scholarly journals The Relationship between the Un Security Council and General Assembly in Matters of International Peace and Security

Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 129-134
Author(s):  
Boris N. Mamlyuk

Larry Johnson’s timely and important essay challenges both utopian and realist accounts of UN law and practice by reviving the debate over the nature and functions of the UN General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly’s power to deploy certain legal tactics not only to influence collective security deliberations in the UN Security Council, but also, more significantly, to provide some legal justification for multilateral military “collective measures” in the event of Security Council gridlock. One vehicle by which the General Assembly may assert its own right to intervene in defense of “international peace and security” is a “Uniting for Peace” (UFP) resolution, authorized by resolution 377(V) (1950). At its core, a “uniting for peace” resolution is an attempt to circumvent a Security Council deadlock by authorizing Member States to take collective action, including the use of force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. General Assembly resolution 377(V) does not require resolutions to take specific legal form—language that echoes the preambular “lack of unanimity of the permanent members [that results in the Security Council failing to] exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” is sufficient to render a given resolution a UFP, provided the General Assembly resolution calls for concrete “collective [forceful] measures.” For this reason, experts disagree on precisely how many times a UFP has indeed been invoked or implemented, although informed analysts suggest UFP has been invoked in slightly more than ten instances since 1950.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Stefan Talmon

In his essay on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, Larry Johnson suggests that the General Assembly can recommend non-use of force collective measures when the Security Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto. He rightly points out that today there is no longer any need to use Uniting for Peace for such recommendations. The General Assembly can and has recommended so-called “voluntary sanctions” in cases where it found a threat to international peace and security to exist. For example, in resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965 concerning the Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Assembly, making no reference to Uniting for Peace, urged “Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:(a)To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;(b)To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;(c)To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;(d)To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;(e)To boycott all trade with Portugal.”


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 118-122
Author(s):  
Ieva Miluna

The Uniting for Peace resolution together with the UN Charter prescribes a certain role for the General Assembly with regard to international peace and security. Larry Johnson addresses that role, but he does not consider a second question: how does the Uniting for Peace resolution affect the UN Security Council? The normative role of the Council is influenced not only by the Charter, but also by general international law. In this comment, I explore the normative role of the Council in fulfilling the Charter’s purpose to maintain international peace and security. I argue that the text of the Charter and the prior practice of both the Assembly and the Council help to determine the proper division of these organs’ respective tasks within the Charter system. I conclude that the Council alone exercises the constant control needed to enforce measures of collective security effectively, and that the Assembly is limited to recommending the consequences for states when threats or breaches of the peace occur.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Richardson

Larry Johnson’s essay on the UN General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace resolution (UFP) is a useful general analysis of issues arising from UN Security Council Permanent Member veto-paralysis. His essay, which focuses on the text of the original Resolution, is directed at asking whether the UFP retains a current “useful purpose.” Relying on a text-centric interpretation of the presence or absence of subsequent invocations of the UFP, he concludes that no “useful purpose” remains, in part because evolved General Assembly authority has displaced the need to specifically invoke the UFP to make recommendations on certain issues of international peace and security. Johnson then asks whether, under the original UFP or subsequently, the Assembly may recommend to Member States “enforcement” uses of force, notwithstanding the prohibitions of Article 2(4) of the Charter. He finds Article 2(4) to be an absolute barrier to Assembly authority to recommend those measures, but not for “innovative and inventive non-use-of force measures.”


Author(s):  
Christine Chinkin

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was not adopted in a vacuum, but rather can be read with a number of other programs within the Security Council (SC) and UN architecture. These include other thematic resolutions, as well as broader policy initiatives. Taken together, these diverse strands sought to shift the understanding of the SC’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security, away from a classic state-oriented approach to one that places people at its center. The adoption of Resolution 1325, along with these other developments, had implications for the making of international law (the place of civil society and experts within the international legal and institutional framework), for rethinking participation, and the meaning of security/protection. This chapter suggests that 2000 was a pivotal moment when a more human-oriented international law seemed a real possibility and before the turn back toward militarism and national security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZOU Keyuan

AbstractThe Charter of the United Nations designates the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as one of the principal organs of the United Nations, assuming the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. It has the power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, to make recommendations, and decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This article addresses a number of issues concerning how the UNSC Resolutions are enforced at sea in accordance with applicable international law and makes special reference to the circumstances in East Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Barber

