Defining the Medical Sphere

1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margo J. Trappenburg

Part of the debate on cost containment in healthcare systems may be characterized as applied political philosophy One might say that the current debate between competing theories of justice that started with Rawls' A Theory of Justice in 1971 has acquired a small sister debate in healthcare philosophy Major participants in the debate on social justice have become an important source of inspiration for bioethicists interested in a just distribution of healthcare resources. Thus Rawls' A Theory of Justice has been remodeled for healthcare philosophy by Norman Daniels. Nozick's libertarian manifesto Anarchy, State, and Utopia has been used for bioethical purposes by H.T. Engelhardt. The books of Daniel Callahan evidently belong to a family of communitarian theories, though Callahan cannot be said to follow one or another communitarian thinker (be it Christopher Lasch, Alisdair Maclntyre, or Amitai Etzioni) in particular. In the next two sections of this article I will give a very brief sketch of the debate on social justice in political philosophy and then discuss the sister debate on social justice in healthcare.

Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.


Author(s):  
David Estlund

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.


Dialogue ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. E. Cooper

The author struggles to come to grips here with the philosophical complexities and personal tragedies that disorient us when we reflect on the great and pervasive inequalities in human societies. His egalitarianism is radical in denying the justice of the inequalities that liberals like Rawls would countenance, and in denying that justice and capitalism are compatible. Nielsen displays a masterly knowledge of the literature of social justice, especially that which bears on Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, the celebrated philosophical flagships of liberalism and conservatism respectively; this feature of the book should be useful for advanced students of social and political philosophy who need to acquire a sense for the texture of contemporary argument in the field. The thicket of sturdy arguments in Equality and Liberty should convince Rawlsians to accept many tenets of Nielsen's radical egalitarianism, or else to re-examine their thinking about social justice. And the extended critique of Anarchy, State and Utopia should persuade Nozickians of the need for “a reasonably sophisticated political sociology and a sound critical theory of society” if one is to philosophize adequately about social justice (5). Many will find this critique the most valuable part of the book.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
Ali Mehdi

Given the backlash against the politics and practice of social justice, this chapter provides a justification for an engagement with the proactive debate in political philosophy on ‘equalisandum’—what is to be equalized across individuals in a just society—since the publication of John Rawls’ path-breaking work, A Theory of Justice, in 1971. Since injustice faced by children is the biggest blot on the promise of equality of opportunity, it makes a case for anchoring the discussion of equalisandum in the context of child survival, in India. Millions of children continue to lack the opportunity to even survive within the first five years of birth, and India has recorded not only the highest number of child deaths for decades, but also some of the worst forms of injustice. The chapter ends with a brief discussion on why Amartya Sen’s capability metric is preferable vis-à-vis its Rawlsian and resourcist counterparts, both conceptually and contextually.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-260
Author(s):  
DARRYL GUNSON

Abstract:Appeals to social justice that argue medicine and healthcare should have certain priorities and not others are common. It is an obvious question to ask: What does social justice demand of the new genetic technologies? However, it is important to note that there are many theories and sub-theories of justice. There are utilitarian theories, libertarian theories, and egalitarian theories. There are so-called luck egalitarians, equality-as-fairness thinkers, and capability theorists, with each having his or her own distinctive approach to the distribution of medical goods and technologies, and to healthcare priorities. This article argues that the discussion surrounding this question is potentially hampered by an implicit assumption that if one theory of justice is applicable in one context, then it must also be applicable in others. Instead, it is proposed that one adopt the stance, influenced by Michael Waltzer, that different theories with their opposing principles may be applicable to different questions regarding justice and genetics. The specific view advanced is that to answer questions about what justice requires regarding the therapeutic and enhancement use of genetic techniques, a method of reflective equilibrium can show how intuitions, in context, may support different theories of justice. When particular pre-theoretic ethical judgments are balanced against the theories that might explain or justify them, and are in accord with what seems emotionally acceptable, then it can be seen how different general theories may be applicable in the different contexts in which questions of justice and genetics arise.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Dr. Partha Protim Borthakur

Purpose: The present paper tries to cross-examine Sen’s notion of justice and to find a midway between the ideal and non-ideal theorizing of justice. Besides, searching for reconciliation between Rawls and Sen, the present paper also attempts to go beyond Sen, while critically engaging with his idea of justice. Methodology: This study has applied qualitative method; however, both the historical and analytical methods are employed for reaching out the conclusive findings of the study. As the sources of this paper are basically secondary, all necessary and relevant materials are collected from a range of related books, articles, journals, newspapers, and reports of various seminars and conferences that fall within the domain of the study area. Main Findings: While analyzing Sen’s critique of Rawlsian theory, the study finds that the Rawlsian theory cannot be discarded only as a theory that formulates ideal justice and is not redundant. The study while revisiting Sen’s notion finds that there is also a possibility of reconciliation between ideal and non-ideal theorizing of justice. Application: This study will be useful in understanding the debate between ideal versus non-ideal theories of justice that has lately been haunting the political philosophy. Besides, it will also be useful in searching for reconciliation between Rawls’ and Sen’s paradigms of justice and thereby offering a conception of justice that is reasonable and true in assessing issues of justice in the present scenario. Novelty/ Originality: Revisiting Sen’s notion of justice and analyzing such dimensions of politics, the study will benefit the reader to evaluate the debate between ideal versus non-ideal theorizing of justice. Moreover, by searching for a possibility between Rawls and Sen, the study will contribute towards developing an alternative approach and understanding of justice.


Utopophobia ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 255-270
Author(s):  
David Estlund

This chapter considers several ways in which idealistic theories of justice could have value for practice. There are two main points in the chapter. First, it is important not to foreclose the possibility of unbelievable moral progress. Second, even if the only value of a theory of justice were as a guide to social choice, in which case all we ultimately need from a theory of justice is comparative rankings of realistic possibilities, it does not follow that a practically adequate theory of justice could be developed without the idea of full social justice. Indeed, it could not even be developed without a theoretical incorporation of unrealistic, idealistic standards of justice.


2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Moriarty

Abstract:The central problems of political philosophy (e.g., legitimate authority, distributive justice) mirror the central problems of business ethics. The question naturally arises: should political theories be applied to problems in business ethics? If a version of egalitarianism is the correct theory of justice for states, for example, does it follow that it is the correct theory of justice for businesses? If states should be democratically governed by their citizens, should businesses be democratically managed by their employees? Most theorists who have considered these questions, including John Rawls in Political Liberalism, and Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis in a 1999 article, have said “no.” They claim that states and businesses are different kinds of entities, and hence require different theories of justice. I challenge this claim. While businesses differ from states, the difference is one of degree, not one of kind. Business ethics has much to learn from political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Gerald Gaus

This book lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. It shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. The book argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of justice—essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years—needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, the book points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society—with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives—have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. The book defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, this book rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times.


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