THE CASE OF TAHA YASEEN RAMADAN BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL: AN INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE

2006 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 181-243
Author(s):  
William H. Wiley

AbstractTaha Yaseen Ramadan was a long-time ally of Saddam Hussein and Vice-President of Iraq at the time of the United States-led invasion in 2003; he was captured by American forces in 2004 and, in 2005-2006, tried before the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), alongside Saddam Hussein. The Trial Chamber hearing the case found Taha Yaseen guilty of,inter alia, the crime against humanity of wilful killing; he was handed a sentence of life imprisonment in November 2006. This sentence was appealed by the IHT Prosecutor; the IHT Appellate Chamber responded several days later with an order that the Trial Chamber award Taha Yaseen a capital sentence. The process of re-sentencing, which ultimately led to the execution of Taha Yaseen in March 2007, was, like many other key phases of the trial of Saddam Hussein and Taha Yaseen, undermined by Iraqi political interference emanating, in the main, from the office of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The fairness of the proceedings against Taha Yaseen and his co-accused was further undermined throughout by the near total ignorance of the those involved in the case (i.e., the Iraqi Judges, Prosecutors and Defence counsel) of the substantive law that they were meant to be applying, in particular, International Criminal Law, which had been received into Iraqi law almostverbatimin 2004 from the Statute of the International Criminal Court. This combination of professional ignorance and political interference gave rise to a travesty of justice that cannot be reversed, that is, the execution of a man who was manifestly not guilty of the crime for which he was hanged.

2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 1031-1079 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Powderly

On June 8, 2018, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered its eagerly anticipated judgment on the appeal of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against his conviction by Trial Chamber III in March 2016 for war crimes (murder, rape, and pillage) and crimes against humanity (murder and rape). Bemba's conviction was notable for the variety of “firsts” it gave rise to for the ICC. As a former vice-president of the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and president of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), he became the most senior leader to be successfully convicted by the ICC. His conviction was the first in which an individual was found responsible for the commission of crimes pursuant to command responsibility under Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Of particular significance was the fact that this was the first conviction at the ICC for acts of rape and sexual violence committed against women and men. Finally, this was the first case in the history of international criminal law where members of the defense team were arrested, tried, and convicted of crimes against the administration of justice during the course of the trial. The trial judgment was heralded as “a turning point in the ICC's history” following the debacles in the Lubanga, Katanga, Chui, and Kenya cases. However, we now have a new addition to the list of firsts: with the Appeals Chamber's majority judgment (decided 3-2), Bemba becomes the first accused to have his conviction overturned in full.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 517-523

On November 14, 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) released its annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (the Report). The Report contained the OTP's updates on preliminary examinations of several situations, including in Afghanistan. Of particular note, the OTP announced that it had identified a reasonable basis to seek Pre-Trial Chamber authorization for an investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by the United States—primarily from 2003 to 2004, but in some cases as recently as December 2014.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-681
Author(s):  
ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT

The editorial board of the Leiden Journal of International Law is pleased to announce a debate on a very important but underexposed topic in international criminal law: witness proofing. Witness proofing is an accepted and well-established practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It entails setting up a meeting between a party to the proceedings and a witness, usually shortly before the witness is to testify in court, the purpose of which is to prepare and familiarize the witness with courtroom procedure and to review the witness's evidence. Recently a trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) prohibited witness proofing. On 30 November 2007, Trial Chamber I held in the Lubanga case that the possibility of witness proofing is not expressly provided for in the ICC Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that no general principle exists in national or international criminal law that would require the ICC to adhere to such a practice. Moreover, and this is the most interesting argument, the trial chamber held that the ICC Statute ‘moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc tribunals’ and that as a result witness proofing is not easily transferable to the ICC.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLAUS KRESS

AbstractAt the beginning of the renaissance of international criminal law in the 1990s, the law on crimes against humanity was in a fragile state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decisively contributed to the consolidation of customary international law on crimes against humanity and paved the way for its first comprehensive codification in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, the ICTY in its early decisions already showed a certain inclination to broaden the scope of the application of the crime by downgrading its contextual requirement. More recently, this tendency culminated in the complete abandonment of the policy requirement. While this ‘progressive’ facet of the ICTY's jurisprudence largely took the form of obiter dicta, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya has confronted the ICC with the need to ‘get serious’ about the present state of the law. This has led to a controversy in Pre-Trial Chamber II about the concept of organization in Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. While the majority essentially follows the path of the more recent case law of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone and supports a liberal interpretation, Judge Kaul prefers to confine the term to state-like organizations and generally calls for caution against too hasty an expansion of the realm of international criminal law stricto sensu. This comment agrees with the main thrust of the Dissenting Opinion and hopes that it will provoke a thorough debate.


