From a Community of Law to a Union of Values. A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area - Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart Publishing 2015) C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2016) A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values - Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017)

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 793-816 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli
Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-169

Oppitz, Florian, Theorien der Meinungsfreiheit. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung richterlicher Grundrechtsdogmatik, Baden-Baden 2018, Nomos, 264 S. (Eva Herzog, Berlin) Jakab, András/Kochenov, Dimitry (Hrsg.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values. Ensuring Member States’ Compliance. Oxford 2017, Oxford University Press, 510 S. (Petra Lea Láncos, Speyer) White, Jonathan, Politics of Last Resort. Governing by Emergency in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, 240 S. (Eva Neumann, Heidelberg) Riege, Iris, Ambulante Interventionen der DDR-Jugendhilfe in die Familien in den 1960er bis 1980er Jahren. Rechtliche Normierung sowie tatsächliche Anlässe (Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte, Bd. 189). Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2020, 262 S. (Adrian Schmidt-Recla, Jena/Leipzig) Barth, Olivia, Zivilpersonen im modernen Luftkrieg. Herausforderungen des Rechts des bewaffneten Konflikts im Hinblick auf den Schutz von Zivilpersonen im Rahmen von Luftoperationen, Schriften zum Völkerrecht Bd. 237. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2020, 426 S. (Michael Kilian, Halle/Saale) Lorenzen, Jacqueline, Kontrolle einer sich ausdifferenzierenden EU-Eigenverwaltung, Beiträge zum Verwaltungsrecht, Band 8. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2019, 486 S. (Enrico Peuker, Berlin) Plappert, Liesa, Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz bei gebundenen Verwaltungsentscheidungen. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2020, 310 S. (Helmut Goerlich, Leipzig)


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-221
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Moss

Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities, Vivien A. Schmidt, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 326.Vivien Schmidt is a specialist on the European Union (EU) who, like most, believes that it has taken over most of the functions of the member-states, that it is a pluralist democracy superior to theirs, that it is necessary and beneficial and the wave of the future. The only problem remaining to complete the subordination of the member-states posed in her book is that their politicians have not yet found the language or discourse to convince the public of these self-evident and unavoidable truths.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


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