Naval mines: Legal considerations in armed conflict and peacetime

2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (902) ◽  
pp. 543-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Letts

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to examine the key elements of the legal framework in which naval mines are used both across the spectrum of conflict and during peacetime. The article will also consider the legal issues associated with the use of mines by States in international armed conflict, and address the distinct legal issues which arise in non-international armed conflict, where the emergence of an increasing presence of non-State armed groups has been a hallmark of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The obligations placed upon States in peacetime, and under the law of neutrality, when the use and presence of naval mines is a relevant factor will also be analyzed.

Emerging technologies have always played an important role in armed conflict. From the crossbow to cyber capabilities, technology that could be weaponized to create an advantage over an adversary has inevitably found its way into military arsenals for use in armed conflict. The weaponization of emerging technologies, however, raises challenging legal issues with respect to the law of armed conflict. As States continue to develop and exploit new technologies, how will the law of armed conflict address the use of these technologies on the battlefield? Is existing law sufficient to regulate new technologies, such as cyber capabilities, autonomous weapons systems, and artificial intelligence? Have emerging technologies fundamentally altered the way we should understand concepts such as law-of-war precautions and the principle of distinction? How can we ensure compliance and accountability in light of technological advancement? This book explores these critical questions while highlighting the legal challenges—and opportunities—presented by the use of emerging technologies on the battlefield.


This chapter studies the early termination of collateral transactions. It is in this context that the transactions must prove their worth, i.e. must show they indeed reduce or limit the credit risk the collateral taker runs on the collateral provider. To achieve this result, contractual techniques have been developed that have subsequently been sanctioned and protected by the law. The chapter looks at the legal framework regulating those contractual techniques. However, the early termination of collateral transactions and the enforcement by the collateral taker of its rights in the assets provided as collateral involve specific legal issues. The majority of collateral transactions provide for 'close-out netting' as a way of enforcement; close-out netting thus replaces traditional enforcement of security interests, such as public auction. In addition, the termination of collateral transactions, and close-out netting in particular, in multiple jurisdictions is protected by 'safe harbours', i.e. shielded from insolvency law rules that would otherwise be applicable.


2011 ◽  
Vol 93 (882) ◽  
pp. 463-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

AbstractArmed groups frequently issue ad hoc commitments that contain a law of armed conflict component. These commitments detail the obligation of the relevant armed group to abide by international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, or particular rules set out in the commitment. They commit the group to abide by international standards, sometimes exceed international standards, or in certain respects violate international standards. Although these commitments are often overlooked, they offer certain lessons for the law of armed conflict. This article considers the commitments of armed groups with respect to two specific areas of the law that are either of contested interpretation or seemingly inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts, namely the identification of legitimate targets and the prisoners of war regime.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58
Author(s):  
Sardar M. A. Waqar Khan Arif

Human rights are available to everyone on the basis of humanity. Universality, non-discrimination, equality and inalienability are core principles governing International Human rights Law (IHRL). The law governing armed conflict or war is known as International humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case of armed conflict, IHRL poses certain obligations on states along with humanitarian obligations. In this context, this article identifies the international human rights obligations of States in armed conflict. It argues that States must respect, promote, protect and fulfill human rights obligations of individuals, in the case of armed conflict, with increasing and serious concern, by analyzing the applicable legal framework under IHRL. It also addresses the extraterritorial application of IHRL and its limitations and derogations in armed conflict. Further, it discusses contemporary challenges for States in jurisdictional applicability and implementation of IHRL. To that extent, the argument developed throughout this article is that States have obligations under IHRL, irrespective of humanitarian obligations, not only in peace situations but also in the case of war or armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin

This chapter provides a historical account of the manner in which the legal personality of armed groups was conceived and treated prior to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Conducting a detailed review of the law of belligerency and the legal framework of insurgency, the chapter demonstrates the different ways in which armed groups could acquire obligations under international law under these frameworks. During the course of this examination, the chapter pays particular attention to the relevance of territory, special agreements, State consent, and the armed group’s functionality. It concludes by analysing its findings against the evaluative framework set out in Chapter 3.


