Developmental continuity in coordination of perspectives as an alternative to the implicit and explicit theory of mind controversy.

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (11) ◽  
pp. 1772-1786
Author(s):  
Marta Białecka-Pikul ◽  
Arkadiusz Białek
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Developmental Continuity ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

scholarly journals Testing the stability of theory of mind: A longitudinal approach

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. e0241721
Author(s):  
Diane Poulin-Dubois ◽  
Naomi Azar ◽  
Brandon Elkaim ◽  
Kimberly Burnside
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Communication ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Social ◽  
Longitudinal Approach ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Second Year ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Violation Of Expectation

An explicit understanding of false belief develops around the age of four years. However, tasks based on spontaneous responses have revealed an implicit understanding of belief and other theory of mind constructs in infants in their second year of life. The few longitudinal studies that have examined conceptual continuity of theory of mind from infancy to early childhood have reported mixed findings. Here we report two longitudinal experiments to investigate the developmental relation between implicit and explicit theory of mind. No link was observed in the first experiment between false belief and intention understanding measured at 14 and 18 months with the violation of expectation paradigm and tasks measuring explicit and implicit false belief at four or five years of age. In the second experiment, infants aged 18 months were tested with a battery of tasks that measured knowledge inference and false belief. They were then tested with the theory of mind scale at five years of age. The parents completed the Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ). As in the first experiment, there were no associations between early and later forms of theory of mind. We suggest that these findings do not support the view that there is conceptual continuity in theory of mind development.

scholarly journals Differentiating implicit and explicit theory of mind and associated neural networks in youth at Clinical High Risk (CHR) for psychosis

2019 ◽  
Vol 208 ◽  
pp. 173-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teresa Vargas ◽  
Katherine S.F. Damme ◽  
Christine I. Hooker ◽  
Tina Gupta ◽  
Henry R. Cowan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Clinical High Risk ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Implicit And Explicit

Progressing from an implicit to an explicit false belief understanding: A matter of executive control?

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Kloo ◽  
Susanne Kristen-Antonow ◽  
Beate Sodian
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Functions ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Reflective Processing ◽  
Conscious Control

In a longitudinal study ( N = 54), we investigated the developmental relation between children’s implicit and explicit theory of mind and executive functions. We found that implicit false belief understanding at 18 months was correlated with explicit false belief understanding at 4 to 5 years of age, with the latter being closely related to second-order false belief understanding at 5 years of age. Also, replicating a number of studies, explicit first- and second-order false belief understanding, in contrast to implicit false belief understanding, were related to executive functioning. This indicates that executive functions play a role in standard explicit false belief tasks, but not in implicit false belief understanding. We argue that spontaneous, implicit false belief understanding does not require conscious control, whereas explicit false belief understanding is based on conscious, reflective processing. In sum, we suggest a developmental enrichment account of theory of mind development, with belief processing becoming increasingly reflective and controlled with advancing age.

scholarly journals The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 172273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Schuwerk ◽  
Beate Priewasser ◽  
Beate Sodian ◽  
Josef Perner
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Test Phase ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Replication Study ◽  
Familiarization Phase ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
Link Type ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Anticipatory Looking

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18 , 587–592 ( doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x ); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325 , 883–885 ( doi:10.1126/science.1176170 )). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds ( N  = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds ( N  = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults ( N  = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.

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