through unsuccessful League of Nations efforts to define and criminalize terrorism as such. Until 2001 most international attention focused on transnational criminal cooperation against terrorism, through the development of method-specific “prosecute or extradite” treaties (concerning, for instance, violence against aircraft or ships, hostage taking, or attacks on diplomats) but without defining terrorism as a general concept or crime. It may, however, be possible to qualify some terrorist acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Since the 1970s, there were ambivalent efforts through the UN General Assembly to develop normative frameworks to confront terrorism per se, which often came unstuck on the controversial issues of “state terrorism” and liberation movement violence. Greater consensus was achieved by 1994 with the General Assembly’s adoption of a declaration against terrorism. There appears to exist an international consensus that terrorism per se is wrongful, even if disagreement remains about identifying precisely what constitutes terrorism. The effort to deal with terrorism as such suggests that the international community views terrorism as more than its underlying physical parts, which are already crimes in most national legal systems and under certain transnational treaties. The special wrongfulness of terrorism is perhaps signified by its intimidation of civilian populations, its coercion of governments or international organizations, and its political, religious, or ideological aspect. Terrorist violence has also sometimes raised certain problems under the law of armed conflict and the law on the use of force, as well as occasionally attracted sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Terrorism was generally dealt with, however, through the application of general legal norms rather than through the emergence of terrorism-specific rules. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, sharper international focus was brought to bear on the legal challenges presented by terrorism and counter-terrorism in numerous specialized branches of international law (particularly in the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, and international humanitarian law), as well as in the institutional practices of the UN Security Council and the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on international human rights law. By 2011 the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon even declared the existence of an international customary law crime of transnational terrorism, although that decision has proven highly controversial as not supported by state practice. Efforts to negotiate a comprehensive international convention against terrorism have continued since 2000, with disagreement remaining over the scope of exceptions. There is also now increasing debate about whether a field of international anti-terrorism law is emerging.


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