Progressing from an implicit to an explicit false belief understanding: A matter of executive control?

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Kloo ◽  
Susanne Kristen-Antonow ◽  
Beate Sodian
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Functions ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Reflective Processing ◽  
Conscious Control

In a longitudinal study ( N = 54), we investigated the developmental relation between children’s implicit and explicit theory of mind and executive functions. We found that implicit false belief understanding at 18 months was correlated with explicit false belief understanding at 4 to 5 years of age, with the latter being closely related to second-order false belief understanding at 5 years of age. Also, replicating a number of studies, explicit first- and second-order false belief understanding, in contrast to implicit false belief understanding, were related to executive functioning. This indicates that executive functions play a role in standard explicit false belief tasks, but not in implicit false belief understanding. We argue that spontaneous, implicit false belief understanding does not require conscious control, whereas explicit false belief understanding is based on conscious, reflective processing. In sum, we suggest a developmental enrichment account of theory of mind development, with belief processing becoming increasingly reflective and controlled with advancing age.

scholarly journals Testing the stability of theory of mind: A longitudinal approach

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. e0241721
Author(s):  
Diane Poulin-Dubois ◽  
Naomi Azar ◽  
Brandon Elkaim ◽  
Kimberly Burnside
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Communication ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Social ◽  
Longitudinal Approach ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Second Year ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Violation Of Expectation

An explicit understanding of false belief develops around the age of four years. However, tasks based on spontaneous responses have revealed an implicit understanding of belief and other theory of mind constructs in infants in their second year of life. The few longitudinal studies that have examined conceptual continuity of theory of mind from infancy to early childhood have reported mixed findings. Here we report two longitudinal experiments to investigate the developmental relation between implicit and explicit theory of mind. No link was observed in the first experiment between false belief and intention understanding measured at 14 and 18 months with the violation of expectation paradigm and tasks measuring explicit and implicit false belief at four or five years of age. In the second experiment, infants aged 18 months were tested with a battery of tasks that measured knowledge inference and false belief. They were then tested with the theory of mind scale at five years of age. The parents completed the Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ). As in the first experiment, there were no associations between early and later forms of theory of mind. We suggest that these findings do not support the view that there is conceptual continuity in theory of mind development.

scholarly journals On the Relationship between Theory of Mind and Syntax in Clinical and Non-Clinical Populations: State of the Art and Implications for Research

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Fontana ◽  
Mauro Adenzato ◽  
Jacopo S. Penso ◽  
Ivan Enrici ◽  
Rita B. Ardito
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Language Impairment ◽  
Specific Language Impairment ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Neuropsychological Disorders ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
The Relationship

Background:Over the years, different explanations have been given on the relationship between syntax and Theory of Mind,i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to others and predict, describe, and explain behavior based on such mental states. In the present study, we focus on the relationship between false-belief understanding as a crucial aspect of Theory of Mind, and on the ability to master the syntax of complementation,i.e., the ability to produce and comprehend sentences in a recursive way.Objective:Our purpose is to test two main hypotheses on the relationship between false-belief understanding and the ability to master the syntax of complementation: the dependence and the independence of false-belief understanding on syntactic complementation.Method:We analyze studies on children with typical development, deaf children with deaf signing or hearing parents, children with specific language impairment, children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, longitudinal and training studies, and studies on adults with neuropsychological disorders.Conclusion:Strengths and weaknesses of the two hypotheses are discussed and limitations of the current state of knowledge are presented. A lifespan approach taking into account both the emergence and maintenance of false-belief understanding and using both implicit and explicit false-belief tasks is proposed to face the issue discussed.

scholarly journals The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 172273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Schuwerk ◽  
Beate Priewasser ◽  
Beate Sodian ◽  
Josef Perner
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Test Phase ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Replication Study ◽  
Familiarization Phase ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
Link Type ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Anticipatory Looking

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18 , 587–592 ( doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x ); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325 , 883–885 ( doi:10.1126/science.1176170 )). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds ( N  = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds ( N  = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults ( N  = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.

Depressive Traits and Theory of Mind in Healthy Individuals: A Mediation Study

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas James Rowark
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Functions ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Statistical Power ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Clinical Sample ◽  
Small Sample ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Healthy Individuals ◽  
Prepotent Response

Depression has been associated with poor social cognitive functioning, including impaired performance on measures of theory of mind. However, the association between depression and theory of mind performance has been removed when controlling for differences in executive functioning, which is also impacted by depression. Among these executive functions, inhibition of prepotent response has been demonstrated as enabling success on theory of mind tests. In the context of these findings, the current investigation tested whether a relationship could be found between depressive traits and theory of mind in a non-clinical sample, and whether this relationship was mediated by differences in executive control of inhibition. Theory of mind was assessed in 31 healthy individuals using an audio-presented false-belief reasoning task, which also tested baseline performance in non-mental-state reasoning. Inhibition of prepotent response was assessed with interference measures on a Stroop colour-word task, and depressive traits were self-reported through the second version of the Beck Depression Inventory. Mediation analysis revealed that executive control of inhibition did not significantly mediate an indirect effect of depressive traits on theory of mind. It was interpreted that relationships previously found between major depression, executive and social-cognitive functions do not generalise beyond clinical boundaries. However, these findings are discussed in terms of the small sample size, limiting statistical power, and several methodological limitations. Future research should assess the relationship between depressive traits and theory of mind using alternative measures of mental representation, or include a neurocognitive battery assessing executive functions other than inhibition.

Do children understand desires before they understand beliefs? A comparison of 3-year-olds’ grasp of incompatible desires, competitive games and false beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Proft ◽  
Cornelia Hoss ◽  
Katharina Manfredini Paredes ◽  
hannes rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Active Choice ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Competitive Games ◽  
Cognitive Attitudes

A long-standing dispute in theory of mind research concerns the development of understanding different kinds of propositional attitudes. The asymmetry view suggests that children understand conative attitudes (e.g., desires) before they understand cognitive attitudes (e.g., beliefs). The symmetry view suggests that notions of cognitive and conative attitudes develop simultaneously. Relevant studies to date have produced inconsistent results, yet with different methods and dependent measures. To test between the two accounts more systematically, we thus combined different forms of desire tasks (incompatible desires and competition) with different forms of measurement (verbal ascription and active choice) in a single design. Additionally, children’s performance in the desire tasks was compared to their false-belief understanding. Results revealed that 3-year-olds were better at ascribing desires than at ascribing beliefs for both desire tasks whereas they had difficulties actively choosing the more desired option in the competition task. The present findings thus favor the asymmetry theory.

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