scholarly journals “Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 106-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry D. Johnson

During the past several years, vetoes have been cast in the UN Security Council to block draft resolutions aimed at addressing the crises in Syria and Ukraine. Concerning Syria, Russia and China have vetoed three resolutions (the votes were 9-2-4 on October 4, 2011, 13-2-0 on February 4, 2012, and 11-2-2 on July 19, 2012). Concerning Ukraine, Russia vetoed a resolution just recently (the vote was 13-1-1 on March 15, 2014). The same question that arose in 1950 has thus arisen again today: can the General Assembly do anything when the Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto? The answer is “yes.” But the reason is not because of the Assembly’s resolution 377A(V) of November 3, 1950 (“Uniting for Peace”), even though advocates of Assembly action frequently invoke it. Indeed, this resolution is for the most part no longer needed to provide a basis for Assembly “collective measures” recommendations when a veto proscribes the Council’s adoption of such measures. Moreover, the resolution does not provide a basis or justification for the use of force that would not be justified on other grounds, such as self-defense.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Richardson

Larry Johnson’s essay on the UN General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace resolution (UFP) is a useful general analysis of issues arising from UN Security Council Permanent Member veto-paralysis. His essay, which focuses on the text of the original Resolution, is directed at asking whether the UFP retains a current “useful purpose.” Relying on a text-centric interpretation of the presence or absence of subsequent invocations of the UFP, he concludes that no “useful purpose” remains, in part because evolved General Assembly authority has displaced the need to specifically invoke the UFP to make recommendations on certain issues of international peace and security. Johnson then asks whether, under the original UFP or subsequently, the Assembly may recommend to Member States “enforcement” uses of force, notwithstanding the prohibitions of Article 2(4) of the Charter. He finds Article 2(4) to be an absolute barrier to Assembly authority to recommend those measures, but not for “innovative and inventive non-use-of force measures.”


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Stefan Talmon

In his essay on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, Larry Johnson suggests that the General Assembly can recommend non-use of force collective measures when the Security Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto. He rightly points out that today there is no longer any need to use Uniting for Peace for such recommendations. The General Assembly can and has recommended so-called “voluntary sanctions” in cases where it found a threat to international peace and security to exist. For example, in resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965 concerning the Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Assembly, making no reference to Uniting for Peace, urged “Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:(a)To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;(b)To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;(c)To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;(d)To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;(e)To boycott all trade with Portugal.”


Author(s):  
Hanna Bourgeois

Abstract In this article, I aim to explore the interpretation and implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates authorising the protection of civilians (PoC) and, in particular, the meaning of an authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians. Over the past two decades, the UN Security Council has repeatedly provided UN (mandated) peace operations with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. In doing so, it has typically authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to achieve the aforementioned objective. This PoC language has been subject to varying interpretations and implementations in practice and is therefore often considered ambiguous. The conclusion reached in this article is that PoC language is indeed vague, but that this is not necessarily problematic. It might even be unavoidable in light of the cascade structure in which the PoC mandate is placed and whereby the PoC mandate is interpreted and implemented at the various levels of authority, command, and control. What is problematic is that there is uncertainty and discussion about the limits to the use of force in the implementation of PoC mandates. After all, the formula to use ‘all necessary means’ cannot be regarded as a ‘blank cheque’ to use any amount of force. Therefore, I identify the upper limit to what UN (mandated) peace operations may lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with a mandate to use ‘all necessary means’. I also detect an emerging lower limit for what UN (mandated) peace operations must lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with such a PoC mandate.


Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) played an important role in shaping the world's response to actual and threatened atrocities in Libya. Not least, the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the UN Security Council on May 17, 2011, approving a no-fly zone over Libya and calling for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, reflected a change in the Council's attitude toward the use of force for human protection purposes; and the role played by the UN's new Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect points toward the potential for this new capacity to identify threats of mass atrocities and to focus the UN's attention on preventing them. Given the reluctance of both the Security Council and the wider UN membership even to discuss RtoP in the years immediately following the 2005 World Summit—the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly that gave birth to RtoP—these two facts suggest that significant progress has been made thanks to the astute stewardship of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who is personally committed to the principle. Where it was once a term of art employed by a handful of like-minded countries, activists, and scholars, but regarded with suspicion by much of the rest of the world, RtoP has become a commonly accepted frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities.


1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Bowett

Few propositions about international law have enjoyed more support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal. Although, indeed, the words “reprisals” and “retaliation ” are not to be found in the Charter, this proposition was generally regarded by writers2 and by the Security Council as the logical and necessary consequence of the prohibition of force in Article 2(4), the injunction to settle disputes peacefully in Article 2(3) and the limiting of permissible force by states to self-defense. The U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) on October 24, 1970, contains the following categorical statement: “States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rashid I. Khalidi

This essay argues that what has been going on in Palestine for a century has been mischaracterized. Advancing a different perspective, it illuminates the history of the last hundred years as the Palestinians have experienced it. In doing so, it explores key historical documents, including the Balfour Declaration, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and UN Security Council Resolution 242, none of which included the Palestinians in key decisions impacting their lives and very survival. What amounts to a hundred years of war against the Palestinians, the essay contends, should be seen in comparative perspective as one of the last major colonial conflicts of the modern era, with the United States and Europe serving as the metropole, and their extension, Israel, operating as a semi-independent settler colony. An important feature of this long war has been the Palestinians' continuing resistance, against heavy odds, to colonial subjugation. Stigmatizing such resistance as “terrorism” has successfully occluded the real history of the past hundred years in Palestine.


Author(s):  
Jasmine-Kim Westendorf

In the past fifteen years, despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Zero Tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers, abuse by interveners remains prevalent in peace operations. SEA is not only perpetrated by peacekeepers, but also aid workers, diplomats, private contractors, and others associated with interventions. This chapter maps the extent and main characteristics of SEA in peace operations, and investigates the ways the international community has attempted to prevent and hold individuals accountable for SEA. It provides an assessment of the weaknesses in the existing WPS framework regarding SEA, particularly in terms of its engagement with masculinities, capital, and other permissive factors that make SEA such a central feature of peacekeeping operations.


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