Island-Building in the South China Sea: Legality and Limits

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tara DAVENPORT
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Southeast Asian ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
Spratly Islands ◽  
Building Activities ◽  
Legal Constraints

AbstractAll the claimants in the South China Sea disputes have engaged in various degrees of island-building on many of the geographic features in the Spratly Islands. However, as noted by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration, none has been on the scale of Chinese island-building on the features which it occupies, which escalated after the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings in 2013. While the most important aspect of the Award is that it clarified the extent of the respective maritime rights of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, the Tribunal’s rulings on the reclamation and island-building activities of China are equally significant. To this end, this paper will examine the findings of the Tribunal on the legality of China’s island-building activities as well as legal constraints on such activities (if any). Last, it will explore the implications of these findings for the Southeast Asian claimants and island-building and fortification of the features that they occupy.

China's Assertive Posture in Reinforcing its Territorial and Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea: An Insight into Malaysia's Stance

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-105
Author(s):  
MOHAMMAD ZAKI AHMAD ◽  
MOHD AZIZUDDIN MOHD SANI
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
Policy Preference ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
Spratly Islands ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractChina's growing assertiveness in strengthening its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea has arguably intensified friction and deepened tension between the rival claimant States. In sharp contrast to the strong reactions of its fellow ASEAN claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia traditionally has been less critical and more inclined to downplay China's perceived emotive actions. This subtle foreign policy orientation is likely to remain unchanged in the immediate future. Malaysian leaders are aware of the need to continue adopting a more cautious but pragmatic approach to counter China's increasingly aggressive actions in the Spratly Islands. Because of the significant economic and political benefits derived from its close relationships with China, Malaysia's policy preference is aimed to avoid jeopardizing such relations. However, the growing presence of Chinese military vessels in Malaysia's waters in recent years has forced the latter to reassess its foreign policy approach, which might include adopting a more assertive stance towards China. Set against this backdrop, this article aims to give an exploratory insight into Malaysia's external behaviour and actions in response to China's recent growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea. To this end, the aim of this article is achieved through a twofold approach. First, it examines Malaysia's overlapping claims to maritime features and waters with China, with the focus on the Spratly Islands group. Lastly, the article provides an explorative insight of Malaysia's rationalist stance, particularly under the current administration of Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, in response to China's aggressiveness. It also examines the motivations, intentions, and basis of this external posture.

scholarly journals The Strategy of Power Politics of the Philippines in Facing China in the South China Sea Conflict

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-216
Author(s):  
Ahmad Fauzi Imanuddin ◽  
Sugito Sugito
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
Military Power ◽  
The South ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
China Sea ◽  
Spratly Islands

The South China Sea conflict has involved many parties, including the Philippines. In defending one of the most strategic islands, the Spratly Islands, the Philippines has exerted its hard power by increasing its military power strategy. By engaging the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and working with the U.S., the Philippines can increase its military power. The prior studies have only explored how the dispute in SCS is caused by maritime growth, and some have found the effective way to solve the issue is from the liberal perspective. This study uses a power politics approach to the Philippines' strategy to defend the Spratly Islands and its surroundings in the South China Sea dispute. It analyzes the Philippines' interests in the Spratly islands. The research was conducted using qualitative methods through literature study, and the data were analyzed, then described to obtain a complete picture of the answers to the problems studied. This finding explores how the Philippines' defense strategy works and how it is generated. The results of this study indicate that the defense strategy in the Spratly Islands is generated by the national interests of the Philippines, especially in the economic field.

Risk of conflict will rise in the South China Sea

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
Content Type ◽  
China Sea ◽  
Building Activities

Subject Risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. Significance US patrols close to Chinese installations in the South China Sea, in the context of growing willingness among China, Vietnam and the Philippines to assert maritime claims by force, raise fears of lethal clashes. These have occurred before, between China and Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, leading respectively to around 70 and 60 deaths. Impacts Neither China's rival claimants nor the United States are likely to risk physically disrupting China's island-building activities. Unintended conflict is more likely than calculated use of force. Conflict between China and Vietnam is the most likely conflict scenario. Washington's need to preserve credibility as a treaty ally and security guarantor would force it to intervene in conflicts.

