The English Law of Sanctuary

1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 8-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker

Although the protection of churches and holy places was embodied froman early date in Canon law, the law of sanctuary as it applied in England was necessarily part of the secular common law. The Church never had the physical power to resist the secular authorities in the administration of justice, and although those who violated sanctuary were liable to excommunication the Church could not in cases of conflict prevent the removal from sanctuary of someone to whom the privilege was not allowed by the law of the land. The control of the common law judges was, indeed, tighter than in the case of benefit of clergy. The question whether an accused person was or was not a clerk in Holy Orders was ultimately a question for the ordinary, however much pressure might be put upon him by the judges; but the question of sanctuary or no sanctuary was always a question for the royal courts to decide, upon the application of a person who claimed to have been wrongly arrested in a privileged place. The present summary is confined to the position under English law.

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kearns

This essay argues that the 1675 conviction of John Taylor by the Court of King's Bench for slandering God reveals Chief Justice Matthew Hale implementing a model of conjoint law-making between courts, Parliament, and crown that gave pre-eminent power to the common lawyers, and none to the Church of England. In doing so, it counters the prevailing literature on Restoration English law, which has treated the law as hierarchical, with the common lawyers subordinate to the sovereign. Rather than following statute or ecclesiastical law, which emphasised the spiritual nature of crimes like Taylor's, Hale located Taylor's offence in the exclusively temporal common law jurisdiction of defamation, which existed largely outside of monarchical purview. Hale's judgment reflected his rhetoric of judicial office outside the courtroom, where he argued the judiciary worked alongside King and Parliament in making law, but were not subservient to these institutions, for common lawyers relied on sources of law beyond sovereign-made statute. The language of sovereignty as hierarchical was thus a factional attack on an independent common law, an attempt to subordinate the common lawyers to the crown that was resisted by the lawyers like Hale in his rhetoric and exercise of office, and should not ground accounts of the Restoration regime.


2019 ◽  
pp. 240-246
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McSweeney

The culture of textual production that these justices tried to create did not survive the thirteenth century. In the second half of the century, English legal literature became more insular in its outlook. But Bracton and the plea roll collections represent an important moment in the history of the common law, when people were reflecting on what law is and how it should be practiced. Through Bracton we can catch a glimpse of people who were thinking about what it meant to administer the law of the king’s courts, in a time before the common law was the common law. In these texts, we see the justices of the royal courts turning to Roman and canon law for inspiration.


Author(s):  
Daniel Visser

Unjustified enrichment confronted both civil and common lawyers with thinking which was often completely outside the paradigm to which they had become accustomed. The recognition of unjustified enrichment as a cause of action in its own right in English law created a new arena of uncertainty between the systems. This article argues that comparative lawyers can make an important contribution to the future of the fractured and fractious world of unjustified enrichment. It may help to uncover the enormous wealth of learning of which both the common law and the civil law are the repositories, and so bring the same level of understanding to the law of unjustified enrichment which has, over the years, been achieved between the systems in regard to contract and tort.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Laura-Dumitrana Rath Boșca ◽  
Bogdan Bodea

Common Law represents the second biggest contemporary judicial system. Immanent to a historical process which led to the creation of a community, common law represents a form of social solidarity. It is not the result of any social consent to obey a law as much as it is the participation of the society, through its exceptions, to the process of elaborating the law by which it functions. So, society itself is through a sort of syncretism the common law.One the elementary concepts of common law is the doctrine of precedent which functions in parallel with organic laws in order to enhance both the results of judicial cases and the efficiency of the cases. In the English law, the testament is a representation of the wishes of a defunct person and the declaration of that persons wishes in relation to the belongings he wished to pass on after his death.


