scholarly journals DOES INFLATION TARGETING MATTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 362-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Cornand ◽  
Cheick Kader M'baye

We use laboratory experiments with human subjects to test the relevance of different inflation-targeting regimes. In particular and within the standard New Keynesian model, we evaluate to what extent communication of the inflation target is relevant to the success of inflation targeting. We find that if the central bank cares only about inflation stabilization, announcing the inflation target does not make a difference in terms of macroeconomic performance compared with a standard active monetary policy. However, if the central bank also cares about the stabilization of economic activity, communicating the target helps to reduce the volatility of inflation, interest rate, and output gap, although their average levels are not affected. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature and provides a rationale for the adoption of a flexible inflation-targeting regime.

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 1343-1377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B Barsky ◽  
Eric R Sims

Innovations to consumer confidence convey incremental information about economic activity far into the future. Does this reflect a causal effect of animal spirits on economic activity, or news about exogenous future productivity received by consumers? Using indirect inference, we study the impulse responses to confidence innovations in conjunction with an appropriately augmented New Keynesian model. While news, animal spirits, and pure noise all contribute to confidence innovations, the relationship between confidence and subsequent activity is almost entirely reflective of the news component. Confidence innovations are well characterized as noisy measures of changes in expected productivity growth over a relatively long horizon. (JEL D12, D83, D84, E12)


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Eusepi ◽  
Bart Hobijn ◽  
Andrea Tambalotti

We construct a PCE-based price index whose weights minimize the welfare costs of nominal distortions: a cost-of-nominal-distortions index. We compute these weights in a multi-sector New Keynesian model, calibrated to match US data on price stickiness, labor shares, and inflation across sectors. The CONDI weights mostly depend on price stickiness. Moreover, CONDI stabilization leads to negligible welfare losses compared to the optimal policy and is better approximated by core rather than headline inflation targeting. An even better approximation can be obtained with an adjusted core index. (JEL C14, E12, E25, E31, E52).


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1504-1526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Gerke ◽  
Felix Hammermann

We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be misspecified. We find that, first, whether robust optimal monetary policy under commitment responds more cautiously or more aggressively depends crucially on the source of shock. Imperfect pass-through amplifies the robust policy. Second, if the central bank is concerned about uncertainty, it dampens volatility in the inflation rate preemptively but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and loan rate. However, for highly sticky loan rates, insurance against model misspecification becomes particularly pricy. Third, if the central bank fears uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilization away from inflation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nipit Wongpunya

Abstract This paper explores the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting in Thailand. Furthermore, this study uses a nonlinear new Keynesian model under the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with price indexation to analyze the monetary policy under inflation targeting in Thailand. The model is estimated using a Bayesian statistic for the Thai economy. It shows that inflation is more stabilized and inflation persistence has fallen after adopting inflation targeting. The paper also indicates that the Bank of Thailand is more responsive to the deviation of inflation from its target using inflation targeting. The key monetary mechanism exists through changes in the real interest rate which affect aggregate demand. It is worth noting that the larger the inflation targeting rate is, the lower the steady state output from its steady state level given no trend inflation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
Enrique Martínez-García

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joep Lustenhouwer

We study a New Keynesian model with bounded rationality, where agents choose their expectations heterogeneously from a discrete choice set. The range of their set of possible expectation values can be interpreted as the anchoring of expectations. In the model, multiple locally stable steady states can arise that reflect coordination on particular expectation values. Moreover, bad shocks to the economy can trigger a self-reinforcing wave of pessimism, where the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding, and agents coordinate on a locally stable liquidity trap steady state. When we let the anchoring of expectations evolve endogenously, it turns out that the anchoring of expectations at the time the bad shocks hit the economy is crucial in determining whether the economy can recover from the liquidity trap. Finally, we find that a higher inflation target makes it less likely that self-reinforcing liquidity traps arise.


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