On the applicability of the Aristotelian principles to the definition of life

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera M. Kolb

Despite numerous attempts, we still do not have a satisfactory definition of life. It is generally accepted that one of the essential features of life is the ability of an organism to reproduce. This implies that mules, workers ants, and other sterile individuals are not alive. To correct this apparent problem, we suggest that life should be defined in two ways. First, we define life as a phenomenon, for which the reproduction of some, but not all, individuals is essential. Second, we define life as a set of characteristics of an individual organism, among which reproduction is not essential. We explore Aristotle's classifications of things that exist, in which he placed individual living beings as primary substances, above their species and genera, which are considered secondary substances. The definition of life as a phenomenon needs to link life to its origins. Life presumably emerged from abiotic matter via chemical evolution. We have examined Aristotle's concept of change in which potentiality goes to actuality, and its variant, Kauffman's concept of ‘adjacent possible’, for their possible application in prebiotic chemical evolution. We have found that these principles are somewhat useful in the back-engineering process, but that they have very little predictive value. We have also considered whether viruses should be considered alive, and have pointed to the need for astrobiology to include viruses in its studies.

2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera M. Kolb

AbstractWe have found that the principles of dialetheism, which state that some contradictions (typically at the limits of a system) may be true, and which amply demonstrate the limits of thought and conception, can be valuable in sorting out and clarifying some astrobiological problems that impede our ability to define life. The examples include the classification of viruses as alive or not alive, and the description of the transition zone for the abiotic-to-biotic transition. Dialetheism gives us the philosophical tool to state that the viruses may be both alive and not alive, and that chemical systems may exist that are both abiotic and biotic.We have extracted some philosophical principles of the identity and have applied them to the identity of living organisms and their life forms. The first and most important idea is that we should define an individual organism via its numerical identity. For each organism its identity will be in relation to itself. As the organism undergoes various changes during its development, and as it transitions from one to the next of its life forms, one can observe numerous qualitative differences between these life forms. Although the life forms change and the organism is in a flux, what remains constant is the numerical identity of the organism. If the organism reproduces, for example by a fission mode, then the daughter cells will have their own numerical identity. We can state that the life of an organism is a sum of all its life forms over the period of time of the existence of the organism. Reproduction, particularly by fission, represents an identity dilemma, but it can be resolved by Gallois' occasional identities theory.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (Supplement_2) ◽  
Author(s):  
R Bhoite ◽  
H Jinnouchi ◽  
F Otsuka ◽  
Y Sato ◽  
A Sakamoto ◽  
...  

Abstract Background In many studies, struts coverage is defined as >0 mm of tissue overlying the stent struts by optical coherence tomography (OCT). However, this definition has never been validated using histology as the “gold standard”. The present study sought to assess the appropriate cut-off value of neointimal thickness of stent strut coverage by OCT using histology. Methods OCT imaging was performed on 39 human coronary arteries with stents from 25 patients at autopsy. A total of 165 cross-sectional images from 46 stents were co-registered with histology. The optimal cut-off value of strut coverage by OCT was determined. Strut coverage by histology was defined as endothelial cells with at least underlying two layers of smooth muscle cells. Considering the resolution of OCT is 10–20 μm, 3 different cut-off values (i.e. at ≥20, ≥40, and ≥60 μm) were assessed. Results A total of 2235 struts were evaluated by histology. Eventually, 1216 struts which were well-matched struts were analyzed in this study. By histology, uncovered struts were observed in 160 struts and covered struts were observed in 1056 struts. The broadly used definition of OCT-coverage which does not consider neointimal thickness yielded a poor specificity of 37.5% and high sensitivity 100%. Of 3 cut-off values, the cut-off value of >40 μm was more accurate as compared to >20 and >60 mm [sensitivity (99.3%), specificity (91.0%), positive predictive value (98.6%), and negative predictive value (95.6%)] Conclusion The most accurate cut-off value was ≥40 μm neointimal thickness by OCT in order to identify stent strut coverage validated by histology. Funding Acknowledgement Type of funding source: None


Author(s):  
D. Madrigal-Trejo ◽  
P.S. Villanueva-Barragán ◽  
R. Zamudio-Ramírez ◽  
K. E. Cervantes-de la Cruz ◽  
I. Mejía-Luna ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 353-365
Author(s):  
Herbert Spencer ◽  
Michael Taylor

Author(s):  
John Maynard Smith ◽  
Eors Szathmary

Imagine that, when the first spacemen step out of their craft onto the surface of one of the moons of Jupiter, they are confronted by an object the size of a horse, rolling towards them on wheels, and bearing on its back a concave disc pointing towards the Sun. They will at once conclude that the object is alive, or has been made by something alive. If all they find is a purple smear on the surface of the rocks, they will have to work harder to decide. This is the phenotypic approach to the definition of life: a thing is alive if it has parts, or ‘organs’, which perform functions. William Paley explained the machine-like nature of life by the existence of a creator: today, we would invoke natural selection. There are, however, dangers in assuming that any entity with the properties of a self-regulating machine is alive, or an artefact. In section 2.2, we tell the story of a self-regulating atomic reactor, the Oklo reactor, which is neither. This story can be taken in one of three ways. First, it shows the dangers of the phenotypic definition of life: not all complex entities are alive. Second, it illustrates how the accidents of history can give rise spontaneously to surprisingly complex machine-like entities. The relevance of this to the origin of life is obvious. In essence, the problem is the following. How could chemical and physical processes give rise, without natural selection, to entities capable of hereditary replication, which would therefore, from then on, evolve by natural selection? The Oklo reactor is an example of what can happen. Finally, section 2.2 can simply be skipped: the events were interesting, but do not resemble in detail those that led to the origin of life on Earth. There is an alternative to the phenotypic definition of life. It is to define as alive any entities that have the properties of multiplication, variation and heredity. The logic behind this definition, first proposed by Muller (1966), is that a population of entities with these properties will evolve by natural selection, and hence can be expected to acquire the complex adaptations for survival and reproduction that are characteristic of living things.


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