Self-determination as a Challenge to the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions: The Case of Kosovo

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Srdjan Cvijic

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War were greeted by many as an important step in the unstoppable development of human civilization. Francis Fukuyama even announced, in his celebrated essay of the same name, the “end of history” and the triumph of the liberal democratic model, which, according to him, was soon to become the most dominant, if not the only, form of organized human community.

Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-76
Author(s):  
Ajnesh Prasad

“The international community is at a crossroads” (Held, 1995a: 96). Since the conclusion of the Cold War and with the elimination of the bipolar world thereafter, many scholars have attempted to theorize, if only to evaluate, the transformations that have taken place within the realm of world politics in the last decade and a half. From Francis Fukuyama’s argument, the “End of History” (1992), to Samuel Huntington’s thesisclaim, the “Clash of Civilizations” (1993), there have been categorizing, and ultimately limiting, understandings of international affairs in the postcommunist period. Consequently, discursive and explicit interstices of antagonistic tension continue to prevail and manifest into graphic demonstrations of hegemonic aggression and parochial actions of daily resistance. The international interstices of antagonistic tension continue to threaten immeasurable tragedy at the most globalized landscape. Remnants of these present tensions go so far as to predicate the aggressive and resistant temperament of events like the aircraft attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. [...]


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Idriss Jazairy

AbstractAs part of the roundtable “Economic Sanctions and Their Consequences,” this essay examines unilateral coercive measures. These types of sanctions are applied outside the scope of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and were developed and refined in the West in the context of the Cold War. Yet the eventual collapse of the Berlin Wall did not herald the demise of unilateral sanctions; much to the contrary. While there are no incontrovertible data on the extent of these measures, one can safely say that they target in some way a full quarter of humanity. In addition to being a major attack on the principle of self-determination, unilateral measures not only adversely affect the rights to international trade and to navigation but also the basic human rights of innocent civilians. The current deterioration of the situation, with the mutation of embargoes into blockades and impositions on third parties, is a threat to peace that needs to be upgraded in strategic concern.


1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-535
Author(s):  
Ali A. Mazrui

IntroductionThe debate about the end of history raises issues that sometimestouch almost upon the philosophy of history, insofar as they relate to thesignificance of not only a particular century but of the human species.Francis Fukuyama provoked this debate in his seminal article entitled,"The End of History?" in the journal The National Interest. 'At the end ofthe twentieth century, Fukuyama saw "an unabashed Victory of economicand political liberalism."' His central argument was that the whole worldwas moving towards a liberal democratic capitalist system that was destinedto be the final sociopolitical paradigm of all human evolution. AsFukuyama put it:What we may be witnessing is just not the end of the Cold War,or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but theend of history as such that is, the end point of mankind's ideologicalevolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracyas the final form of human govemment.For Fukuyama, at the time of writing the original article (in 1989),the momentous changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, ...


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Zaum

While the impact of norms on post-conflict statebuilding operations has been well-explored in the literature, the ways in which the same normative frameworks affect the exit practices of such operations has so far remained unaddressed. To fill this gap, this paper examines the impact of the liberal-democratic norms governing statebuilding operations on the timing and process of exit of post-conflict international transitional administrations. To that end, it first examines the concept of exit, arguing that exit is best considered as a process rather than an event. The second section outlines the normative framework that has shaped postconflict statebuilding activities since the end of the cold war, and proposes three ways in which norms can affect exit: first, that norms act as blueprints for statebuilding and can thereby shape benchmarks for exit; second, that norms create “zones of permissibility” that explicitly commit statebuilders to a transitional presence and make exit central to the legitimacy of statebuilding operations; and third, that local actors strategically use norms, in particular those of self-determination and the taboo of permanent control of a territory, to push for an early exit of statebuilding operations. The third section explores both the scope and limitations of the three functions of norms with regard to exit in the context of a brief case study of UNMIK's exit from Kosovo. The article concludes with some observations about the impact of the findings for exit strategies of international actors from statebuilding operations.


