Does Physics Answer Metaphysical Questions?

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Speed Of Light ◽  
Michael Friedman ◽  
Rational Thought ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.

Does Physics Answer Metaphysical Questions?

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201
Author(s):  
James Ladyman
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Speed Of Light ◽  
Michael Friedman ◽  
Rational Thought ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.

Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Skorupski
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
Modern Period ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Late Modern

The empiricist approaches to mathematics discussed in this article belong to an era of philosophy which we can begin to see as a whole. It stretches from Kant's Critiques of the 1780s to the twentieth-century analytic movements which ended, broadly speaking, in the 1950s—in and largely as a result of the work of Quine. Seeing this period historically is by no means saying that its ideas are dead; it just helps in understanding the ideas. That applies to the two versions of empiricism that were most prominent in this late modern period: the radical empiricism of Mill and the “logical” empiricism associated with the Vienna Circle positivism of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Mill and the logical positivists shared the empiricist doctrine that no informative proposition is a priori.

scholarly journals Internal History versus External History

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bence Nanay
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Art History ◽  
Historical Linguistics ◽  
Historical Narratives ◽  
History Of

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to generalize a pair of concepts that are widely used in the history of science, in art history and in historical linguistics – the concept of internal and external history – and to replace the often very vague talk of ‘historical narratives’ with this conceptual framework of internal versus external history. I argue that this way of framing the problem allows us to see the possible alternatives more clearly – as a limited number of possible relations between internal and external history. Finally, I argue that while external history is metaphysically prior to internal history, when it comes to historical explanations, we need both.

Overseas History in the Netherlands after the Second World War. Historical Backgrounds, Modern Developments, Present-Day Situation

Itinerario ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115
Author(s):  
H.L. Wesseling
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Art History ◽  
Second World War ◽  
World War ◽  
Spiritual Climate ◽  
History Of Art ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
Second World ◽  
Or History

Is history science or art? This is a problem which has been on people's minds for more than a century and certainly it is an interesting question. But within the framework of this contribution it is not really important, for, whether one practises art history or history of science, one faces the same problem. On the one hand such a history is first and foremost a history of the work and achievements of individuals. A history of science which does not deal with the work of Copernicus, Newton and Einstein is as useless as a history of art in which Rembrandt, Rubens and Michelangelo do not figure. Art and history are and will remain foremost the work of individuals of genius. On the other hand it is also true that a history of art or science which confines itself exclusively to a series of sketches of individuals and their work is not satisfactory either. Artists and scientists do not work within a vacuum. As one discerns tendencies and trends in art, likewise within the field of science one finds schools and paradigms. In order to understand works of art and science we have to look closely at influences and examples, at the time-spirit, the spiritual climate, et cetera.

scholarly journals Similarities, Differences, and Missed Connections between Thomas S. Kuhn, Gaston Bachelard and the Continental Historiography of Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-111
Author(s):  
Alberto Fragio
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
European History ◽  
Gaston Bachelard ◽  
Historical Turn ◽  
Michael Friedman ◽  
Historiography Of Science ◽  
History Of ◽  
Important Object

AbstractAccording to the American philosopher, Michael Friedman, while triggering the so-called “historical turn,” Kuhn reinstated the history of science as perhaps the most important object for the philosophy of science. In this paper, I show that this reinstatement is rather a rehabilitation of the philosophical and epistemological uses of the history of science, something already present in the continental historiography of science in the first half of the twentieth century, and especially in Gaston Bachelard’s work. In this sense, I undertake a review of the European history and philosophy of science during that period, paying special attention to Gaston Bachelard as one of the leading representatives of the French historical epistemology of the 1930s. I conclude with the late and quite problematic reception of Bachelard’s thought in the early work of Thomas S. Kuhn. My thesis is this strand may help to outline what is continental history and philosophy of science.

KUHN AND PHILOSOPHY

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL FRIEDMAN
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Teaching Philosophy ◽  
New Model ◽  
Accumulation Model ◽  
History Of

Initially trained as a physicist, Kuhn became a leading and extraordinarily influential figure in the history of science. He saw his work in the history of science as contributing to a novel philosophical conception of the nature of science. At the outset of Structure, for example, Kuhn announces his intention to replace the “development-by-accumulation” model he associates with the philosophical tradition before him—including, in particular, what he calls “early logical positivism”—with a new model of radical conceptual discontinuity or incommensurability. Structure was written during Kuhn's tenure teaching philosophy and history of science at Berkeley, and, shortly after its publication, he took up a new post as professor of philosophy and history of science at Princeton. From 1983 until his death in 1996 Kuhn was professor of philosophy at MIT, where he attempted further to articulate his conception of incommensurability, taking account of developments in linguistics and philosophy of language.

The Game of Morra

1898 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 129-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Perdrizet
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Fourth Century ◽  
The Other ◽  
Detailed Report ◽  
History Of ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
The One

The Imperial Ottoman Museum has recently acquired a very valuable and interesting gold ring (Fig. 1) which was found in 1894 or 1895 in a tomb at Lampsacus. The Museum authorities subsequently undertook further excavations in the necropolis of which this tomb formed part, and it is a matter for great regret that no detailed report of the results was drawn up; we are therefore forced to content ourselves with the somewhat meagre information given by the late Baltazzi-Bey to M. Salomon Reinach, according to which the necropolis yielded fragments of red-figured pottery and specimens of silver autonomous coins of Lampsacus. Both these details are of importance in fixing the date of the ring; for on the one hand silver coins of this class belong almost exclusively to the fourth century, and on the other, the manufacture of painted vases was not continued after that date. When we add that the evidence of coins and inscriptions proves that this was the most flourishing period in the history of Lampsacus, we have strong a priori reason for assigning the ring to this century, while a consideration of the style of the intaglio may help us to fix the date within narrower limits.

Analogy, Natural History and the Philosophy of Nature

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalia Nassar
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Methodological Challenge ◽  
Philosophy Of Nature ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
Fundamental Tension ◽  
Critical Reviews

In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.

scholarly journals Portugal en los albores de la modernidad científica (siglo XVI)

2019 ◽  
pp. 137-152
Author(s):  
Onésimo T. Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
The Other ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

In following a sequence of articles published in the last thirty years which discuss, on the one hand, a series of Portuguese exaggerations, and on the other, attempt to shed contemporary historiographic light on some important omissions regarding the era in which Portugal its discoveries, the present article discusses what are currently understood as the Portuguese contributions to scientific modernity. Though this recognition is generally accepted by Portuguese historians, this article locates these accomplishments within the global framework of the development of a scientific mentality and methodology, and within the general history of science.

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