A NOTE ON THE UNIQUENESS OF STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER STATE-DEPENDENT WAGE SETTING
Keyword(s):
Does wage setting exhibit strategic complementarity and produce multiple equilibria? This study constructs a discrete-time New Keynesian model in which households choose the timing of their wage adjustments endogenously subject to fixed wage-setting costs. I explore steady-state equilibrium of the state-dependent wage-setting model both analytically and numerically. For reasonable parameter values, complementarity in wage setting is weak and the steady-state equilibrium is unique.
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
2015 ◽
Vol 57
◽
pp. 96-111
◽
2012 ◽
Vol 17
(3)
◽
pp. 591-620
◽
Keyword(s):