Author(s):  
Christopher Hobson

This chapter provides an introduction to the central arguments and themes of the book. It considers the standing of democracy following the end of the Cold War, noting that liberal democracy still remains ideationally in the ascent a quarter of a century later. It is suggested that there is a strong need to understand the history of democracy in order to comprehend the challenges and problems it currently faces. The historical approach the book takes is outlined, proposing that there is a need to explore democracy’s development in relation to the emergence of modern international society.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis Bauer

Clearly the East lost the Cold War to the West, suffering total economic and political collapse by the late 1980s. Yet it is not entirely clear if or what the West won. Western economies continue to labor under the extensive military commitments. The ideology of liberal democracy, although laudable, is difficult to implement. Capitalism, as an economic system, is torn between the need for perpetual growth and the protection of a fragile environment. Was the end of the Cold War truly "the end of history" as some suggest, or do the lessons of the period stand instead as a cautionary for the future?


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
Coline Covington

The Berlin Wall came down on 9 November 1989 and marked the end of the Cold War. As old antagonisms thawed a new landscape emerged of unification and tolerance. Censorship was no longer the principal means of ensuring group solidarity. The crumbling bricks brought not only freedom of movement but freedom of thought. Now, nearly thirty years later, globalisation has created a new balance of power, disrupting borders and economies across the world. The groups that thought they were in power no longer have much of a say and are anxious about their future. As protest grows, we are beginning to see that the old antagonisms have not disappeared but are, in fact, resurfacing. This article will start by looking at the dissembling of a marriage in which the wall that had peacefully maintained coexistence disintegrates and leads to a psychic development that uncannily mirrors that of populism today. The individual vignette leads to a broader psychological understanding of the totalitarian dynamic that underlies populism and threatens once again to imprison us within its walls.


Author(s):  
Sara Lorenzini

In the Cold War, “development” was a catchphrase that came to signify progress, modernity, and economic growth. Development aid was closely aligned with the security concerns of the great powers, for whom infrastructure and development projects were ideological tools for conquering hearts and minds around the globe, from Europe and Africa to Asia and Latin America. This book provides a global history of development, drawing on a wealth of archival evidence to offer a panoramic and multifaceted portrait of a Cold War phenomenon that transformed the modern world. Taking readers from the aftermath of the Second World War to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the book shows how development projects altered local realities, transnational interactions, and even ideas about development itself. The book shines new light on the international organizations behind these projects—examining their strategies and priorities and assessing the actual results on the ground—and it also gives voice to the recipients of development aid. It shows how the Cold War shaped the global ambitions of development on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and how international organizations promoted an unrealistically harmonious vision of development that did not reflect local and international differences. The book presents a global perspective on Cold War development, demonstrating how its impacts are still being felt today.


2021 ◽  
pp. 187936652199975
Author(s):  
Richard Sakwa

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall represented the beginning of the unification of Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev talked in terms of a “Common European Home,” an idea that continues in the guise of the project for a “Greater Europe.” However, right from the start, the transformative idea of Greater Europe was countered by the notion of “Europe whole and free,” whose fundamental dynamic was the enlargement of the existing West European order to encompass the rest of the continent. This was a program for the enlargement of the Atlantic system. After some prevarication, the enlargement agenda proved unacceptable to Moscow, and while it continues to argue in favor of transformation its main efforts are now devoted to creating some sort of “greater Eurasia.” There remains a fundamental tension between Atlanticist and pan-continental version of the post-–Cold War international order in the region. This tension gave rise to conflict and war: in 2008 (the Russo-Georgian War) and again from 2014 (Ukraine), and to what some call the Second Cold War. The continent is once again divided. However, pan-continentalism is far from dead, and although Greater Eurasian ideas have thrived, some sort of Greater European continentalism remains on the agenda. Is this, though, no more than a “sad delusion” or a genuine possibility?


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