scholarly journals Genetics and Justice: Must One Theory Fit All Contexts?

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-260
Author(s):  
DARRYL GUNSON
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Ethical Judgments ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Genetic Technologies ◽  
Genetic Techniques ◽  
Luck Egalitarians

Abstract:Appeals to social justice that argue medicine and healthcare should have certain priorities and not others are common. It is an obvious question to ask: What does social justice demand of the new genetic technologies? However, it is important to note that there are many theories and sub-theories of justice. There are utilitarian theories, libertarian theories, and egalitarian theories. There are so-called luck egalitarians, equality-as-fairness thinkers, and capability theorists, with each having his or her own distinctive approach to the distribution of medical goods and technologies, and to healthcare priorities. This article argues that the discussion surrounding this question is potentially hampered by an implicit assumption that if one theory of justice is applicable in one context, then it must also be applicable in others. Instead, it is proposed that one adopt the stance, influenced by Michael Waltzer, that different theories with their opposing principles may be applicable to different questions regarding justice and genetics. The specific view advanced is that to answer questions about what justice requires regarding the therapeutic and enhancement use of genetic techniques, a method of reflective equilibrium can show how intuitions, in context, may support different theories of justice. When particular pre-theoretic ethical judgments are balanced against the theories that might explain or justify them, and are in accord with what seems emotionally acceptable, then it can be seen how different general theories may be applicable in the different contexts in which questions of justice and genetics arise.

Justice and the Difference Principle

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The People ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
The Difference

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).

Defining the Medical Sphere

1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margo J. Trappenburg
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Healthcare Systems ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Healthcare Resources ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Amitai Etzioni ◽  
Norman Daniels ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Christopher Lasch

Part of the debate on cost containment in healthcare systems may be characterized as applied political philosophy One might say that the current debate between competing theories of justice that started with Rawls' A Theory of Justice in 1971 has acquired a small sister debate in healthcare philosophy Major participants in the debate on social justice have become an important source of inspiration for bioethicists interested in a just distribution of healthcare resources. Thus Rawls' A Theory of Justice has been remodeled for healthcare philosophy by Norman Daniels. Nozick's libertarian manifesto Anarchy, State, and Utopia has been used for bioethical purposes by H.T. Engelhardt. The books of Daniel Callahan evidently belong to a family of communitarian theories, though Callahan cannot be said to follow one or another communitarian thinker (be it Christopher Lasch, Alisdair Maclntyre, or Amitai Etzioni) in particular. In the next two sections of this article I will give a very brief sketch of the debate on social justice in political philosophy and then discuss the sister debate on social justice in healthcare.

Progress, Perfection, and Practice

Utopophobia ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 255-270
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Adequate Theory ◽  
Theories Of Justice

This chapter considers several ways in which idealistic theories of justice could have value for practice. There are two main points in the chapter. First, it is important not to foreclose the possibility of unbelievable moral progress. Second, even if the only value of a theory of justice were as a guide to social choice, in which case all we ultimately need from a theory of justice is comparative rankings of realistic possibilities, it does not follow that a practically adequate theory of justice could be developed without the idea of full social justice. Indeed, it could not even be developed without a theoretical incorporation of unrealistic, idealistic standards of justice.

Global Justice in Lutheran Political Theology

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-58
Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Political Theology ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Influential Theory

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.

Utopophobia

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sound Theory ◽  
Theory Versus ◽  
History Of ◽  
Practical Guidance

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.

Narratives in teaching and research for justice and human rights

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Osler ◽  
Juanjuan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Life History ◽  
Multiple Identities ◽  
Common Humanity ◽  
Pedagogical Tools ◽  
Overlapping Communities ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Collective Narratives ◽  
Living Together

Throughout history individual and collective narratives have been used in struggles for justice. We draw on Sen’s theory of justice to examine the potential of narratives in teaching and researching for social justice. Human rights are presented as powerful ethical claims that can be critically examined by learners to consider their rights and responsibilities to others, at scales from the local to the global. One life history is used as an illustrative example to examine the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and its possible meanings for learners in China and globally. This article discusses the strengths and limitations of narratives as research and pedagogical tools in understanding justice, human rights and inequalities; in stimulating solidarity and our common humanity; and in enabling learners to explore their multiple identities. We conclude by making the case for human rights as principles for learning and living together in overlapping communities of fate.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

scholarly journals The contstructivistic defence of the objectivity of moral standards and natural law that does not require the debate on moral realism

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 653-663
Author(s):  
Slavenko Sljukic
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Theories Of Justice

The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.

“I Don't Get No Respect

Dialogue ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. E. Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Critical Theory ◽  
Political Sociology ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Advanced Students ◽  
To Come

The author struggles to come to grips here with the philosophical complexities and personal tragedies that disorient us when we reflect on the great and pervasive inequalities in human societies. His egalitarianism is radical in denying the justice of the inequalities that liberals like Rawls would countenance, and in denying that justice and capitalism are compatible. Nielsen displays a masterly knowledge of the literature of social justice, especially that which bears on Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, the celebrated philosophical flagships of liberalism and conservatism respectively; this feature of the book should be useful for advanced students of social and political philosophy who need to acquire a sense for the texture of contemporary argument in the field. The thicket of sturdy arguments in Equality and Liberty should convince Rawlsians to accept many tenets of Nielsen's radical egalitarianism, or else to re-examine their thinking about social justice. And the extended critique of Anarchy, State and Utopia should persuade Nozickians of the need for “a reasonably sophisticated political sociology and a sound critical theory of society” if one is to philosophize adequately about social justice (5). Many will find this critique the most valuable part of the book.

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