Does Size Matter? The ICRW and the Inclusion of Small Cetaceans

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Stephenson ◽  
Arne Mooers ◽  
Amir Attaran

AbstractThe competency debate over small cetacean regulation at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is legal in nature, yet has been in a political stalemate for years. In this article we argue that the IWC has the competence to regulate small cetaceans and that the commercial whaling of ‘small cetaceans’ is a violation of the moratorium on commercial whaling. We present hybrid legal and scientific arguments and counter-arguments for the treaty interpretation of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and, given recent precedent, advocate that the International Court of Justice be called upon to resolve this matter.

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Gogarty

The recent judgment in the International Court of Justice case Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) determined that Japanese ‘special permit’ whaling in the Southern Ocean was not ‘for the purposes of scientific research’. This is the only exemption permitted under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’s current moratorium on commercial whaling. The Court made its determination by characterising the Japanese research program as a scientific program, but failing to define what scientific research actually was or was not. This paper presents the background to the decision, and challenges the reasoning of the Court and its standard of review test. It concludes that the Court failed to take the opportunity to offer a clear determination to states on their legal–scientific obligations within international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-726
Author(s):  
Anastasia Telesetsky ◽  
Seokwoo Lee

Since the global decline in commercial whaling, the International Whaling Commission (iwc) has been at the centre of a long-standing debate between pro-whaling industry States and whale preservation States that threatens the collapse of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (icrw) as a treaty regime. This article describes the ongoing treaty regime disagreement that led to the International Court of Justice (icj) Whaling in the Antarctic case and suggests that the icj’s decision highlights further weaknesses in the existing icrw treaty regime. The fissures in the treaty regime have become even more apparent with the iwc Scientific Committee’s request for more data from the Japanese government on the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (newrep-a) and Japan’s diplomatic threat to unilaterally resume whaling. The article concludes with a suggestion that States amend Article viii in order to strengthen the existing icrw framework.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cymie R. Payne

AbstractThe International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment inWhaling in the Antarctic, a dispute brought by Australia against Japan, found that Japan had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) moratoria on all commercial whaling and the use of factory ships to process whales, and also the prohibition on whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. In the course of analyzing whether special permits issued by Japan qualified for the scientific whaling exemption under Article VIII ICRW, the Court benefited from a more robust scientific fact-finding process than at times in the past. The judgment emphasized the mutual obligations of this multilateral agreement by taking the view that the provisions of the ICRW’s scientific whaling exemptions are neither self-judging nor subject to a ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of a state party claiming the exemption. The case was driven by conflicting attitudes towards commercial whaling, and also towards global common spaces. The ICJ’s decision and Japan’s response indicate the limits of the ICRW in resolving those differences.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (51) ◽  
pp. 14523-14527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Mangel

I provide a brief review of the origins of the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling and the failure to successfully regulate whaling that led to the commercial moratorium in 1986. I then describe the Japanese Whale Research Programs Under Special Permit in the Antarctica (JARPA I, JARPA II) and the origins of the caseWhaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)in the International Court of Justice. I explain that the International Court of Justice chose to conduct an objective review of JARPA II, the standard that it used for the review, and the pathway that it took to adjudicate the case without providing a definition of science to be used in international law. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the Judgment for the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, and the International Whaling Commission in particular, for other international treaties, and for the interaction of science and law more generally.


Author(s):  
Olena Polivanova

The article examines the Judgment of the United Nations International Court of Justice of November 8, 2019, on the preliminary objections of the Russian Federation in the dispute concerning the application of the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Ukraine v. Russian Federation”), filed to the Registry of the Court by Ukraine on January 16, 2017. Given that in its Judgment the International Court of Justice confirmed its jurisdiction ratione materiae on the bases invoked by Ukraine, the article considers the Court’s substantiation of its position in this regard. As to the Judgment, for the determination of the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae in the dispute under art. 24.1 of the ICSFT it is crucial to clarify whether a dispute between the parties concerns the interpretation or application of the relevant Convention. Having interpreted the ICSFT provisions, the Court found that the actions of the Russian Federation contested by Ukraine fall within its scope. The Court, thus, dismissed the RF's objection to the ratione materiae jurisdiction under the ICSFT. As the parties had made a genuine attempt to settle the dispute and since the dispute could not be resolved by negotiations within a reasonable time, the Court stated that Ukraine had satisfied the procedural precondition for art. 24.1 of the ICSFT application. In order to determine jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court under the ICERD, it was essential for the Court to be convinced that the measures of which Ukraine complains fall within provisions of the ICERD. Considering that both parties agreed that Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea constitute ethnic groups protected under the ICERD and based on the provisions of the ICERD interpretation, the Court found that the measures of the Russian Federation challenged by Ukraine were capable of having adverse effect on enjoyment of certain rights protected under the ICERD. These measures fall within provisions of the Convention. Therefore, the Court concluded that Ukraine's claims fall within the scope of the ICERD. Determining whether the procedural preconditions under art. 22 of the ICERD have been met, the Court had to define whether two preconditions enshrined in the article are alternative or cumulative. By application of rules of customary international law on treaty interpretation, the Court found that art. 22 of the ICERD imposes alternative preconditions for the Court's jurisdiction. As the dispute between the parties was not referred to the Committee of the Convention, the Court examined whether the parties attempted to negotiate settlement to their dispute. The Court found that there has been a failure of negotiations between the parties and those negotiations had become futile or deadlocked by time Ukraine filed its application to the Court under art. 22 of the Convention. Accordingly, the procedural preconditions for the Court’s jurisdiction under art. 22 of the ICERD are satisfied in the circumstances of this case. As a result, the Court has jurisdiction to hear Ukraine's claims based on the ICERD.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-407
Author(s):  
Udoka Ndidiamaka Owie

Abstract International law has a long history of dealing with racial discrimination, including its involvement in the perpetration of racial discrimination. However, in establishing a body of norms to tackle the problems of racial discrimination, several multilateral instruments have been adopted under the auspices of the United Nations addressing this malaise to various extents with the most extensive being the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of 21 December 1965. While lauded for its singular and dedicated focus on racial discrimination, the Convention is challenged, at least interpretatively, as to the grounds for racial discrimination within its remit. Events occurring between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates on 5 June 2017 have afforded the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an opportunity—the third since the coming into effect of the Convention—to interpret this landmark treaty.


2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 973-1030
Author(s):  
Alexandra Hofer

On July 23, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) issued its Order on Qatar's request for provisional measures in the Qatar v. United Arab Emirates (UAE) case in which Qatar claims the UAE is responsible for violating the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD or the Convention). The Court has previously ordered provisional measures under CERD in the context of the Ukraine v. Russia case and in the Georgia v. Russia proceedings. As is already apparent in the Order and the dissenting and separate opinions, the Qatar v. UAE case raises important issues pertaining to the interpretation of racial discrimination on the basis of “national origin” under Article 1(1) CERD as well as to the reading of the procedural conditions under Article 22 CERD.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liliana E. Popa

This article revises the topic of treaty interpretation at the International Court of Justice and focuses on what judges at this Court do in terms of treaty interpretation. The main argument developed in the article, based on an extended analysis of case-law at the ICJ, prior to and after the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is that the ICJ’s approaches to interpretation after the VCLT was adopted are consistent with the canons of treaty interpretation which this Court has greatly developed and applied with consistency since its inception. The case-law analysis reveals a preference of the PCIJ/ICJ for holistic interpretation, and thus for the use of more rules and methods of interpretation than initially declared by the Court as sufficient to solve the issue of interpretation before it, in an interpretative approach which could be termed ‘overbuilding’.


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