Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) played an important role in shaping the world's response to actual and threatened atrocities in Libya. Not least, the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the UN Security Council on May 17, 2011, approving a no-fly zone over Libya and calling for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, reflected a change in the Council's attitude toward the use of force for human protection purposes; and the role played by the UN's new Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect points toward the potential for this new capacity to identify threats of mass atrocities and to focus the UN's attention on preventing them. Given the reluctance of both the Security Council and the wider UN membership even to discuss RtoP in the years immediately following the 2005 World Summit—the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly that gave birth to RtoP—these two facts suggest that significant progress has been made thanks to the astute stewardship of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who is personally committed to the principle. Where it was once a term of art employed by a handful of like-minded countries, activists, and scholars, but regarded with suspicion by much of the rest of the world, RtoP has become a commonly accepted frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities.

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 495
Author(s):  
Petra Perisic

In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty introduced a new doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)”, which signified an obligation of each state to protect its population from mass atrocities occurring in that state, as well as an obligation on the part of international community to offer such protection if the state in question fails to fulfill its duty. The doctrine of RtoP was subsequently endorsed by states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, though it was formulated more restrictively in comparison to the 2001 Report. In 2011 a conflict broke out in Libya between its ruler Muammar Gaddafi and the protesters against his rule. Government forces were brutal in their attempt to quell the protests and it was not long before different international bodies started to report mass violations of human rights. Surprisingly, the UN Security Council was not deadlocked by veto and passed the Resolution 1973, which invoked the RtoP principle and authorized the use of force. Supporters of RtoP hailed such an application of the principle and believed that the case of Libya was just a beginning of a successful bringing RtoP to life. Such predictions turned out to be premature. Not long after the Libyan conflict, the one in Syria began. Although Syrian people was faced with the same humanitarian disaster as Libyan did, the Security Council could not agree on passing of the resolution which would authorize the use of force to halt human rights violations. Two crises are being analyzed, as well as reasons behind such a disparate reaction of the Security Council in very similar circumstances.


Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Ulfstein ◽  
Hege Føsund Christiansen

AbstractOn 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Adelaida Rivera

On March 17th 2011, the United Nations Security Council approved the Resolution 1973 which authorized the use of force in Libya in order to protect civilians from the attacks performed by the state armed forces. The military action by NATO in Libya has resulted in diverse and divided opinions. The recourse of Responsibility to protect appeared later as a measure intended to be implemented in the ongoing conflict in Syria, but after two failed resolutions, it became clear that some UN Security Council members are not willing to repeat the Libyan scenario. This text aims to examine some basic notions of the R2P concept, its application in Libya and the implications of the results after the Libyan case on its possible application in Syria. Should the discussed objectives behind the application of Responsibility to Protect in the Libyan case and its results be determinant on the decision whether this doctrine can be applied in Syria? Is it possible that the mistakes committed in Libya, the atrocities now experienced in Syria and the non-response by the international community could mark the end of the whole concept of Responsibility to Protect? These questions are intended to be discussed in this paper.


Author(s):  
Charles Cater ◽  
David M. Malone

This chapter addresses the evolution of the responsibility to protect concept from September 1999 to its adoption in the World Summit Outcome Document of September 2005. It covers Kofi Annan’s ‘dilemma of intervention’, some early human security initiatives by Canada including the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and its report The Responsibility to Protect which first articulated the moniker as well as the concept, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom, the negotiations and Outcome Document of the World Summit, and the early incorporation of protection of civilians within Security Council resolutions. Throughout this narrative, the importance of sustained advocacy by key individuals—including Kofi Annan, Lloyd Axworthy, and Gareth Evans among others—is presented as vital to the evolution (in theory and in practice) of the responsibility to protect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-316
Author(s):  
Akanksha Singh

The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) took shape to refine the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. In the initial phase, the concept of R2P did not receive enthusiastic endorsement. Developing countries including India perceived it as a new body with the old spirit and likened it with the concept of humanitarian intervention, and this was reinforced by the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. However, the 2005 World Summit proved to be a watershed in the evolution of R2P, just as it is a landmark to understand an important phase of India’s approach to the idea. It would not be accurate to characterize India as a determined nay-sayer on R2P endorsement, particularly in view of the widely known priority India attached at the World Summit to the question of United Nations (UN) Security Council enlargement. Eventually, by 2009 (with the introduction of ‘three- pillar principles’ of R2P), India became a major proponent for the cautious and legitimate implementation of R2P. However, the experiences gained from Libya made India become a voice of caution in invoking forcible options under the R2P principle in Syria. In this article, the attempt has been made to articulate various permutations and combinations regarding India’s evolving approach to R2P on a case-by-case basis.


