scholarly journals Neuroethics for Fantasyland or for the Clinic? The Limitations of Speculative Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 630-641
Author(s):  
SVEN OVE HANSSON

AbstractWhat purpose can be served by empirically unsubstantiated speculation in ethics? In answering that question, we need to distinguish between the major branches of ethics. In foundational moral philosophy, the use of speculative examples is warranted to the extent that ethical principles and theories are assumed to be applicable even under the extreme circumstances referred to in these examples. Such an assumption is in need of justification, and it cannot just be taken for granted. In applied ethics, the use of unrealistic scenarios is more difficult to justify. It can be positively harmful if it diverts our attention from more urgent issues. Neuroethics is one of the areas of applied ethics where speculative scenarios have taken up much of the attention that could instead have been devoted to problems that are relevant for the treatment and care of patients. Speculative ethics has often been defended with mere possibility arguments that may at first hand seem difficult to refute. It is shown with examples how such claims can be defeated with a combination of science and argumentation analysis.

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-564
Author(s):  
Phillip Richter

The Applied Ethics debate has not yet sufficiently clarified what application of ethics exactly is. The issue of application is considered to be especially problematic in Kantian ethics or in discourse ethics. This article describes the concept of applying ethics in Kant. In discussing the duty of helping others and the theory of its application in Metaphysics of Morals it is shown that a strict separation of justification and application in ethical theory results in the paradox of imperfect duty. The paradox says that the duty to help others would be fulfilled without ever being fulfilled in action. To overcome the paradox it is necessary to form submaximes of helping, which are not arbitrarily but instructed by a theory of casuistry. This casuistry, if it is considered as a doctrine of application in Kantian ethics, can overcome the paradox of imperfect duty. However, the casuistry can overcome this paradox only if it is understood as a philosophy of prudence, which can be found in Aristotle or Descartes.


Author(s):  
Terence Cuneo

This authoritative dictionary contains clear, concise definitions of key terms from ethical theory and touches upon a variety of relevant subfields including metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. A Dictionary of Ethics is a valuable reference resource for academics, practitioners, and students of moral philosophy, applied ethics, and public policy. It will also be of interest to readers looking to familiarize themselves with ethical terms and the concepts they express.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 244-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Kontos

Affectively uncomfortable concern, anxiety, indecisionand disputation over ‘right’ action are among the expressions of moral tension associated with ethical dilemmas. Moral tension is generated and experienced by people. While ethical principles, rules and situations must be worked through in any dilemma, each occurs against a backdrop of people who enact them and stand much to gain or lose depending on how they are applied and resolved. This paper attempts to develop a taxonomy of moral tension based on its intrapersonal and interpersonal sources and expressions. The proposed ‘ethics of incongruity’ (EoI) outlines ways in which values, actions and needs can find themselves mismatched in morally relevant ways between patients and their clinicians, their own psychologies and their societies. Patient–clinician incongruities may manifest as discord, value misalignment and deception. Patient–patient (ie, intrapersonal) incongruities may manifest as incapacity, akrasia and self-deception. Patient–society incongruities may manifest as disenfranchisement, disaffiliation and disregard. Brief explanations of the incongruities in this scheme are provided, as are suggestions on working within them. Using concepts from moral philosophy when applicable, these suggestions may either ease direct resolution of problems arising from the incongruities, or make sense of the moral tension that arises from the human context of the ethical dilemma at hand. This presentation of content and resolution methods for the EOI is no doubt incomplete. Hopefully, refinement of this preliminary proposal will follow, particularly from clinicians, as the ones who, along with their patients, experience medical ethics in directly tension-inducing ways.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 2867-2891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dylan Cawthorne ◽  
Aimee Robbins-van Wynsberghe

Abstract The use of drones in public healthcare is suggested as a means to improve efficiency under constrained resources and personnel. This paper begins by framing drones in healthcare as a social experiment where ethical guidelines are needed to protect those impacted while fully realizing the benefits the technology offers. Then we propose an ethical framework to facilitate the design, development, implementation, and assessment of drones used in public healthcare. Given the healthcare context, we structure the framework according to the four bioethics principles: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice, plus a fifth principle from artificial intelligence ethics: explicability. These principles are abstract which makes operationalization a challenge; therefore, we suggest an approach of translation according to a values hierarchy whereby the top-level ethical principles are translated into relevant human values within the domain. The resulting framework is an applied ethics tool that facilitates awareness of relevant ethical issues during the design, development, implementation, and assessment of drones in public healthcare.


Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-290
Author(s):  
Jerome E. Bickenbach

For several years philosophy departments across this continent have offered undergraduate philosophy courses designed to acquaint students with philosophical techniques and fundamental ethical theories in the context of concrete moral problems. These “applied ethics” courses go by various names: “Contemporary Moral Issues”, “Practical Ethics”, “Social Ethics”, “Issues in Applied Ethics”, “Current Moral and Legal Problems”, “Moral Philosophy and Medicine”, “Biomedical Ethics”, and so on. I have taught several versions of applied ethics courses many times and have always enjoyed them. Typically they are popular courses, drawing students from many disciplines and backgrounds, most of whom have never taken philosophy before. The range of possible “applied ethics” topics available is limited only by the instructor's imagination, although there is a fascination for the thanatological—hence the pride of place usually given to discussions of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, world starvation, war, and capital punishment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Russell Fulmer

Normative ethics is the philosophical basis for the American Psychological Association’s (2010) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, the applied ethics by which the psychology profession is governed. Concerned with the theories that help to determine right and wrong, normative ethics is an indispensable yet ostensibly inaccessible realm of study for clinical psychologists. This article presents a comprehensible exercise that professors and supervisors versed in normative ethics can administer to students and clinicians in training to help them clarify and articulate their beliefs. Results are presented that support the efficacy of the exercise in terms of increased normative awareness, heightened self-knowledge, and broadened worldviews. Implications for the utility of the exercise in the clinical psychology and health fields at large are also discussed.


Author(s):  
David J. Franz

AbstractThis paper argues that applied ethics can itself be morally problematic. As illustrated by the case of Peter Singer’s criticism of social practice, morally loaded communication by applied ethicists can lead to protests, backlashes, and aggression. By reviewing the psychological literature on self-image, collective identity, and motivated reasoning three categories of morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism by applied ethicists are identified: serious psychological discomfort, moral backfiring, and hostile conflict. The most worrisome is moral backfiring: psychological research suggests that ethical criticism of people’s central moral convictions can reinforce exactly those attitudes. Therefore, applied ethicists unintentionally can contribute to a consolidation of precisely those social circumstances that they condemn to be unethical. Furthermore, I argue that the normative concerns raised in this paper are not dependent on the commitment to one specific paradigm in moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Rawlsian contractarianism all provide sound reasons to take morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism seriously. Only the case of deontological ethics is less clear-cut. Finally, I point out that the issues raised in this paper provide an excellent opportunity for further interdisciplinary collaboration between applied ethics and social sciences. I also propose strategies for communicating ethics effectively.


2018 ◽  
pp. 139-168
Author(s):  
Barry Hoffmaster ◽  
Cliff Hooker

The new conception of rationality as non-formal reason is completed by an explanation of how design in engineering can be brought to the design of practical problems in ethics, from which the notion of ethics as design for flourishing is developed. The conventional notions of balancing and specification in applied ethics are rejected and replaced by two methods that use non-formal reason: fully engaged moral compromise and wide reflective equilibrium. A case depicts a disagreement between a nurse and a doctor in an intensive care unit that is resolved by a compromise that emanates from a process of deliberation among the staff. Reflective equilibrium was widely adopted into moral philosophy, and it quickly expanded into wide reflective equilibrium. Here it is further enhanced by adding the three features of liberation, extension, and enrichment. The upshot of these developments is a completed initial account of non-formal rationality with four resources, two specific methods, and a shift from principles to values.


Author(s):  
Thierry Magnin

SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY have their own distinct languages and modes of representing reality.  These must be clearly distinguished in order to avoid na¨ıve concordism. However, it is interesting to explore how the methods and logic used in one field can be applicable to the other, taking into account the specific constraints of each. The aim of this paper is to show how the incompleteness of both the scientist and the theologian in their own field is a new way to consider the dialog between science and theology today. We will see that Christian dogmas- Trinity and Incarnation, as well as the biblical notion of Covenant-can,  be fruitfully explored through the logic of the “included middle” as applied to quantum physics. This application of methods from one field to another emphasizes that deep, common human attitudes enable both physicists and believers to explore the nature of reality without any confusion between the fields of science and theology. Common attitudes derive from the study of the logic of the included middle and its role in science and theology. Such a field of pursuit is called “moral philosophy” because it is related to critical analysis of the ethical principles involved in comparative epistemologies in science and theology. Taking into account the different domains of science, metaphysics, and theology, we will show how moral philosophy can be a new foundation for the dialog between scientists and people of faith. Such a dialog can perhaps be helpful in promoting quality in education and in supporting peace in the modern world


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 35-54
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Jokic

In this article the author considers a recent proposal to understand ?military ethics? as a species of the genus ?professional ethics?. This contention is rejected on the grounds that ?professional ethics? are not a matter of ethics but policy, and it is argued that ?military ethics? properly belongs to applied ethics, as a branch of moral philosophy instead. The article proceeds by offering an account of the notion of ?reflexivity in normativity? in order to argue against the practice of using ?just war? theory as a moral doctrine. A distinct feature of the current production in military ethics by Western scholars and publicists is their reliance on ?just war? theory. Two considerations are offered aimed at ending this practice. First, the author uses Pierre Bourdieu?s distinction between ?activism in scholarship? and ?activism with scholarship? to demonstrate that the post- Cold War uses of the ?just war? theory could amount only to pseudo-scholarship. Second, and most disturbing, the author shows how this practice has two unsettling consequences: regarding the ad bellum (moral) justice, it leads to the decriminalization of aggression, the supreme crime in international law; and regarding the in bello (moral) justice to the decriminalization of actual war crimes committed by the ?good guys?.


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