Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development

Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.

National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: an Experimentalist Governance Analysis

National Action Plans (NAPs) on business and human rights are a growing phenomenon. Since 2011, 42 such plans have been adopted or are in-development worldwide. By comparison, only 39 general human rights action plans were published between 1993 and 2021. In parallel, NAPs have attracted growing scholarly interest. While some studies highlight their potential to advance national compliance with international norms, others criticise NAPs as cosmetic devices that states use to deflect attention from persisting abuses and needed regulation. In response to wider critiques of international human rights norms, and their failure to exact universal state compliance, experimentalist governance theory highlights the dynamic, dialogic and iterative character of human rights implementation as well as the role of stakeholders. In this article, we apply experimentalist governance theory to evaluate the role and character of business and human rights NAPs. Rather than attempting to evaluate NAPs’ ultimate consequences for rights-holders, which appears premature, we focus on NAPs processes. Specifically, we analyse NAPs processes in twenty-five states against five experimentalist governance criteria relating to (i) stakeholder participation; (ii) agreement on a broad problem definition; (iii) local contextualisation; (iv) monitoring and peer review and (v) periodic revision and learning. According to our findings, NAPs on business and human rights in most states demonstrate resemblance to the traits of experimentalist governance. In particular, our analysis points to the emergence of relatively sophisticated and demanding institutional governance mechanisms within NAPs — including the institutionalisation of complex deliberative processes. Nevertheless, our paper also identifies some significant shortcomings in NAPs, related to the lack of inclusion of vulnerable groups and the lack of explicit indicators and targets.

Managing Nascent Digital Competition: An Assessment of Australian Merger Law under Conditions of Radical Uncertainty

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is among several national competition regulators that have recently expressed concerns about the inability of existing merger law to address competition issues that arise from acquisitions of digital start-ups. The unique characteristics of rapidly evolving digital markets present unprecedented challenges for traditional merger regimes that rely on predictions of future market conditions to justify intervention. This article argues that Australian merger law is unable to adequately address the uncertain risks presented by acquisitions of nascent competitors in digital markets. It further argues that traditional rule-based merger regimes are unable to properly navigate conditions of extreme uncertainty. An alternative regulatory model that is explored in detail is experimentalist governance, which promises to allow regulators and firms to respond to radical uncertainty by recursively crafting solutions to problems that emerge in dynamic digital markets over time.

Experimentalist Governance for Technology Upgrading

The chapter extends the familiar Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction to the public-sector domain by asking a practical “how to” question: how policymakers can set priorities assuming that they have neither the panoramic view of the economy nor good capabilities to learn. The key notion is a trial-and-error policy process—with new experimentalist public programs and policies at the center—which shifts attention from one-time choice to incremental and continuous error-detection and correction of policy choices. Central governance procedure of such policy process is diagnostic monitoring which motivates stakeholders to learn by revealing both mistakes and new possibilities for action. Such problem-solving monitoring is contrasted with conventional (accounting) monitoring. Echoing the industry life-cycle literature, a policy life cycle of a new experimentalist program is introduced. A distinction is made between experimental policy process in the managerial sense (medium-term horizon) and in the evolutionary sense (long-term horizon).

Local Adaptation Without Work Intensification: Experimentalist Governance of Digital Technology for Mutually Beneficial Role Reconfiguration in Organizations

This 1.5-year ethnographic study of a U.S. medical center shows that avoiding loss of autonomy and work intensification for less powerful actors during digital technology introduction and integration presents a multisited collective action challenge. I found that technology-related participation problems, threshold problems, and free rider problems may arise during digital technology introduction and integration that enable loss of autonomy and work intensification for less powerful actors. However, the emergence of new triangles of power allows for novel coalitions between less powerful actors and newly powerful third-party actors that can help mitigate this problem. I extend the political science perspective of experimentalist governance to examine how a digital technology-focused, iterative collective action process of local experimentation followed by central revision can facilitate mutually beneficial role reconfiguration during digital technology introduction and integration. In experimentalist governance of digital technology, local units are given discretion to adapt digital technologies to their specific contexts. A central unit composed of diverse actors then reviews progress across local units integrating similar digital technology to negotiate a new shared understanding of mutually beneficial technology-related tasks for each group of actors. The central unit modifies both local routines and the technology itself in response to problems and possibilities revealed by the central revision process, and the cycle repeats. Here, accomplishing mutually beneficial role reconfiguration occurs through an experimentalist, collective action process rather than through a labor-management bargaining process or a professional-led tuning process.