Abstract The Security Council’s recent intractability in the face of human rights and humanitarian crises has directed increased attention to the General Assembly’s secondary responsibility for international peace and security. Despite considerable academic attention to the issue, however, significant questions remain regarding the scope of the Assembly’s powers. One of the most significant of these questions is whether the Assembly may authorise conduct that would otherwise be unlawful. This question is important, because while there is good authority to support the proposition that the Assembly may recommend measures up to and including the use of force, if the Assembly is not also competent to authorise such measures, we are left with the unsatisfactory scenario in which the Assembly is legally competent to make recommendations that States may not legally be able to act upon. Drawing on the International Law Commission’s 2018 Draft Articles on Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice, as well as those on Identification of Customary International Law, this article explores whether an authorising competence on the part of the General Assembly can be grounded in the Assembly’s practice. Specifically, it considers whether the Assembly’s practice of recommending and seemingly purporting to authorise coercive measures may amount to ‘established practice’, thus forming part of the ‘rules of the organisation’ within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); or alternatively if it can be considered ‘subsequent practice’ within the meaning of the VCLT; or alternatively it may attest to a rule of customary international law.


Author(s):  
Gina Heathcote

This chapter examines the use of force from a feminist perspective and its prohibition in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Using structural bias feminism, it demonstrates how the gendering of international legal categories contributes to the harm and discrimination experienced by women worldwide. The chapter cites UN Security Council action in Libya in 2011 as an example of the normative and organizational exclusion of women and the justification of the use of force. It discusses the relationship between race and gender privilege in international law and argues that the Council’s resolutions on women, peace, and security, support, and legitimate use of force undermine feminist peace activism. It proposes a transformative approach to the foundations of international law that articulates the prohibition on the use of force as a useful first step for imagining the potential of humanity rather than justifying further force, further violence, or further destruction.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Hans Corell

The point of departure in the present article is that the UN Security Council must be reformed. But this reform should not focus on extending the membership of the Council, which seems to be the main issue in the discussion at present. It is imperative that the Council is maintained as an executive organ since this is a precondition for its effective functioning. Too many members would destroy this requirement completely, in particular if additional members are granted veto power. Already 15 members may be past the limit for an executive organ. Additional members will endanger the Council’s ability to fulfil its obligations under Art. 24 of the UN Charter: the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Instead, the reform should focus on resolving the real problem with the Council, namely the manner in which the permanent members sometimes behave. The exercise of the veto power must be in conformity with the UN Charter, which now must be viewed against the background of the development of international law since the UN was established more than 70 years ago. The manner in which some permanent members exercise their veto power is simply not in conformity with the Charter. Against this background it is absolutely necessary that the five permanent members engage in a profound discussion about their performance and the manner in which the veto power is exercised. Here, there is need for statesmanship. The members of the Security Council, and in particular the permanent members, must lead by example. What the Council must focus on is conflict prevention. This requires determination and consequence. The focus must be on the challenges that humankind is facing and will face ever more in the future and the threats to international peace and security that these challenges are causing. The need for the rule of law and protection of human rights are obvious elements in this analysis. Furthermore, the growth of the world population in combination with climate change simply must be addressed in an effective manner. The Council must focus attentively on these ‘conflict multipliers’. The discussion must also focus on peacekeeping and responsibility to protect. With respect to responsibility to protect there is great need for improvement. We cannot accept in the 21st century that fundamental human rights are violated and that crimes against international humanitarian law are being committed on a large scale without consequences. Another important element in this context is empowerment of women. In addressing these questions there is need for close cooperation with regional organizations. This cooperation already exists, but the question is how it can be developed and what lessons can be learnt from the past. Since the five permanent members are also recognized as nuclear-weapon States under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, they must confirm their obligations under this treaty and make serious their obligation to work for a nuclear-weapon free world. A reform along the lines discussed in the present article can be made without amending the UN Charter.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Yoo

In his speech before the United Nations (UN) in September 2002, President George W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further intransigence. When Iraq refused to fully comply with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq on March 19,2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. On May 1,2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time of this writing, the United States has assumed the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483.


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