All That Remains: Identifying the Victims of the Srebrenica Massacre

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAURIE VOLLEN

Late in the afternoon of July 11, 1995, the Bosnian Serb army, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, seized the northeastern Bosnia town of Srebrenica. Declared a “safe area” by the United Nations two years earlier, the predominately Muslim community had swollen from a prewar population of 9,000 to over 40,000, many of whom had been “cleansed” from elsewhere in Bosnia. As Mladic's troops swarmed over the town, the women, children, elderly, and many of the men took refuge two kilometers away in the United Nations's Srebrenica headquarters, staffed by a Dutch battalion, in the village of Potocari. Meanwhile, the remaining Srebrenica men and boys—some 10,000 to 15,000—fled through the woods on foot, trying to reach Muslim-controlled territory, nearly 40 miles away.

Wajah Hukum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Dony Yusra Pebrianto ◽  
Budi Ardianto ◽  
Taufan Dyusanda Putra

Internationally The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) emphasizes respect for the local wisdom of indigenous legal communities. The selection of village heads is one of the regulatory concepts stipulated in Law No. 6 of 2014 on Villages. The selection of village heads in the concept of this law is conducted simultaneously stipulated by local regulations and the procedures are specifically regulated through government regulations as stipulated in Article 31 of Law No. 6 of 2014 on Villages. But it turns out that in practice, especially in indigenous peoples, the deability of the village head election often clashes with the arrangement of the village head election. So in this case the formulation of the problem in this writing is how the arrangement of the rights of indigenous peoples in The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the value and concept of local wisdom that applies in the selection of village heads in 5 (Five) Villages Semerap Kedepatian. The method used in this writing uses empirical juridical methods. And in this case it is concluded that UNDRIP regulates matters relating to individual rights as well as very specific collective rights sourced from indigenous peoples. In this case the State is obliged to protect or fulfill the rights of indigenous peoples including cultural heritage and their cultural manifestations including human resources and genetics. And in the indigenous people of kedepatian semerap Kerinci regency there is a customary provision where the prospective head of the village must get customary recommendations and be appointed from Depati and Nenek Mamak. The provision is considered contrary to the local Paraturan in relation to the election of the village head. So given the provisions of UNDRIP and the 1945 Constitution, the State is obliged to protect and maintain these customs given the positive impact that arises from it. So in this case the customary provisions should be regulated in the Regulation including also about the recognition of indigenous peoples. In addition, the community needs to open a paradigm on human rights in the selection of village heads in addition to the paradigm of the enforcement of customary law there needs to be flexibility from the State as long as it is not contrary to national law.


1996 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 353-372 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThis paper considers ethnic conflict within Cyprus involving Greeks, Turks and the United Nations. The focus for discussion is the village of Pyla on the 'Green Line' and the key question to be answered is: to whom does the border belong? The answer is that everyone in the village including the UN is involved in maintaining the boundary and thereby preventing ethnic violence breaking out. Procedures of everyday peace-making are carefully observed which prevent outsiders from stirring up trouble. However, this mutual responsibility is fraught with continuing tension between the three parties (Greek, Turkish and UN) created by the wider context of ethnic conflict at national and international levels. The best which the local people can hope for in current political conditions is the continuation of an uneasy balance between the three parties and a precarious containment of the endemic ethnic tension.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Maley

On 14 December 1995, an agreement as the Elysée Treaty (earlier initialled in Dayton after weeks of difficult negotiation) was signed in Paris by the Heads of State of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One of the witnesses at the ceremony was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and, in a real sense, it marked the nadir of his term of office. In June 1992, amidst the euphoria of U.S. President George Bush's articulation of hopes for a new world order, Boutros-Ghali had presented a report to U.N. members entitled An Agenda for Peace which painted an ambitious picture of the opportunities for constructive involvement of the U.N. in conflict resolution. Yet ironically, this was almost the moment at which the intensification of intergroup conflict precipitated Bosnia-Hercegovina's slide into social and political disarray. The ultimate humiliation for the U.N. came in July 1995 when the massacre of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces in the U.N.-declared “safe area” of Srebrenica triggered the chain of events which saw responsibility for Bosnia-Hercegovina decisively removed from the U.N.'s grasp, and assumed by the United States and its NATO allies. The U.N. may recover from the shame of its Balkan entanglement, but the scars are likely to prove permanent.


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