scholarly journals Atmospheric emissions from the Deepwater Horizon spill constrain air-water partitioning, hydrocarbon fate, and leak rate

2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (7) ◽  
pp. n/a-n/a ◽  
Author(s):  
T. B. Ryerson ◽  
K. C. Aikin ◽  
W. M. Angevine ◽  
E. L. Atlas ◽  
D. R. Blake ◽  
...  
2012 ◽  
Vol 117 (D9) ◽  
pp. n/a-n/a ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Neuman ◽  
K. C. Aikin ◽  
E. L. Atlas ◽  
D. R. Blake ◽  
J. S. Holloway ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Gregory D. Bothun

The initial estimate of the flow rate of now liberated crude oil following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil platform turned out to be a factor of 50 times lower than the physical reality. This initial estimate, provided by the corporate owner of the oil platform, British Petroleum (BP), was a leak rate of 1,000 barrels per day (bpd). This number was not based on any scientific approach and was never put into context, for the media or the public, of whether this was a big or small number (i.e., how many bpd is equivalent to filling a bathtub for 24 h) and was simply accepted as the physical reality. As a consequence, the initial response to the disaster would plan for a scope that was much smaller than what ultimately unfolded. Furthermore, since 1,000 bpd turns out to be a small number, the initial strategy was based on the belief that the leak could be patched and therefore a fix was manageable. Here we show that (a) simple physical reasoning at the time of the occurrence would have lead to initial estimates that were close to the final estimate (determined 2 months after the initial incident) of about 50,000 bpd; (b) there was an unnecessarily slow time evolution to involve the scientific community to gather relevant data that would vastly improve the estimate and; (c) this slow evolution in unmasking the physical reality of the situation prevented a more robust governmental response to the problem. Even though the government, through National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), revised the leak rate to 5,000 bpd one week after the disaster, another month would elapse before it was officially recognized that the leak rate was essentially 10 times higher.


2004 ◽  
Vol 42 (05) ◽  
Author(s):  
M Kassai ◽  
L Illényi ◽  
Ö Horváth ◽  
G Horváth ◽  
Y Al-Farhat

2016 ◽  
Vol 561 ◽  
pp. 51-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
AWJ Demopoulos ◽  
JR Bourque ◽  
E Cordes ◽  
KM Stamler

Shore & Beach ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 65-71
Author(s):  
Whitney Thompson ◽  
Christopher Paul ◽  
John Darnall

Coastal Louisiana received significant funds tied to BP penalties as a result of the Deepwater Horizon incident. As it is widely considered that the State of Louisiana sustained most of the damage due to this incident, there has been a firm push to waste no time in implementing habitat restoration projects. Sustaining the land on the coast of Louisiana is vital to our nation’s economy, as several of the nation’s largest ports are located on the Gulf coast in Louisiana. In addition, the ecosystems making up the Louisiana coast are important to sustain some of the largest and most valuable fisheries in the nation. Funded by BP Phase 3 Early Restoration, the goals of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) Outer Coast Restoration Project are to restore beach, dune, and marsh habitats to help compensate spill-related injuries to habitats and species, specifically brown pelicans, terns, skimmers, and gulls. Four island components in Louisiana were funded under this project; Shell Island Barrier Restoration, Chenier Ronquille Barrier Island Restoration, Caillou Lake Headlands Barrier Island Restoration, and North Breton Island Restoration (https://www. gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/louisiana-outer-coast-restoration, NOAA 2018). Shell Island and Chenier Ronquille are critical pieces of barrier shoreline within the Barataria Basin in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. These large-scale restoration projects were completed in the years following the Deepwater Horizon incident, creating new habitat and reinforcing Louisiana’s Gulf of Mexico shoreline. The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) finished construction of the Shell Island NRDA Restoration Project in 2017, which restored two barrier islands in Plaquemines Parish utilizing sand hydraulically dredged from the Mississippi River and pumped via pipeline over 20 miles over levees and through towns, marinas, and marshes to the coastline. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) also completed the Plaquemines Parish barrier island restoration at Chenier Ronquille in 2017 utilizing nearshore Gulf of Mexico sediment, restoring wetland, coastal, and nearshore habitat in the Barataria Basin. A design and construction overview is provided herein.


1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (10) ◽  
pp. 9-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. S. de Silva ◽  
G. Fleming ◽  
P. G. Smith

UK research into the beneficial uses of dredged material is being undertaken at Strathclyde University, and includes initiatives in research in the use of dredgings for soil in land restoration projects, and for brick manufacture. Extensive research in the historically industrial River Clyde in Scotland has shown that pollutant levels do not preclude the use of selected materials for land restoration work. However, limitations are imposed on the use of the material for agricultural or grazing purposes at this time. Brick manufacture from clay sediments has proved that an attractive, quality product can be provided to the industry although some further testing is required; particularly in the area of atmospheric emissions during firing. The use of dredged clay for landfill capping and lining also remains a viable possibility. Economic considerations for each application vary, and require further investigation, however, the options are technically feasible and if employed on a larger scale, can account for a significant proportion of dredged sediments which are currently disposed of at sea.


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