Hot Pursuit

Author(s):  
Bill Gilmore

This chapter examines the doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ used by the state to exercise its coercive powers beyond national territory for law enforcement purposes. It discusses hot pursuit by sea, land, and air in the context of international law, particularly with respect to self-defence and reprisal. Whilst hot pursuit is well recognized in the customary international law of the sea, it has yet to achieve that form of normative recognition in relation to pursuit on land or by air. The chapter considers the debate over hot pursuit as a legal justification for cross-border military incursions independent of the right of self-defence and describes the concept of extended constructive presence before concluding with an analysis of hot pursuit in a use of force context.

Author(s):  
Douglas Guilfoyle

This chapter examines the use of force against piracy in the context of international law, with particular reference to the pirates off Somalia. It discusses the counter-piracy activities by multinational military forces under the applicable public international law of the sea and as law enforcement operations. It also considers the issues raised by the use of force by private merchant vessels in self-defence, including the use of privately contracted armed security personnel. The chapter reviews the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the legal regime applicable at sea and ashore within Somalia itself. It also analyses the Council’s authorization of states to use ‘all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’ within Somalia’s territorial sea.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

This chapter focuses on the use of cyber force on and off the battlefield within the framework of international law. Drawing on the work of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), it considers the jus ad bellum issues surrounding cyber operations. In particular, it examines when cyber operations violate the prohibition on the use (or threat) of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law, and when a state that has been the target of cyber operations may retaliate with its own use of force. The chapter also discusses two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, one of which is the exercise of the right of self-defence. Finally, it analyses state interpretations of international law’s prescriptive norms regarding the use of force when applied to cyberspace.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Feinstein

Dean Acheson frankly reconfirmed the right of self-preservation, when he asserted, “…law simply does not deal with … questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty…. No law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law”. It is beyond the law.Given the existence of man's elementary loyalty to autonomous states, the necessity for using force springs from the need of states to depend fundamentally on self-help in order to guarantee their survival and welfare. This search for security in a system of politics without government, forces the state to be dependent upon military self-help.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen

This article analyses the legal regulation of the use of force in international law in the context of three emerging Palestinian forms of struggle against Israeli occupation: the Knife Intifada, the disturbances at the border, and the launching of incendiary kites. It discusses what legal paradigms or concepts should regulate the type and level of force used in each situation – a question that is complicated by various dilemmas – and finally, appraises the Israel Defence Forces policies tailored in response. The article evaluates the applicability of two legal paradigms regulating the use of force in military operations – (i) the conduct of hostilities and (ii) law enforcement – as well as the concept of personal self-defence in international law and the escalation of force procedure. While the Knife Intifada clearly falls under the law enforcement paradigm, the disturbances at the border and the launching of incendiary kites raise more difficult legal questions. Categorising them under a paradigm of law enforcement is less straightforward, and may have undesirable ramifications for safeguarding humanitarian interests. The article argues that the use of force in the disturbances at the border and the incendiary kites cases should be regulated by the concept of self-defence and escalation of force procedure, and that the application of the self-defence concept should be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to situations of law enforcement and to situations of hostilities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86
Author(s):  
Papawadee Tanodomdej

The Tallinn Manuals (the Manuals) attempted to clarify how to apply existing international law to cyber operations. Though the Manuals are non-binding instruments, the Group of International Experts claimed that they reflected the lex lata applicable to cyber operations. However, this claim is questionable due to the dominating role of a few Western states in the drafting process and the linked neglect of the practice of “affected states” in cyber operations. This article examines the quality of the Manuals’ drafting process and the composition and impartiality of the experts involved. It focuses on the issue of the prohibition of the use of force. The aim of this examination is not to discuss whether the Manuals provided the right answer to the question of how international law applies to cyber operations. Rather, they function as a case study of how legal scholarship may affect the making of international law. The article concludes that certain rules in the Manuals are marked by NATO influence and overlook the practice of other states engaged in cyber operations. Therefore, the Manuals disregard the generality of state practice, which should be the decisive factor in the formation of customary international law. As far as “political activism” may be involved, the article argues that the role of legal scholars as assistants to the cognition of international law could be compromised.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

States invariably justify using force extraterritorially by reference to their inherent right of self-defence. In so doing, they accept that the exercise of such right is conditioned by the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. To date, these requirements have received little attention. They are notorious for being normatively indeterminate and operationally complex. As a breach of either requirement renders ostensibly defensive action unlawful, increased determinacy regarding their scope and content is crucial to how international law constrains military force. This book examines the conceptual meaning, substance and practical application of necessity and proportionality as they relate to the right of self-defence following the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. It provides a coherent and up-to-date description of the applicable contemporary international law and proposes an analytical framework to guide its operation and appraisal. This book contends that necessity and proportionality are conceptually distinct and must be applied in the foregoing order to avoid an insufficient ‘catch-all’ description of (il)legality. Necessity determines whether defensive force may be used to respond to an armed attack and where it must be directed. Proportionality governs how much total force is permissible and prohibits excessive responses. Both requirements are shown to apply on an ongoing basis throughout the duration of an armed conflict prompted by self-defence. Compliance with necessity and proportionality ensures that the purposes of self-defence are met (and nothing more) and that defensive force is not unduly disruptive to third-party interests and to international peace and security.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-493
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

The legality of a forceful intervention by a state to protect its nationals has been the subject of a continuing controversy over the past 15 years. Many see it as an unlawful use of force prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations, others see it as a lawful exercice of a self-standing right recognized under contemporary international law, some finally claim it falls under the scope of self-defence. The author proposes not to restate that debate, but more to reassess it, examining and challenging some of the arguments raised on both sides of the question. Within that debate, it will be concluded that the international legal order does indeed recognize the validity of the use of force for such a purpose : if the avenue of self-defence is rejected, for conceptual as well as practical reasons, the right of intervention to protect nationals is indeed, for the author, part of the comtemporary international legal order. Then, the author wishes to broaden the debate and proposes another option, which has not been explored by scholars and publicists but which is found more satisfactory than any other approach : intervention to protect nationals can be justified under international law because of the existence, in a particular case, of a "state of necessity" as defined by the International Law Commission.


2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.


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