2011 ◽  
Vol 93 (884) ◽  
pp. 993-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Schwendimann

AbstractObtaining and maintaining humanitarian access to populations in need by humanitarian actors is a challenge. A wide range of constraints on humanitarian access exist, including ongoing hostilities or an otherwise insecure environment, destruction of infrastructure, often onerous bureaucratic requirements, and attempts by parties to armed conflict to block access intentionally. The difficulties that these constraints present to humanitarians are frequently compounded by a lack of familiarity – on the part of states, non-state armed groups, and humanitarian relief organizations – with the legal framework. The main purpose of this article is to lay out the existing international legal framework regulating humanitarian access in situations of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro

Abstract War has increasingly concealed itself by way of euphemism and undeclared armed conflict, a practice that has unsettled the distinction between wartime and peacetime. Each of the four books reviewed herein touches upon this topic, either directly or indirectly. Carson addresses the features of and reasons for covert operations over the course of the twentieth century, focusing on concerted concerns over the risk of escalation. Hoffman and Weiss investigate the evolution of the mainstay commitment to humanitarianism in the international arena, and the extent to which it has become increasingly attached to security. Fazal largely agrees with this conclusion, but takes it one step further. She persuasively shows how the proliferation of international humanitarian law led to a decrease in formal declarations of war among states, a practice that contributed to semantic confusion as well as to the growing use of euphemism to account for armed conflict. Schadlow argues consistently for greater conceptual and practical links between war and postconflict governance, pointing, among other things, to how ill-conceived strategy regarding the broader meaning of war leads to unsuccessful military operations. The review essay subsequently links this common thread—particularly the concealed types of warfare, the use of euphemism, and limited conceptions of armed conflict—to ongoing debates on wartime and peacetime and their relationship to the international order. Overall, the international order's specific setup in conjunction with how war is no longer explicitly recognized or declared has resulted in a division of labor among the military, technocrats, and the police. This division of labor has in turn unsettled the traditional distinction between peacetime and wartime to the effect that the latter is no longer explicitly acknowledged.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Gal

In 2016 Daragh Murray published his book Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Hart 2016). By way of distinction from many other contributions on this widely discussed topic, Murray tries to provide the reader with a complete overview of the legal framework that enables armed groups to acquire international legal status, and preferably outside the framework of armed conflict. He walks the reader through the path of international legal personality, leading towards the acknowledgement of armed groups as addressees of the law. Murray's attempt is courageous, interesting and innovative, but it has its shortcomings. These include his reliance on international criminal law as a source for defining armed groups, and his insistence on stepping outside international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, his contribution is essential for those who wish to include even more armed groups on the international plane.


Author(s):  
McLaughlin Robert

This introductory chapter argues that most difficulties encountered in the application of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), or in proffering fixes for alleged lacunae in LOAC, are dealt with through exegetical analysis from modern rules and their underpinning principles. This is generally undertaken with a view towards progressive development of the law. Nowhere is this more currently apparent than in relation to grappling with the status and obligations of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the context of non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The chapter then presents three assumptions. The legal assumption is that the threshold between civil war and international armed conflict (IAC) is not an exact correlate of that between NIAC and IAC. The doctrinal assumption is that the harmonization of NIAC and IAC LOAC will never be total. Finally, the historical assumption is that a true rendering of the utility and influence of a legal doctrine is born of an assessment of its uses as an analytical tool, not just as a label for an outcome. The chapter also sets out the methodological background to the project: why and how this book will examine recognition of belligerency, and some clarifications on terminology.


2018 ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Ford

The U.S. military Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) restrict the use of force in armed conflict to either self-defense or “mission-specific” rules of engagement, which refer to the use of force against members of enemy armed forces or organized armed groups that have been “declared hostile.” This bifurcation of authority works well in an international armed conflict, where the enemy force is uniformed and easily distinguished. In these circumstances, the overwhelming number of engagements are against identified hostile forces. In many non-international armed conflicts, however, combatants actively attempt to camouflage their status, and U.S. forces find themselves engaging enemy forces under a self-defense framework. This creates problems. Consider, for example, a situation where three individuals of unknown affiliation launch an attack against a U.S. military convoy in Afghanistan. After a short engagement, the attackers get in a van and speed away from the attack site. The U.S. convoy is disabled, but an unmanned aerial vehicle tracks the van as it retreats into the desert. Thirty minutes later an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter arrives on scene above the still-retreating van. Can the Apache attack the vehicle? The van is retreating and poses no threat, thus self-defense principles would not allow for the use of force, despite the fact that the occupants are clearly directly participating in hostilities. This chapter addresses three questions: Why are the SROE drafted in this manner? What is the basis in the law for the SROE’s approach to self-defense? What are the problems presented by this approach?


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