Author(s):  
Robert W. Murray ◽  
Tom Keating

Robert Keating and Tom Murray argue that the implementation of R2P has failed despite the rhetorical consensus around R2P over the last decade. They suggest that the behaviour of the US and its NATO allies are partly to blame. These powers ignored the UN Security Council over Kosovo, which other world powers such as the BRICs took as an affront and a challenge. Normative defiance to the liberal world order was the reaction: Russia in particular became less willing to support humanitarian intervention than it had been throughout the 1990s. Similarly, in Libya, NATO refused to conform to the limitations on the intervention imposed by UNSC Resolution 1973. This weakened confidence in the Security Council’s ability to manage interventions, further undermining support for such operations generally. Thus the manner in which Western powers have sought to implement R2P has alienated the emerging powers on whose support successful R2P implementation depends.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 51-108
Author(s):  
Dan Kuwali

AbstractThe concept of ‘the responsibility to protect’ (R2P) was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit by the UN General Assembly. This concept, like the right to intervene under Article 4(h) of theConstitutive Act of the African Union, aims to end mass atrocity crimes in the form of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Yet the question that remains is: what if the UN Security Council is unwilling or unable to act? Further, there is a continuing unanswered question: ‘should action to prevent large-scale killing in an African country be beholden to a Security Council that has no permanent African membership?’ The High-level Panel indicated that in some urgent situations UN Security Council authorization may be sought after operations have commenced, whereas the World Summit Outcome rejected demands that states or organizations such as the African Union (AU) should be able to act before gaining UN authorization. These are the principal issues addressed in this analysis, which discusses how the AU can implement the right to intervene under Article 4(h) against the background of the prohibition of the use of force regime under the UN Charter. The analysis explores the current thinking of the AU and the international community on the key question of how to proceed in cases where the UN Security Council is deadlocked in using force to prevent mass atrocity crimes. The discussion highlights the intention of the framers of the AU Actvis-à-visthe practice of the Security Council in authorizing enforcement action as well as views of various commentators in this regard.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 106-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry D. Johnson

During the past several years, vetoes have been cast in the UN Security Council to block draft resolutions aimed at addressing the crises in Syria and Ukraine. Concerning Syria, Russia and China have vetoed three resolutions (the votes were 9-2-4 on October 4, 2011, 13-2-0 on February 4, 2012, and 11-2-2 on July 19, 2012). Concerning Ukraine, Russia vetoed a resolution just recently (the vote was 13-1-1 on March 15, 2014). The same question that arose in 1950 has thus arisen again today: can the General Assembly do anything when the Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto? The answer is “yes.” But the reason is not because of the Assembly’s resolution 377A(V) of November 3, 1950 (“Uniting for Peace”), even though advocates of Assembly action frequently invoke it. Indeed, this resolution is for the most part no longer needed to provide a basis for Assembly “collective measures” recommendations when a veto proscribes the Council’s adoption of such measures. Moreover, the resolution does not provide a basis or justification for the use of force that would not be justified on other grounds, such as self-defense.


2013 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

The responsibility to protect was invoked by the United Nations (UN) Security Council in support of its authorization of a military intervention in Libya in 2011. In the wake of the intervention, Brazil approached the UN with a new doctrine: the responsibility while protecting. The responsibility while protecting implies a greater degree of caution on the part of the international community in its exercise of the responsibility to protect. Intentionally or unintentionally, Brazil mixes aspects of the jus ad bellum with aspects of the jus in bello in the new doctrine. This is controversial and potentially detrimental to both areas of law. An additional layer of limitations on the use of armed force in multinational peace operations is introduced beyond the existing restrictions on warfare following from international humanitarian law. A lack of clarity pertaining to the use of force and to the respective roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly in this respect in the exercise of the responsibility to protect contribute to making the responsibility while protecting seem increasingly enigmatic. Interpreted constructively, however, the responsibility while protecting simply urges the international community to follow international law. This would be good.


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