“THE MOMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE”: THEDECADE PHILOSOPHIQUEAND LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL SONENSCHER

The first issue of theDécade philosophiqueappeared on 29 April 1794. In all, fifty-four volumes of the journal were published between that date and 1807, when, on Napoleon's orders, it was forced to merge with theMercure français. TheDécadewas published three times a month (taking its name from its appearance on the tenth day of each month of the French republican calendar) and the periodical soon became one of the intellectual powerhouses of the French republic after Robespierre. But quite what, in this particular setting, an intellectual powerhouse might have been is still an open question. Alongside Immanuel Kant or Jeremy Bentham, and their vast and varied intellectual legacies, the significance of the dozens of writers, including Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours and Jean-Baptiste Say, who contributed to theDécade, is now more difficult to specify. There have, of course, been several fine studies of theDécadeand its contributors, notably by Joanna Kitchen and Marc Régaldo, and more broadly by Sergio Moravia, Martin Staum and Cheryl Welch. But it is still somewhat easier to associate the periodical with a number of keywords, such asidéologieandscience sociale, than with anything comparable to those more comprehensively articulated bodies of thought that came to be labelled “idealism” or “utilitarianism”. “Ideologism” never seems to have existed, and certainly never caught on. But this very indeterminacy may still be an advantage. It may help to open up, both historically and analytically, rather more of the intellectual space once covered by the broad range of subjects and arguments that first helped to shape—and then came to be buried by—idealism and utilitarianism.

2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 195-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hagner

ArgumentIn this paper I will argue that the scientific investigation of skulls and brains of geniuses went hand in hand with hagiographical celebrations of scientists. My analysis starts with late-eighteenth century anatomists and anthropologists who highlighted quantitative parameters such as the size and weight of the brain in order to explain intellectual differences between women and men and Europeans and non-Europeans, geniuses and ordinary persons. After 1800 these parameters were modified by phrenological inspections of the skull and brain. As the phrenological examination of the skulls of Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Heinse, Arthur Schopenhauer and others shows, the anthropometrical data was interpreted in light of biographical circumstances. The same pattern of interpretation can be found in non-phrenological contexts: Reports about extraordinary brains were part of biographical sketches, mainly delivered in celebratory obituaries. It was only in this context that moral reservations about dissecting the brains of geniuses could be overcome, which led to a more systematic investigation of brains of geniuses after 1860.


Author(s):  
Ivona Kollárová

Through a wide range of sources, this study reveals the non-philosophical spread of the ideas of Immanuel Kant in the Slovak regions of Hungary. The flow of philosophical ideas can be demonstrated not only in the works of the Hungarian followers of Kant, but also in censorship sources documenting the import of Kantian texts in the 1790s. The critical debates in correspondences and published texts reveal anti-Kantian argumentations. Information about the advertisements of Kant’s works and subscriptions to them also help form an idea about their popularity. Research on private albums reveals how the philosophical legacy circulated, despite bans and repressions, in non-public communication networks and how its social area extended beyond the sphere of philosophy and education.


Author(s):  
Nigel Biggar

The claim that there are natural rights, which exist before or outside of any ordered civil society and apart from any positively legal expression, has long been controversial. There is a tradition of scepticism about such rights, stretching at least from the late eighteenth century to the present day. This opening chapter expounds four eminent expressions of this ‘Sceptical Tradition’ in the thought of Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham, David Ritchie, and Onora O’Neill. It concludes by distilling the tradition’ into a set of objections to natural rights-talk: its abstract character, which makes it impossible to evaluate and encourages political recklessness; its inflated rhetoric, which overlooks the moral importance of circumstances, especially feasibility; and its confusion of natural morality with legality. The subsequent four chapters then proceed to test these objections against natural rights-talk, first, in the pre-modern period (Chapter 2), second in the modern period (Chapter 3), third in modern Roman Catholic thought (Chapter 4), and finally as it comes from the pens of a selection of contemporary defenders (Chapter 5).


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-505
Author(s):  
CLAIRE RYDELL ARCENAS

Edmund Burke is difficult to classify. Born in Ireland in 1730, he entered parliament in 1765 having already achieved literary distinction for several philosophical works, including On the origins of the sublime and beautiful (1757). His subsequent career as a Whig statesman, politician, and reformer spanned the tumultuous decades of the late eighteenth century and culminated, less than a decade before his death, in his famous polemic against the French Revolution, Reflections on the revolution in France (1790). Over the course of his life, Burke opined with such frequency on so many topics that the nature of his ‘philosophy’ remains an open question, and scholars continue to offer strikingly different interpretations of his life and legacies. ‘Burke's legacy to history’, historian Richard Bourke summarized, ‘has been a complicated affair’.


2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances A. Chiu

Abstract Who has not been on an amusement park ride that proceeds through a haunted house, complete with cobwebs, coffins, once opulent furnishings, and a ghost or two? It is an idea that we have encountered countless times in novels and movies alike yet one that continues to mystify us. How did the trope of the haunted Gothic castle/mansion materialize so quickly in the late eighteenth century? Although we have more or less recognized Walpole’s castle of Otranto as its prototype, we are yet unacquainted with the rapid construction of the so-called “haunted castle/mansion/house” trope, particularly between 1777 and 1800. This essay contends that far from being accidental, the foundations of this trope were heavily impacted not only by populist histories that detailed the beginnings of Britain’s stately castles, abbeys, and houses and the dark tales of their presiding tyrants, but more significantly by the simultaneous campaigns for parliamentary reform and religious toleration. I demonstrate how historians began to identify the chief features of Gothic architecture as Norman during a period in which reformers and radicals were also beginning to revive the myth of the Norman Yoke and stir up resentment against the church and aristocracy. I also show how reformers were increasingly inclined to deploy architectural metaphors in their discussions of Britain’s political institutions and establishments: just as conservatives argued for the retention of the Gothic castle, progressives argued for its destruction, regarding it in some instances as either haunted or filled with harpies (i.e., Jeremy Bentham). Finally, I analyze the means by which Jacobin and Gothic novelists adopted the Gothic castle as a criticism of Britain’s so-called “establishments” and, more interestingly, came to explore the idea of identification between villains and their dark abodes in their novels.


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