Estimating Party Policy Positions: Japan in Comparative Context

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL LAVER ◽  
KENNETH BENOIT
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Special Reference ◽  
Content Validity ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Expert Survey ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Policy Content ◽  
Party Policy Positions ◽  
Expert Surveys

This paper first reviews a number of epistemological and methodological issues relating to the estimation of party policy positions, particularly in a comparative context, with special reference to the methodology of ‘expert surveys’. It is argued that expert surveys, as systematic summaries of the views of country specialists, have a particular role in assessing the content validity of other types of estimates of party policy positions. The paper moves on to analyze the positions of Japanese political parties in a comparative context, using results from a new 47-country expert survey. Attention is paid both to the substantive policy content of the left–right dimension in Japan, and to the locations of Japanese parties in policy spaces, relative to the locations of comparable parties in other political systems.

scholarly journals Party Responsiveness to Public Opinion in Young Democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172199363
Author(s):  
Raimondas Ibenskas ◽  
Jonathan Polk
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
The Public ◽  
National Surveys ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Expert Surveys ◽  
Cross National

Are political parties in young democracies responsive to the policy preferences of the public? Compared to extensive scholarship on party responsiveness in established democracies, research on party responsiveness in young democracies is limited. We argue that weaker programmatic party–voter linkages in post-communist democracies create incentives for parties to respond to their supporters rather than the more general electorate. Such responsiveness occurs in two ways. First, parties follow shifts in the mean position of their supporters. Second, drawing on the research on party–voter congruence, we argue that parties adjust their policy positions to eliminate previous incongruence between themselves and their supporters. Analyses based on a comprehensive dataset that uses expert surveys, parties’ manifestoes and election surveys to measure parties’ positions, and several cross-national and national surveys to measure voters’ preferences provide strong support for this argument.

scholarly journals Party Policy Diffusion

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOBIAS BÖHMELT ◽  
LAWRENCE EZROW ◽  
RONI LEHRER ◽  
HUGH WARD
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Policy Diffusion ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Spatial Econometric ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Econometric Analyses ◽  
Established Democracies

Do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems? This research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulatingforeign successful (incumbent) parties. Spatial-econometric analyses of parties’ election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left-right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed. By showing that parties respond to theseforeign incumbent parties, this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion, as we suggest that political parties are important vehiclesthroughwhich public policies diffuse.

Policy and Party Competition in Japan after the Election of 2000

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUNKO KATO ◽  
MICHAEL LAVER
Keyword(s):  
Party Competition ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Party Policy Positions ◽  
Expert Surveys

This paper reports the results of the latest in a series of expert surveys of party policy positions in Japan and considers some of the implications of these results for our understanding of party competition and government formation in recent Japanese politics.

Political Cleavages and Political Parties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
New Left ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Cultural Policies ◽  
Policy Choices

This chapter uses the cleavage positions of Candidates to the European Parliament (CEPs) to as representative of their parties’ political positions. Three surveys of CEPs track the evolution of party supply in European party systems. In 1979 parties were primarily aligned along a Left–Right economic cleavage. Gradually new left and Green parties began to compete in elections and crystallized and represented liberal cultural policies. In recent decades new far-right parties arose to represent culturally conservative positions. The cross-cutting cultural cleavage has also prompted many of the established parties to alter their policy positions. In most multiparty systems, political parties now compete in a fully populated two-dimensional space. This increases the supply of policy choices for the voters. The analyses are based on the Candidates to the European Parliament Studies in 1979, 1994, and 2009.

scholarly journals Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

scholarly journals When Populist Leaders Govern: Conceptualising Populism in Policy Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 71-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bartha ◽  
Zsolt Boda ◽  
Dorottya Szikra
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Ideal Type ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Willingness To Adopt ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Policy Content ◽  
Distinguishing Features

The rise of populist governance throughout the world offers a novel opportunity to study the way in which populist leaders and parties rule. This article conceptualises populist policy making by theoretically addressing the substantive and discursive components of populist policies and the decision-making processes of populist governments. It first reconstructs the implicit ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies based on the mainstream governance and policy making scholarship. Then, taking stock of the recent populism literature, the article elaborates an ideal type of populist policy making along the dimensions of content, procedures and discourses. As an empirical illustration we apply a qualitative congruence analysis to assess the conformity of a genuine case of populist governance, social policy in post-2010 Hungary with the populist policy making ideal type. Concerning the policy content, the article argues that policy heterodoxy, strong willingness to adopt paradigmatic reforms and an excessive responsiveness to majoritarian preferences are distinguishing features of any type of populist policies. Regarding the procedural features populist leaders tend to downplay the role of technocratic expertise, sideline veto-players and implement fast and unpredictable policy changes. Discursively, populist leaders tend to extensively use crisis frames and discursive governance instruments in a Manichean language and a saliently emotional manner that reinforces polarisation in policy positions. Finally, the article suggests that policy making patterns in Hungarian social policy between 2010 and 2018 have been largely congruent with the ideal type of populist policy making.

scholarly journals Follow the foreign leader? Why following foreign incumbents is an effective electoral strategy

2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881988470
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ezrow ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt ◽  
Roni Lehrer ◽  
Hugh Ward
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Policy Diffusion ◽  
Model Specification ◽  
Stage Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Election Strategies

Previous research suggests that political parties respond to left–right policy positions of successful foreign political parties (“foreign leaders”). We evaluate whether this is an effective electoral strategy: specifically, do political parties gain votes in elections when they respond to successful foreign parties? We argue that parties that follow foreign leaders will arrive at policy positions closer to their own (domestic) median voter, which increases their electoral support. The analysis is based on a two-stage model specification of parties’ vote shares and suggests that following foreign leaders is a beneficial election strategy in national election because it allows them to better identify the position of their own median voter. These findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation, parties’ election strategies, and for policy diffusion.

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