scholarly journals Regional Wholesale Price Relationships in the Presence of Counter-Seasonal Imports

2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kellie Curry Raper ◽  
Suzanne Thornsbury ◽  
Cristobal Aguilar

Counter-seasonal imports of fresh produce facilitate year-round availability in the U.S. and may impact the seasonal structure of market price relationships. Vector autoregression analysis is used to determine the nature and extent of spatial price relationships among four geographically distinct regions in the U.S. fresh peach wholesale market. We evaluate differences in regional spatial price relationships and find statistical evidence that price relationships among regions are different in periods dominated by regional domestic supplies imports compared with periods when counter-seasonal imports dominate the market.

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco A. Palma ◽  
Luis A. Ribera ◽  
David Bessler ◽  
Mechel Paggi ◽  
Ronald D. Knutson

This study investigates the potential impacts of food safety outbreaks on domestic shipments, imports, and prices of the produce industry. Three case studies were analyzed to assess these potential impacts: the cantaloupe outbreak of March–April 2008, the spinach outbreak of September 2006, and the tomato outbreak of June–July 2008. Data-determined historical decompositions were conducted to provide a weekly picture of domestic shipment, import, and price fluctuation transmissions. The empirical analysis based on a vector autoregression (VAR) model showed differences in the results depending on the source of the outbreak (domestic vs. imported).


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5648-5664 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Soo-Haeng Cho

We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-249
Author(s):  
Lloyd Baiyegunhi ◽  
Stanley Sharaunga ◽  
Sphelele Dlangisa ◽  
Nonkhululeko Ndaba

In a market-driven economy, price indicators guide and regulate production, consumption and marketing decisions over time, form and place. Identifying the causes of price differentials across markets is important for understanding markets. This study analyzes the market price integration of tomato in Durban and Johannesburg fresh produce markets in South Africa, using secondary monthly time series of wholesale price data for the period 2008–2012. Cointegration was tested using the Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test, while the direction of causality between Johannesburg and Durban prices was tested using the error correction model (ECM). The results showed that the two markets were integrated. Furthermore, the results also revealed that following a shock to the market that causes disequilibrium, economic agents take about a month to adjust back to equilibrium; the response to the shock is faster in the Durban market than in the Johannesburg market. The high degree of market integration suggests that the South African fresh produce market is quite competitive and provides little justification for government intervention designed to improve competitiveness or to enhance market efficiency. Policy implications for an improved and effective tomato marketing program were also discussed.


1996 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bernard ◽  
Lois Schertz Willett

AbstractThis study presents a testing methodology to analyze potential price asymmetries among the farm, wholesale, and retail levels of the U.S. broiler industry. Lag length, direction of causality, and asymmetric relationships are empirically determined. Results suggest that concentration and power of the integrators in the industry have allowed the wholesale price to become the center, causal price in the market. Asymmetric price transmissions, however, are limited. While downward movements in the wholesale price are passed on more fully to growers than increases in the wholesale price, only consumers in the North Central region of the U.S. share a larger portion of wholesalers’ price increases than price decreases.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiangyu Hou ◽  
Rene Haijema ◽  
Dacheng Liu

In the fresh produce wholesale market, the market price is determined by the total demand and supply. The price is stochastic, and either wholesaler or retailer has few influence on it. In the wholesaler’s inventory decision, the price’s uncertainty plays an important role as well as the uncertainty from the demand side: the wholesaler makes his decision based on the retailer’s ordering, which is influenced by the stochastic market price and the distribution of the consumer’s demand. In addition, when at the wholesale stage, the products show a similar quality of similar appearance. With more efforts being input, the wholesaler could detect and record more additional information than that reflected from the appearance. Based on this, he can classify the quality into different levels. No experience shows how the wholesaler could use the underlying quality information and how much this information could improve his profit. To describe and explore this problem, a bilevel dynamic programming approach is employed. We evaluate different strategies of using the underlying information, show the features of the optimal policy, develop heuristics, and discuss the influence of factors such as quality and market price. We also develop the managerial principles for the practical use.


1970 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-169
Author(s):  
Eliahu Hirschberg

Gold value clauses are rarely used in England. In the United States, before the Joint Resolution of both Houses of Congress of January 5, 1933, which abrogated gold clauses in the U.S. retrospectively and prospectively, declaring them to be against public policy, gold coin clauses were a common occurrence. In the past on the European continent much use has been made of gold value clauses.In England gold value clauses may assume greater importance in the future. Lately, the two-tier system of gold prices has been introduced, one between Central Banks and another at the free market price. In an individual gold value clause, the question of which price is recognized by the parties, who probably did not in fact foresee the possibility of the creation of a two-tier system, is one of construction. Even today, a party to a gold value clause which refers to the free market price may gain a profit, if there is an appreciation of the price of gold on the free market above the U.S. government minimum level of $35.00 per ounce.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shizhao Wang ◽  
Yong Luo

Aiming to find the effect of the same status entities’ horizontal coordination on supply chain, this paper studied the coalition stability of dealers in a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and multiple dealers. First, a vertical sequential game model is built, where the supplier is leader and the multiple dealers are followers. In the second stage of the game, multiple dealers face two selections: playing Nash game with each other or developing a coalition. Then, according to the results acquired by comparing the dealers’ profits which depend on their coalition situations, the criterion of coalition stability is developed. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the validity of the model, and some insights are obtained. For example, if the sensitivity coefficientTof the market price is fixed, dealers’ coalition tends to be stable with the increasing of the substitution ratekin a reasonable range; the supplier’s optimal wholesale price is constant with and without dealer’s coalition, but dealers’ coalition causes demand to decrease, which leads to the decrease of the supplier’s profit too. The result of this paper provides an important reference for the formation of dealers’ coalition in IT or automobile supply chain.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document