Restrictivist Reasoning on theRatione PersonaeDimension of Armed Attacks in the Post 9/11 World

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ DE HOOGH

AbstractThis contribution investigates restrictivist reasoning on the origin of armed attacks, and concentrates on the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the use of state practice. One particular aspect is examined: the linkage of the armed activities of non-state actors to a state required for an exercise of the right of self-defence to be justified in relation to that state. Many authors have moved away from a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter and customary international law, and have proposed various legal constructs –complicity, aiding and abetting, harbour and support, unwillingness or inability to act– to allow for the invocation of self-defence even when armed activities of non-state actors cannot be attributed to a state and its substantial involvement is doubtful. Noticeable among authors generally, with certain exceptions, is a certain lack of concern to account for whatever method of interpretation or analysis they employ.

Author(s):  
Kimberley Trapp

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force between States. In so doing, it addresses itself to a strictly interstate context and does not speak to the phenomenon of uses of force by non-state actors (NSAs). The question examined in this chapter is whether the exception to that prohibition—the right to use force in self-defence—is nevertheless responsive to the war-making capacity of NSAs. Otherwise put, is the definition of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter (and related customary international law) conditioned on the attacker being a state? In exploring this question, the chapter considers whether attribution is a necessary condition (in ratione personae terms) for the applicability of Article 51 by assessing the language of the Charter (including its travaux préparatoires), jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, and state practice.


Author(s):  
Byers Michael

This chapter addresses the US and NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day. It examines the different legal justifications advanced or available for the intervention, namely self-defence, UN Security Council authorization, and intervention by invitation. It explores the complex relationships between these justifications and, particularly, the strategies adopted by states in choosing between them. The chapter concludes by considering the effects of the intervention on the customary international law of self-defence as it concerns non-state actors located in “unaware or unable” states, and anticipatory or pre-emptive responses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86
Author(s):  
Papawadee Tanodomdej

The Tallinn Manuals (the Manuals) attempted to clarify how to apply existing international law to cyber operations. Though the Manuals are non-binding instruments, the Group of International Experts claimed that they reflected the lex lata applicable to cyber operations. However, this claim is questionable due to the dominating role of a few Western states in the drafting process and the linked neglect of the practice of “affected states” in cyber operations. This article examines the quality of the Manuals’ drafting process and the composition and impartiality of the experts involved. It focuses on the issue of the prohibition of the use of force. The aim of this examination is not to discuss whether the Manuals provided the right answer to the question of how international law applies to cyber operations. Rather, they function as a case study of how legal scholarship may affect the making of international law. The article concludes that certain rules in the Manuals are marked by NATO influence and overlook the practice of other states engaged in cyber operations. Therefore, the Manuals disregard the generality of state practice, which should be the decisive factor in the formation of customary international law. As far as “political activism” may be involved, the article argues that the role of legal scholars as assistants to the cognition of international law could be compromised.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

States invariably justify using force extraterritorially by reference to their inherent right of self-defence. In so doing, they accept that the exercise of such right is conditioned by the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. To date, these requirements have received little attention. They are notorious for being normatively indeterminate and operationally complex. As a breach of either requirement renders ostensibly defensive action unlawful, increased determinacy regarding their scope and content is crucial to how international law constrains military force. This book examines the conceptual meaning, substance and practical application of necessity and proportionality as they relate to the right of self-defence following the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. It provides a coherent and up-to-date description of the applicable contemporary international law and proposes an analytical framework to guide its operation and appraisal. This book contends that necessity and proportionality are conceptually distinct and must be applied in the foregoing order to avoid an insufficient ‘catch-all’ description of (il)legality. Necessity determines whether defensive force may be used to respond to an armed attack and where it must be directed. Proportionality governs how much total force is permissible and prohibits excessive responses. Both requirements are shown to apply on an ongoing basis throughout the duration of an armed conflict prompted by self-defence. Compliance with necessity and proportionality ensures that the purposes of self-defence are met (and nothing more) and that defensive force is not unduly disruptive to third-party interests and to international peace and security.


Author(s):  
Bill Gilmore

This chapter examines the doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ used by the state to exercise its coercive powers beyond national territory for law enforcement purposes. It discusses hot pursuit by sea, land, and air in the context of international law, particularly with respect to self-defence and reprisal. Whilst hot pursuit is well recognized in the customary international law of the sea, it has yet to achieve that form of normative recognition in relation to pursuit on land or by air. The chapter considers the debate over hot pursuit as a legal justification for cross-border military incursions independent of the right of self-defence and describes the concept of extended constructive presence before concluding with an analysis of hot pursuit in a use of force context.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE

AbstractThis article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.


