scholarly journals Horizontal Coalition Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Entities Based on Sequential Game

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shizhao Wang ◽  
Yong Luo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Coalition Stability ◽  
Reasonable Range

Aiming to find the effect of the same status entities’ horizontal coordination on supply chain, this paper studied the coalition stability of dealers in a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and multiple dealers. First, a vertical sequential game model is built, where the supplier is leader and the multiple dealers are followers. In the second stage of the game, multiple dealers face two selections: playing Nash game with each other or developing a coalition. Then, according to the results acquired by comparing the dealers’ profits which depend on their coalition situations, the criterion of coalition stability is developed. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the validity of the model, and some insights are obtained. For example, if the sensitivity coefficientTof the market price is fixed, dealers’ coalition tends to be stable with the increasing of the substitution ratekin a reasonable range; the supplier’s optimal wholesale price is constant with and without dealer’s coalition, but dealers’ coalition causes demand to decrease, which leads to the decrease of the supplier’s profit too. The result of this paper provides an important reference for the formation of dealers’ coalition in IT or automobile supply chain.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5648-5664 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Soo-Haeng Cho
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Market Game ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Local Supply ◽  
Buyer Power

We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

scholarly journals Complexity and Entropy Analysis of a Multi-Channel Supply Chain Considering Channel Cooperation and Service

Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Xingli Chen ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Stability Domain ◽  
Largest Lyapunov Exponent ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, based on the background of channel cooperation and service of the supply chain, this paper constructs a Nash game model and a Stackeberg game model in the multi-channel supply chain considering an online-to-store channel (OSC). Based on maximizing the profits and the bounded rationality expectation rule (BRE), this paper builds a dynamic game model, respectively, and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium points by mathematical analysis and explores the influences of parameters on stability domain and entropy of the system by using bifurcation diagram, the entropy diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent and the chaotic attractor etc. Besides, the influences of service level and profit distribution rate on system’s profit are discussed. The theoretical results show that the greater the service level and profit distribution rate are, the smaller the stability domain of the system is; the system will go into chaotic state and the system’s entropy will increase when operators adjust her/his price decision quickly; when the manufacturer or the retailer keeps service level in the appropriate value which is conducive to maximizing her/his profit; the manufacturer should carefully set the service level of OSC to ensure the system’s profit; in Nash game model, the stability of the system weakens than that in Stackelberg game model. Furthermore, this paper puts forward some suggestions to help the manufacturer and retailer in multi-channel supply chain to do the better decision.

scholarly journals Decision-making of online channels under three power structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 296-310
Author(s):  
Xingxing Jia
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Online Marketplace ◽  
Shopping Experience ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Channel Service

In recent years, e-commerce has developed rapidly. Many manufacturers are beginning to integrate with the Internet and regard online platforms, such as online marketplaces and self-owned online malls, as important sale channels for their products. Considering the difference of shopping experience between the two online channels, this paper models price and service competition between the two channels. This paper discusses the decisions of supply chain participants with three power structures, that is, the manufacturer Stackelberg game, the online marketplace firm Stackelberg game, and the Nash game. The results show that the channel service level and the consumer sensitivity to channel service positively affect the channel price and demand. We characterize a threshold for the wholesale price. When the wholesale price is below the threshold, the channel prices are lowest in the Nash game, and when the wholesale price is greater than the threshold, the channel prices are lowest when the manufacture acts as the leader. Differentiated services can improve the supply chain participants’ profits and the system’s profit compared with the same service. More interestingly, this paper finds that the online marketplace firm should pay attention to improving its service level, while the manufacturer should pay attention to other work differently, such as focusing on generating promotional value and shaping corporate brand image by the self-owned online mall channel.

scholarly journals Research on Third-Party Collecting Game Model with Competition in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Complex Systems Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yuehong Guo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This paper studied system dynamics characteristics of closed-loop supply chain using repeated game theory and complex system theory. It established decentralized decision-making game model and centralized decision-making game model and then established and analyzed the corresponding continuity system. Drew the region local stability of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, and a series of chaotic system characteristics, have an detail analysis of the Lyapunov index which is under the condition of different parameter combination. According to the limited rational expectations theory, it established repeated game model based on collection price and marginal profits. Further, this paper analyzed the influence of the parameters by numerical simulations and concluded three conclusions. First, when the collection price is to a critical value, the system will be into chaos state. Second, when the sale price of remanufacturing products is more than a critical value, the system will be in chaos state. Last, the initial value of the collection price is sensitive, small changes may cause fluctuations of market price. These conclusions guide enterprises in making the best decisions in each phase to achieve maximize profits.