2021 ◽  
pp. 109-114
Author(s):  
B. I. Nedilko

This article is devoted to the analysis of the Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo case of the International Criminal Court. He was a Congolese politician, as well as the founder and the head of non-governmental armed group, named “Movement for the Liberation of Congo”, which members committed number of crimes during armed conflict in Central African Republic. The importance of this case lies in the fact, that it was the first case of the International Criminal Court, where the accused was charged with crimes, committed by his subordinates, and not by the accused himself. This article reveals the main contradictions between the judgments of the Trial Chamber, which found Bemba guilty, and the Appeals Chamber, which acquitted him. The legal basics of the institute of personal responsibility of commanders and other superiors in international criminal law, which were formed in the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Bemba case, are highlighted therein. The author addresses and analyzes the grounds for recognizing commanders and other superiors guilty for committing crimes by their subordinates. It was discovered, that Article 28 of the Rome Statute requires the commanders to take only necessary or reasonable measures to prevent or punish the crimes, committed by their subordinates, not all possible measures at the relevant time. The Trial Chamber should specify what exactly the accused had to do to prevent or punish the crimes, as well as inform the accused of it prior to the hearing. It is also necessary to take into account objective circumstances, that could prevent the commander from adequately responding to the commission of crimes by his subordinates, especially if they operated in the territory of another state. The commander's ability to take the necessary or reasonable measures to prevent or punish the crimes, committed by his subordinates, should be analyzed in relation to each individual crime he is charged with, and not in relation to all the actions of subordinates as a whole. At last, the Appeals Chamber provided an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether the measures, taken by the commander, were sufficient.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-616
Author(s):  
Charles Chernor Jalloh

On October 9, 2014, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) unanimously held that, under the ICC Statute, a trial chamber has the power to order witnesses to appear before it to give testimony in pending proceedings, which imposes legal obligations on the individuals concerned to comply. In so ruling, the appellate chamber upheld a controversial trial chamber decision granting the ICC prosecutor’s request to summon eight witnesses to testify in the joint trial of Kenya’s vice president, William Samoei Ruto, and former journalist Joshua arap Sang, both of whom faced charges of crimes against humanity for their alleged role in “post-election violence” that led to the deaths of over twelve hundred people (para. 9).


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-630

On April 4, 2019, the United States revoked the visa of Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This action occurred less than a month after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that, except to the extent otherwise required by the UN Headquarters Agreement, the United States would impose visa restrictions on “those individuals directly responsible for any ICC investigation of U.S. personnel.” In her preliminary investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, Bensouda had specifically listed war crimes by U.S. military and intelligence agencies as one of several categories of crimes that her office found reason to believe had occurred. Approximately one week after Bensouda's visa revocation, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denied her request to move forward with an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marten Zwanenburg

The adoption of the Statute of an International Criminal Court in July 1998 is widely regarded as a major step forward in international criminal law. The United States, however, does not share this point of view in all respects. It particularly fears that the Statute will allow prosecution of American peacekeepers for political instead of legal reasons. This article examines the provisions of the Statute in the light of that fear. It concludes that not only is such a fear unjustified, the United States position may have disastrous consequences for efforts in peacekeeping.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Chernor Jalloh

AbstractThis article examines the initially cooperative but increasingly tense relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Africa. It assesses the various legal and political reasons for the mounting criticisms of the ICC by African governments, especially within the African Union (AU), following the indictment of incumbent Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir. The author situates the ICC within broader African efforts to establish more peaceful societies through the continent-wide AU. He submits that the ICC, by prosecuting architects of serious international crimes in Africa's numerous conflicts, could contribute significantly to the continent's fledgling peace and security architecture which aims to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and to anticipate and avert crimes against humanity. On the other hand, the author suggests that the ICC also has much to gain from Africa, especially in these early years when it is seeking to become a functional court of law with global legitimacy. By undertaking independent, fair and credible prosecutions without alienating States Parties, the world criminal court is more likely to fulfill its mandate and to win over powerful hold outs, such as the United States, China, and India. This will help it co-opt the support necessary for its universal reach and future success. However, he cautions that given Africa's sensitive historical experience with foreign interventions, including the slave trade and colonialism, the international criminal justice regime anchored on the ICC may be undermined, or perhaps even falter, if it is perceived as having a biased, politicized or insensitive application to a single region of the world.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annie Bunting ◽  
Izevbuwa Kehinde Ikhimiukor

The March 2016 Confirmation of Charges Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court in Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen characterized the practice of forced conjugal association as the crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’. This decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber comes amidst an unsettled jurisprudence on the legal characterization of the practice of forced conjugal association. The unsettled nature of the jurisprudence has led to inconsistencies in the legal characterization of forced conjugal association as either forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ or sexual slavery, a variant of the general rubric of slavery. Accordingly, this article analyses the expressive effects of the labelling by contemporary international criminal courts and tribunals of forced conjugal association as either forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ or slavery.


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