Author(s):  
Thomas Izbicki

During the Middle Ages, law loomed large in efforts to manage life situations, beginning with the adaptation of late imperial law to the successor or barbarian kingdoms of the West. Alongside local law and custom, the learned law was increasingly used to answer questions and settle disputes about family issues such as marriages and dowry, property and inheritance, contracts, and crime. Study of the law, not only as taught at the universities but as used to advise judges who lacked formal training, illuminates the status of women and children under patriarchy. Although Roman law was geared more to private than public law, political issues were addressed. Moreover, Romanistic procedure had a wide influence across Europe. Even where Roman law was not received, it had its influence via canon law and specialized courts. This is evident in England, where the common law governed real property, but canon law introduced the possibility of testamentary disposition of certain possessions. Similarly, the admiralty courts dealt with issues such as navigation and salvage on the basis of civil law. Roman law began in the Republic, beginning with the Twelve Tables of the Law (450 bce), resulting from struggles between patricians and plebeians. Under the Republic certain men knew the laws; but there were no legal careers. The most important judicial document was the praetor’s edict about procedure, the foundation of later jurisprudence. Both the popular assemblies and the Senate legislated for both the private and the public spheres, and the jurisconsults of the imperial period commented on their enactments. The Roman Empire produced jurisconsults able to give authoritative advice, and some wrote on the laws. Emperors legislated, and collections of their laws were compiled. The most important, the Theodosian Code (438–439 ce), influenced the Latin churches and the codes of the Western barbarian kingdoms. In the East, the study of law continued. Eventually Justinian I ordered systematization of centuries of jurisprudence. The Institutes served as a textbook. The works of the jurisconsults were divided topically in the Digest (Pandects). Imperial decrees were collected in Justinian’s Code with supplements in the Novellae. This Corpus iuris civilis (529–534 ce) was diffused throughout Justinian’s empire but had little influence in the West for centuries. The largest part of Justinian’s corpus is concerned with private, rather than public, law. Later jurists retained that focus in most of their writings. Revived study of Roman law in the West is tied traditionally to recovery of the Digest (c. 1070 ce). The teaching of law took root at the University of Bologna. The Glossators expounded texts and annotated (glossed) them. The Bolognese curriculum divided the Digest into Old Digest, Infortiatum, and New Digest. The first nine books of the Code were treated together, while the Institutes, last three books of the Code and Authenticum, a version of the Novellae, with two books on feudal law, made up the Volume. The direction of study changed in the 14th century. The Commentators (Post-Glossators) created detailed expositions of the entire corpus. The Commentators predominated even after humanists criticized their Latin and their interpretative methods. Works on procedure or specific topics, records of disputations, and opinions (consilia) on cases were written. All of these genres originated in the manuscript milieu, but many texts were printed beginning in the 15th century. Lawyers trained at the universities taught, provided advice, served as judges, and worked as bureaucrats. In much of Italy, the learned law was fused with elements of feudal law in the ius commune (common law). Most consilia engaged both the common law and the ius proprium of localities to be relevant in specific contexts. The Roman law was received through much of Europe in the late medieval and Early Modern periods, but its influence in England was mostly indirect.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. McSweeney

Priests of the Law tells the story of the first people in the history of the common law to think of themselves as legal professionals: the group of justices who wrote the celebrated treatise known as Bracton. It offers a new interpretation of Bracton and its authors. Bracton was not so much an attempt to explain or reform the early common law as it was an attempt to establish the status and authority of the king’s justices. The justices who wrote it were some of the first people to work full-time in England’s royal courts, at a time when they had no obvious model for the legal professional. They found one in an unexpected place: the Roman-law tradition that was sweeping across Europe in the thirteenth century. They modeled themselves on the jurists of Roman law who were teaching in Italy and France. In Bracton and other texts they produced, the justices of the royal courts worked hard to establish that the nascent common-law tradition was just one constituent part of the Roman-law tradition. Through their writing, this small group of people, working in the courts of an island realm, imagined themselves to be part of a broader European legal culture. They made the case that they were not merely servants of the king. They were priests of the law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-73
Author(s):  
Florian Lempa

The article presents the most important values criminally protected in the Catholic Churchby CIC/1983 and CCEO/1990. They are: the religion, the unity, the church authorities and thefreedom of the Church. About their prime position in the hierarchy of goods legally protected bythe provisions of penal canon law testifies that the crimes against them are put in the first and inthe second title of CIC/1983, also the threat of severe penal sanctions. These sanctions result fromthe exceptional social harmfulness of the crimes. In the degree of ailment they are analogical inthe canon law of the Latin rite and in the common law of Eastern Catholic Churches.


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-560
Author(s):  
Michael Chesterman

To allow Court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the orders of the Court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn. Daily, thousands of Canadians resort to our Courts for relief against the wrongful acts of others. If the remedies that Courts grant to correct those wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left but for each person to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction of our society. [O'Leary J, in Canada Metal Co. Ltd v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1975) 48 DLR 3d 641, 669 (High Court of Ontario)]


Legal Studies ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B.L. Phang

Although the law relating to common mistake has engendered a plethora of conundrums, many problem areas have in fact been well-traversed in the literature. The present article does not seek to re-cover such welltrodden ground, but attempts, instead, to suggest a different and more systematic approach that would effect a merger of the common law and equitable branches of common mistake into one coherent, doctrine.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-883 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adeline Chong

There is a dearth of authority and in-depth discussion concerning what the choice of law rules are for claims involving the assertion that property is held on a resulting or constructive trust. It is usually thought that the choice of law rules set out by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (hereafter the ‘Hague Trusts Convention’), as enacted into English law by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, apply. However, it is arguable that this is not so for some types of resulting and constructive trusts, namely those governed by a foreign law; or, at the very least, that some doubt exists as to whether the Hague choice of lawrules apply to all resulting and constructive trusts. It is therefore important that the common law choice of law rules for such trusts is clearly elucidated. Unfortunately, this is an area of the law that is distinctly undeveloped. The aim of this article is to consider what are or should be the common law choice of law rules for resulting and constructive trusts.


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