Fisheries Co-operation in the South China Sea and the (Ir)relevance of the Sovereignty Question

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thang NGUYEN DANG
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Spratly Islands ◽  
Low Profile ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Petroleum Development

Joint petroleum development has often been considered as a viable solution to the seemingly intractable Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea (SCS). This is, however, more easily said than done. On the other hand, little attention is paid to fisheries co-operation in the SCS despite the fact that fisheries constitute an important part in the economies of coastal states. The present laissez-faire approach to fisheries in the disputed area gives rise to friction and tension. By highlighting the salient features of existing fisheries’ co-operative arrangements in the world, this article demonstrates the merits of a fisheries arrangement in the SCS. It also argues that fisheries co-operation, as a low-profile undertaking, is probably easier to achieve than joint petroleum development. A fisheries arrangement would serve the immediate interests of parties to the Spratly Islands dispute and may pave the way for their future high-profile co-operation, i.e. joint petroleum development.

The South China Sea Arbitration: Bindingness, Finality, and Compliance with UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Decisions

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-50
Author(s):  
Hao Duy PHAN ◽  
Lan Ngoc NGUYEN
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
China Sea ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
State Compliance ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

AbstractOn 12 July 2016, the Tribunal in theSouth China Seaarbitration issued its final award. China rejected the ruling as “null and void”. The Philippines dismissed it as “a piece of paper” after initially hailing the ruling a “milestone decision”. The reactions of the parties concerned raise important questions about the bindingness, finality, and state compliance with UNCLOS dispute settlement decisions. This paper addresses these questions by dissecting China’s arguments that the award “has no binding force” and by examining the options available for promoting compliance with the award. The paper also considers the broader question of how states generally comply with UNCLOS dispute settlement decisions and evaluates the significance of UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms, including theSouth China Seaarbitration, in the absence of external enforcement.

Diurnal Cycle of Coastal Convection in the South China Sea Region and Modulation by the BSISO

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-53
Author(s):  
Weixin Xu ◽  
Steven A. Rutledge ◽  
Kyle Chudler
Keyword(s):  
South China Sea ◽  
South China ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
The South China Sea ◽  
Boreal Summer ◽  
Total Precipitation ◽  
The South ◽  
Low Level ◽  
China Sea ◽  
Diurnal Cycles

AbstractUsing 17-yr spaceborne precipitation radar measurements, this study investigates how diurnal cycles of rainfall and convective characteristics over the South China Sea region are modulated by the Boreal Summer Intraseasonal Oscillation (BSISO). Generally, diurnal cycles change significantly between suppressed and active BSISO periods. Over the Philippines and Indochina, where the low-level monsoon flows impinge on coast lines, diurnal cycles of rainfall and many convective properties are enhanced during suppressed periods. During active periods, diurnal variation of convection is still significant over land but diminishes over water. Also, afternoon peaks of rainfall and MCS populations over land are obviously extended in active periods, mainly through the enhancement of stratiform precipitation. Over Borneo, where the prevailing low-level winds are parallel to coasts, diurnal cycles (both onshore and offshore) are actually stronger during active periods. Radar profiles also demonstrate a pronounced nocturnal offshore propagation of deep convection over western Borneo in active periods. During suppressed periods, coastal afternoon convection over Borneo is reduced, and peak convection occurs over the mountains until the convective suppression is overcome in the late afternoon or evening. A major portion (> 70%) of the total precipitation over Philippines and Indochina during suppressed periods falls from afternoon isolated to medium-sized systems (< 10,000 km2), but more than 70% of the active BSISO rainfall is contributed by nocturnal (after 18 LT) broad precipitation systems (> 10,000 km2). However, offshore total precipitation is dominated by large precipitation systems (> 10,000 km2) regardless of BSISO phases and regions.

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