Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being

Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Jacob Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Conceptual Problem ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Interpersonal Comparisons ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Satisfaction Theory

Abstract In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being must turn from a preference-satisfaction to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being in order to avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but object that no version of the desire-satisfaction theory can provide a plausible account of how an individual's degree of well-being depends on the satisfaction or frustration of their various desires, at least in cases involving the gain or loss of desires. So subjectivists can avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons only by adopting a substantively implausible view. In this reply, I defend subjectivism by arguing that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids Van der Deijl and Brouwer's objections, and briefly suggest that it may also be able to handle the problem of adaptive desires. I conclude that subjectivists should endorse the totalist desire-satisfaction theory.

Interpersonal comparisons with preferences and desires

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Limited Range ◽  
Conceptual Problem ◽  
Interpersonal Comparisons ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Popular View

Most moral and political theories require us to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. This poses a challenge to the popular view that welfare consists in the satisfaction of preferences or desires, because interpersonal comparisons of preference or desire satisfaction are widely thought to be conceptually problematic, and purported solutions to this problem to lead to a hopeless subjectivism about these comparisons. In this article, I argue that the key to meeting this challenge lies in distinguishing preferences from desires, and preference satisfaction from desire satisfaction theories of welfare. More specifically, I defend three conclusions. First, interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction do raise a serious conceptual problem, but this same problem does not arise for interpersonal comparisons of desire satisfaction. Second, none of the existing solutions to the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction are satisfactory, since none explain how we can make interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction objectively. Third, we can at least make a limited range of objective interpersonal comparisons of desire satisfaction, and there are reasons to be optimistic about the possibility of making a wider range of such comparisons, but there is a need for further research on the topic.

scholarly journals On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value

Utilitas ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSEPH VAN WEELDEN
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Compound State ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Satisfaction Theory

This article considers two different ways of formulating a desire-satisfaction theory of prudential value. The first version of the theory (the object view) assigns basic prudential value to the state of affairs that is the object of a person's desire. The second version (the combo view) assigns basic prudential value to the compound state of affairs in which (a) a person desires some state of affairs and (b) this state of affairs obtains. My aims in this article are twofold. First, I aim to highlight that these are not mere notational variants, but in fact have quite different implications, so that this distinction is not one that the theorist of prudential value should ignore. More positively, I argue that the object view is better able to capture what is distinctive and appealing about subjective theories of prudential value, on any plausible account of what the central subjectivist insight is.

Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem van der Deijl ◽  
Huub Brouwer
Keyword(s):  
Positive Attitude ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Subjective Theory ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Low Degrees ◽  
Satisfaction Theory

AbstractWellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for degrees of wellbeing. This is generally taken to be problematic. However, other subjective theories – namely, desire-satisfaction, judgment- and value-fulfillment theories – do not suffer from the same difficulties. We introduce two models of degrees of wellbeing a subjectivist can employ: the Relative and the Absolute Model, and defend the claim that both models face difficulties. In particular, we argue that a subjectivist theory should describe instances of depression as instances of low degrees of wellbeing. We also argue that a reduction of desires may sometimes improve one’s degree of wellbeing, an idea we call the Epicurean Intuition. We then argue that the Relative Model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the Absolute Model fails to meet a central commitment of subjectivism – the Resonance Constraint – and is unable to accommodate the Epicurean Intuition. The upshot of the paper is that subjectivist theories cannot account for degrees of well-being in a plausible way.

Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Individual Good ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Good For

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?

Well-Being

Life's Values ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 71-115
Author(s):  
Alan H. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Successful Theory ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Personal Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Individual

Well-being is what makes life valuable or good for the individual whose life it is. It is the all-inclusive category of personal value. This chapter evaluates the leading accounts: hedonism (pleasure is the measure of well-being), perfectionism (development of human capacities is the measure), objective lists (numerous objective goods make up a good life), and desire satisfaction. Fatal objections are raised to the first three, and an idealized desire satisfaction account is defended against objections typically raised by others to this kind of theory. The successful theory must capture our concept, unify and explain why various things are good for individual persons, and show why we are rationally motivated to pursue well-being.

scholarly journals Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Di Tella ◽  
Robert MacCulloch
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Happiness Research ◽  
Interpersonal Comparisons ◽  
Individual Welfare

Happiness research is based on the idea that it is fruitful to study empirical measures of individual welfare. The most common is the answer to a simple well-being question such as “Are you Happy?” Hundreds of thousands of individuals have been asked this question, in many countries and over many years. Researchers have begun to use these data to tackle a variety of important questions in economics. Some require strong assumptions concerning interpersonal comparisons of utility, but others make only mild assumptions in this regard. They range from microeconomic questions, such as the way income and utility are connected, to macroeconomic questions such as the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, including large areas in political economy. Public policy is another area where progress using happiness data is taking place. Given the central role of utility notions in economic theory, we argue that the use of happiness data in empirical research should be given serious consideration.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document