China's Assertive Posture in Reinforcing its Territorial and Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea: An Insight into Malaysia's Stance

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-105
Author(s):  
MOHAMMAD ZAKI AHMAD ◽  
MOHD AZIZUDDIN MOHD SANI

AbstractChina's growing assertiveness in strengthening its territorial and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea has arguably intensified friction and deepened tension between the rival claimant States. In sharp contrast to the strong reactions of its fellow ASEAN claimants, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia traditionally has been less critical and more inclined to downplay China's perceived emotive actions. This subtle foreign policy orientation is likely to remain unchanged in the immediate future. Malaysian leaders are aware of the need to continue adopting a more cautious but pragmatic approach to counter China's increasingly aggressive actions in the Spratly Islands. Because of the significant economic and political benefits derived from its close relationships with China, Malaysia's policy preference is aimed to avoid jeopardizing such relations. However, the growing presence of Chinese military vessels in Malaysia's waters in recent years has forced the latter to reassess its foreign policy approach, which might include adopting a more assertive stance towards China. Set against this backdrop, this article aims to give an exploratory insight into Malaysia's external behaviour and actions in response to China's recent growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea. To this end, the aim of this article is achieved through a twofold approach. First, it examines Malaysia's overlapping claims to maritime features and waters with China, with the focus on the Spratly Islands group. Lastly, the article provides an explorative insight of Malaysia's rationalist stance, particularly under the current administration of Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, in response to China's aggressiveness. It also examines the motivations, intentions, and basis of this external posture.

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-358
Author(s):  
Renato Cruz De Castro

Focusing on the Philippines’ changing foreign policy agendas on the South China Sea dispute, this article examines the limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) intergovernmental approach in addressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. It contends that former President Benigno Aquino III tried to harness this regional organisation in his balancing policy vis-à-vis China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. On the contrary, President Rodrigo Duterte promoted his appeasement policy on China when he became the ASEAN’s chairperson in 2017, and pushed for the elusive passage of the ASEAN–China Code of Conduct in 2019. In conclusion, the article scrutinises the implications of this shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy for the ASEAN, and raises the need for this regional organisation to rethink its intergovernmental approach to the security challenges posed by the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-65
Author(s):  
Lowell Bautista

Abstract The South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal award was an overwhelming legal and moral victory for the Philippines. The arbitral tribunal categorically declared that China’s nine-dash line claim is incompatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, China’s defiance of the ruling and refusal to honor and implement the award pose a serious challenge to Manila’s victory. In addition, the astonishing shift in Philippine foreign policy direction, alongside the change in government, flouts the arbitral award and undermines previous State policies assertive of Philippine maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea. The current direction of Philippine-China relations under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has demonstrated positive signs of improvement compared with acrimonious bilateral relations pursued by the previous Aquino administration. The arbitral award has largely been set aside in the government’s effort to restore amicable economic and diplomatic relations with China. This paper examines the South China Sea arbitral award amidst shifting Philippine foreign policy under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Nguyen Huong Thach Thao

Abstract In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued its final award on the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China that caught the attention of the international community. Since this was the first time that a claimant in the South China Sea had ever referred the case to an international juridical body in an effort to settle the dispute, the responses of both claimant and non-claimant stakeholders were awaited. Realising the relevance of the issue, I conduct a comparative study of the responses to the PCA’s final award to two major claimants with similar positions on the South China Sea—the Philippines and Vietnam. The main aim of this study is to indicate the similarities and/or differences in the way these two states responded to the final decisions of the PCA. The study finds that even though both the Philippines and Vietnam reacted to the award in a similar manner, the motives behind their responses were different. In general, the South China Sea policy of the Philippines has always been less consistent than that of Vietnam, which can be explained through each state’s foreign policy tendencies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tara DAVENPORT

AbstractAll the claimants in the South China Sea disputes have engaged in various degrees of island-building on many of the geographic features in the Spratly Islands. However, as noted by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration, none has been on the scale of Chinese island-building on the features which it occupies, which escalated after the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings in 2013. While the most important aspect of the Award is that it clarified the extent of the respective maritime rights of China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, the Tribunal’s rulings on the reclamation and island-building activities of China are equally significant. To this end, this paper will examine the findings of the Tribunal on the legality of China’s island-building activities as well as legal constraints on such activities (if any). Last, it will explore the implications of these findings for the Southeast Asian claimants and island-building and fortification of the features that they occupy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennie Joyce Candice ◽  
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita

The South China Sea (SCS) has become the largest and the crucial Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) not only for Southeast Asia but also for the world. As one of the claimants of the South China Sea, Philippines were always and will always be trying to protect its national interests in the disputed waterways as part of its national territory. This article discusses about the shift and continuity of the Philippines� foreign policy on the South China Sea issue. It explicates the shift and continuity of Philippines foreign policy under Rodrigo Duterte to the South China Sea. A more focus elaboration will be devoted on how the Philippines implemented its foreign policy to deal with China in the South China Sea dispute.It argues that Duterte foreign policy to this delicate issue is always based on the strategic dynamic of its �two-level game� (domestic and international political stimuli) to its national interests.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-216
Author(s):  
Ahmad Fauzi Imanuddin ◽  
Sugito Sugito

The South China Sea conflict has involved many parties, including the Philippines. In defending one of the most strategic islands, the Spratly Islands, the Philippines has exerted its hard power by increasing its military power strategy. By engaging the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and working with the U.S., the Philippines can increase its military power. The prior studies have only explored how the dispute in SCS is caused by maritime growth, and some have found the effective way to solve the issue is from the liberal perspective. This study uses a power politics approach to the Philippines' strategy to defend the Spratly Islands and its surroundings in the South China Sea dispute. It analyzes the Philippines' interests in the Spratly islands. The research was conducted using qualitative methods through literature study, and the data were analyzed, then described to obtain a complete picture of the answers to the problems studied. This finding explores how the Philippines' defense strategy works and how it is generated. The results of this study indicate that the defense strategy in the Spratly Islands is generated by the national interests of the Philippines, especially in the economic field.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennie Joyce Candice ◽  
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita

This article explicates the implementation of “Equi-Balancing” foreign policy of the Philippines toward China in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. It argues that in order to protects its core national interests, Philippines should be able to manage its constructive relations with China. In order to do so, Philippines under the Rodrigo Duterte administration formulated and implemented cooperative maritime diplomacy to China. The main objectives of this cooperative maritime diplomacy were creating a closer the Philippines-China relations and on the hand, making some diplomatic distance to the United States in the SCS issue. This article utilises qualitative research method in deciphering the above cooperative maritime diplomacy. To achieve these goals, the Philippines has conducted several concrete actions by building: its sofpower, self confidence and coalition.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thang NGUYEN DANG

Joint petroleum development has often been considered as a viable solution to the seemingly intractable Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea (SCS). This is, however, more easily said than done. On the other hand, little attention is paid to fisheries co-operation in the SCS despite the fact that fisheries constitute an important part in the economies of coastal states. The present laissez-faire approach to fisheries in the disputed area gives rise to friction and tension. By highlighting the salient features of existing fisheries’ co-operative arrangements in the world, this article demonstrates the merits of a fisheries arrangement in the SCS. It also argues that fisheries co-operation, as a low-profile undertaking, is probably easier to achieve than joint petroleum development. A fisheries arrangement would serve the immediate interests of parties to the Spratly Islands dispute and may pave the way for their future high-profile co-operation, i.e. joint petroleum development.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-50
Author(s):  
Hao Duy PHAN ◽  
Lan Ngoc NGUYEN

AbstractOn 12 July 2016, the Tribunal in theSouth China Seaarbitration issued its final award. China rejected the ruling as “null and void”. The Philippines dismissed it as “a piece of paper” after initially hailing the ruling a “milestone decision”. The reactions of the parties concerned raise important questions about the bindingness, finality, and state compliance with UNCLOS dispute settlement decisions. This paper addresses these questions by dissecting China’s arguments that the award “has no binding force” and by examining the options available for promoting compliance with the award. The paper also considers the broader question of how states generally comply with UNCLOS dispute settlement decisions and evaluates the significance of UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms, including theSouth China Seaarbitration, in the absence of external enforcement.


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