Discursive accommodation: popular protest and strategic elite communication in China

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Christoph Steinhardt

How do authoritarian states respond to, and seek to defuse, popular protest? This study answers this question by developing the concept of discursive accommodation and tracing the co-evolution of contention and strategic elite communication in China. It reveals that the Chinese Communist Party leadership has responded to waves of intense unrest with increasing, yet not unconditional, sympathy for protesters. It argues that the rationale behind this response pattern has been first, to deflect discontent from the regime and, second, to temper local official and protester behavior. And yet, the unintended consequence of discursive accommodation may well have been the acceleration of mobilization. Investigating elite discourse provides an alternative angle to understand why contention in China has become endemic, but remains conspicuously moderate. It helps to unpack the one-party state’s ability of coexisting with considerable popular pressure and not be washed away by it, and managing protest without institutionalizing it.

1984 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 24-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Young

The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization. Since late 1967, when the process of rebuilding the shattered Party began, strengthening Party leadership has been a principal theme of Chinese politics; that theme has become even more pronounced in recent years. It is now claimed that earlier efforts achieved nothing, and that during the whole “decade of turmoil” until 1976, disarray in the Party persisted and political authority declined still further. Recent programmes of Party reform, therefore, still seek to overcome the malign effects of the Cultural Revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party “traditions” and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.


1969 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 54-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle Goldman

From its inception until at least the Cultural Revolution, the Communist regime in China has had a twofold aim for its intellectuals: it has sought to indoctrinate them with the exclusive ideologies of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and it has tried to utilize their skills to develop an industrialized and modernized society. The Chinese Communist Party has attempted to implement these two policies by an insistence on the strict orthodoxy of thinking individuals, on the one hand, and by the encouragement of intellectuals to work creatively at their jobs on the other. This contradictory approach has resulted in a policy toward the intellectuals that has been alternatively severe and relaxed. Though the main trend is usually in one direction or the other, there have always been counter-currents present which can be revived when necessary.


Modern China ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Trevaskes

This article explores the political significance of “governing the nation in accordance with the law” 依法治国 ( yifa zhiguo) in the Xi Jinping era. It examines party statements and propaganda about the necessity of exercising party leadership over all key aspects of law-based governance, particularly the politico-legal system. The aim is to understand the strategic need for yifa zhiguo as part of the ideological repertoire of the Xi leadership. The argument is that yifa zhiguo is essentially an ideological and strategic message about power relations under Xi and the capacity of the party to withstand various threats to its credibility and thus ultimately to bring about the nation’s and party’s rejuvenation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Li

This article explores two interrelated aspects of the new dynamics within the CCP leadership – the new elite groups and the new ground rules in Chinese politics. The first shows profound changes in the recruitment of the elite and the second aims to reveal the changing mechanisms of political control and the checks and balances of the Chinese political system. The article argues that the future of the CCP largely depends on two seemingly contradictory needs: how broad-based will the Party's recruitment of its new elites be on the one hand and how effective will the top leadership be in controlling this increasingly diverse political institution on the other. The emerging fifth generation of leaders is likely to find the challenge of producing elite harmony and unity within the Party more difficult than their predecessors. Yet, the diverse demographic and political backgrounds of China's new leaders can also be considered a positive development that may contribute to the Chinese-style inner-Party democracy.


Author(s):  
Willy Wo-Lap Lam

This chapter explores the macro-level political development in China and the possibilities of liberalization in the context of weiquan and weiwen. The government is resorting to both hard and soft measures to maintain stability and legitimacy. On the one hand, a “scorched earth policy” is used against dissidents who may be perceived to challenge the Chinese Communist Party directly, as demonstrated by the prosecution and heavy punishment of Liu Xiaobo and his comrades-in-arms. On the other, the CCP has taken a reconciliatory approach in dealing with the poor, the liberal elements within the CCP, and the Uighurs in Xinjiang. In general, however, the CCP is retreating to a conservative comfort zone ideologically and institutionally. This suggests that there are only slim chances of further political reform.


Author(s):  
Benno Weiner

This chapter looks at the events in Zeku County and beyond from the end of the High Tide in summer of 1956 through the eve of the Great Leap Forward in late 1957. This period, referred to as an “un-Maoist interlude,” was marked by a retreat from plans for rapid collectivization and even saw a push during the One Hundred Flowers campaign to encourage open criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) so that its mistakes could be rectified. A centerpiece was soliciting critiques from United Front figures, particularly Han intellectuals but also leading minority nationality figures. Among the latter, many complained that the autonomy the CCP promised non-Han communities at the time of “Liberation” had proved more mirage than fact. Far from a reactionary stance, in the months following the Eighth Party Congress, this critique was widely promoted in Party and government circles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 50-57
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

Xi Jinping and Li Zhanshu share many similarities and formed a bond as rooky party secretaries in counties in Hebei province in the 1980s. Xi brought Li to Beijing in 2012 and Li played a key role in drumming up support for Xi to become the “core” of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. Li is expected to join the next Politburo Standing Committee and play a more prominent role in Xi’s second term.


Author(s):  
Ning Wang

This introductory chapter argues that political exiles to the Great Northern Wilderness were not necessarily real or even potential opponents of Mao's government, rather, they were often “loyal dissidents” and faithful followers of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Some of them were receptive to ideological remoulding and worked hard to achieve self-redemption. This struggle for redemption was self-imposed and was significantly compounded by mental and physical distress. In addition to Party politics, the conditions in the camps also contributed to the suffering of exiles. The chapter looks at both the resistance and subversion of state efforts to subdue these exiles on the one hand, and regrettable infighting and service to those same dark forces on the other.


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