Supply Chain Decisions Considering Heterogeneous Consumer Greenness Preference and Reservation Utilities

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
Reservation Utility

This article focuses on how the prices set by supply chains and the product greenness level changes when there exists a difference for consumers in both their greenness preference and their reservation utility for the common product with minimal greenness, based on a two-dimensional model which is built and the market is partitioned into four groups. In this study, the authors use the Stackelberg game model to analyze the decisions of a two-stage supply chain, providing environmentally friendly products affected by a consumer greenness preference which is represented by the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for product greenness. The authors found that manufacturers may lower the product greenness level with the decrease of the valuation of consumer's WTP for product greenness, but he may prefer keeping the same product greenness, he will even improve it, when there is a reduction in reservation utility for the traditional product. Moreover, this article shows that there is different impact for different combinations of both WTP for product greenness and product greenness level (different market segmentations) on price decisions of the manufacturer and retailer. In consideration of the asymmetric information about consumer's utility and willingness to pay between manufacturer and retailer, the authors introduce the bargaining power into the study, and then they conclude that during the different market segmentations, the wholesale price and retail price go down as a retailer strengthens his bargaining power, and increasing sales volume can improve profit to make up for a loss in retail price.

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Green Supply Chain Under Cost-Sharing Contract with Fairness Concerns

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050017
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma ◽  
Deepika Jain
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

This study investigates the fairness concerned behavior of the supply chain members in a dyadic supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, wherein the manufacturer puts efforts for improving the product’s greening level and sells it to the customers through the retailer. Through manufacturer-led and retailer-led Stackelberg game frameworks, the study presents two models- one in which only the manufacturer exhibits advantageous inequity averse behavior and the other in which only the retailer exhibits them. The results demonstrate the following findings: (1) the manufacturer’s profit is decreasing while product’s greening level, retailer’s and total supply chain’s profits are increasing and manufacturer’s wholesale price and retailer’s market price are nonmonotone in manufacturer’s fairness concern, (2) the wholesale price, product’s greening level, manufacturer’s profit, and total supply chain’s profit are increasing while retailer’s profit is decreasing and market price is nonmonotone in retailer’s fairness concern. In addition, the study examines the optimality of cost-sharing contract for different ranges of the model parameters. Furthermore, the findings are elucidated through the numerical analysis and managerial insights are generated.

scholarly journals Single-Manufacturer Multi-Retailer Supply Chain Models with Discrete Stochastic Demand

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8271
Author(s):  
Yaqing Xu ◽  
Jiang Zhang ◽  
Zihao Chen ◽  
Yihua Wei
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Dynamic Programming Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Stochastic Demands ◽  
Demand Models

Although there are highly discrete stochastic demands in practical supply chain problems, they are seldom considered in the research on supply chain systems, especially the single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain systems. There are no significant differences between continuous and discrete demand supply chain models, but the solutions for discrete random demand models are more challenging and difficult. This paper studies a supply chain system of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers with discrete stochastic demands. Each retailer faces a random discrete demand, and the manufacturer utilizes different wholesale prices to influence each retailer’s ordering decision. Both Make-To-Order and Make-To-Stock scenarios are considered. For each scenario, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed respectively. By proving a series of theorems, we transfer the solution of the game model into non-linear integer programming model, which can be easily solved by a dynamic programming method. However, with the increase in the number of retailers and the production capacity of manufacturers, the computational complexity of dynamic programming drastically increases due to the Dimension Barrier. Therefore, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) approach is introduced, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of solving the supply chain model.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

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