Author(s):  
J.-G. Castel

SummaryWith the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the sole remaining superpower whose ambition is to create a new open and integrated world order based on principks of democratic capitalism. To ensure its hegemony, the United States is prepared to resort to military action with or without UN approval when its international and national security interests are at stake. The intervention in Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing is a good example of this policy and raises the question of its legality and legitimacy under contemporary international law. May or must a state resort to military intervention against a state sponsoring terrorism or depriving its nationals of their internationally recognized human rights? The so-called “Bush doctrine” of anticipatory or preventive self-defence against a state accused of supplying weapons of mass destruction to a foreign terrorist organization, which was one of the reasons advanced by the Coalition of the Willing for intervening in Iraq, meets neither the conditions laid out in Article 51 of the UN Charter nor those of customary international law. Thus, at the present stage of development of international law, the Bush doctrine is not even lege ferenda. It is not an extension of the customary international law right of pre-emptive self-defence. Only with the approval of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter or when it takes place within the strict confines of self-defence, can armed intervention be legitimate.The second reason for intervening in Iraq given by the Coalition of the Willing is based on humanitarian considerations, which raises the question whether the protection of human rights can be assured from the outside. Here, international law is evolving in the right direction since the international community is prepared to adopt the concept of responsibility to protect, which justifies the use of force to protect and enforce human rights as an exception to Article 2(4) and (7) of the UN Charter. Again, such intervention is legal only when approved by the Security Council acting pursuant to Chapter VII on the ground that human right crises do not fall “essentially within the jurisdiction of any state.” However, the international community, with the exception of the Coalition of the Willing, is not yet prepared to support a right of unilateral military intervention as a last resort when the Security Council is incapable and unwilling to do so. This includes intervention motivated by the non-democratic form of government of the targeted state. Although the primary responsibility to deal with human right crises rests with the United Nations based on the responsibility to protect, it is argued that one should not rule out unilateral military action based on a customary international law right of intervention to meet the gravity and urgency of the situation provided the intervening state fully observes the necessary precautionary principles governing such type of intervention. The conclusion is that terrorism and human rights abuses can only be effectively challenged through a concerted multilateral collective approach not through the politics of unilateralism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 751-775
Author(s):  
Rein Müllerson

Abstract Armed attacks in the sense of Article 51 and customary international law can be carried out not only by States, but also by non-State actors (NSA). Self-defensive responses to attacks by NSAs, due to their specific characteristics, may contain a combination of elements of anticipatory self-defence and defensive reprisals. If a State, from the territory of which an attack originates, is unable to prevent an NSA attacking a third State, it has to ask for and to accept the assistance of the victim State, other States, or relevant international organisations. The latter cannot use military force in self-defence in such circumstances without having first sought the consent of the territorial State. However, if a State is unwilling to prevent an NSA, operating from its territory, from attacking third States, it becomes an accessory-after-the-fact to armed attacks of the NSA. Self-defensive, either individual or collective, measures can be carried out on the territory of such a State even without its consent.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

This chapter focuses on the use of cyber force on and off the battlefield within the framework of international law. Drawing on the work of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), it considers the jus ad bellum issues surrounding cyber operations. In particular, it examines when cyber operations violate the prohibition on the use (or threat) of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law, and when a state that has been the target of cyber operations may retaliate with its own use of force. The chapter also discusses two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, one of which is the exercise of the right of self-defence. Finally, it analyses state interpretations of international law’s prescriptive norms regarding the use of force when applied to cyberspace.


2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jutta Brunnée ◽  
Stephen J Toope

AbstractCan a few primarily Western States expand the right to self-defence against non-State actors, incorporating the unwilling or unable standard? Even on a traditional reading of customary law formation, the answer is no because proponents have failed to attract consistent and widespread support. What is more, using our interactional international law approach, we show that efforts to date have not been successful because they have failed to address fundamental rule of law concerns. The current state of world politics has perhaps caught proponents of the unwilling or unable standard in a difficult bind. We suggest how proponents might carefully develop the law on self-defence against non-State actors.


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