Moral dumbfounding: The role of intuition and reasoning in moral judgment

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredrik Bjorklund ◽  
Jonathan Haidt
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cultural Systems ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Construal Levels

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Psychological Profile ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Additional Support

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this thesis through a critical examination of Hume’s sentimentalism and the role of empathy in its account of moral judgment. The main objection to Hume’s account is its exclusion of people whom one can describe as making moral judgments though they have no motivation to act on them. Consideration of such people, particularly those with a psychopathic personality, argues for a distinction between different types of moral judgment in keeping with the essay’s main thesis. Additional support for the main thesis is then drawn from Piaget’s theory of moral judgment in children.

scholarly journals Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (17) ◽  
pp. 4688-4693 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Clark Barrett ◽  
Alexander Bolyanatz ◽  
Alyssa N. Crittenden ◽  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Simon Fitzpatrick ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Narrow Range ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Mitigating Circumstances

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Although these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment.

The role of social cognition in moral judgment in frontotemporal dementia

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht ◽  
Teresa Torralva ◽  
María Roca ◽  
Mariángeles Pose ◽  
Facundo Manes
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Frontotemporal Dementia

The Frame Problem in Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gałecki
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Ethical Principles ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The Frame Problem ◽  
The Invisible

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.

scholarly journals Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Brian D. Earp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
Total N ◽  
Two Dimensional Model ◽  
Do So

Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH—as suggested by previous work—but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenues for future research.

Ethical Leadership and Followers’ Moral Judgment: The Role of Followers’ Perceived Accountability and Self-leadership

2013 ◽  
Vol 120 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Steinbauer ◽  
Robert W. Renn ◽  
Robert R. Taylor ◽  
Phil K. Njoroge
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Ethical Leadership

scholarly journals The Foreign Language Effect on Moral Judgment: The Role of Emotions and Norms

PLoS ONE ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. e0131529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Geipel ◽  
Constantinos Hadjichristidis ◽  
Luca Surian
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Language ◽  
Moral Judgment

scholarly journals Moral judgment of disparagement humor

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karolina Koszałkowska ◽  
Monika Wróbel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Emotional Responses ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
Disparagement Humor

Abstract The aim of the present study was to analyze the link between the five moral codes proposed in the Moral Foundations Theory and moral judgment of disparagement humor. We presented racist, sexist, homophobic, religion-disparaging and neutral jokes to a group of 108 participants, asking them whether they found laughing at a particular joke moral or immoral. Additionally, participants rated the level of amusement and disgust evoked by each joke. We also measured participants’ moral foundations profiles (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). The results confirmed that Care and Fairness were significantly linked to moral judgment of racist, sexist and homophobic jokes, whereas Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity were associated with moral judgment of religion-disparaging jokes. Moreover, these relationships were mediated by emotional responses of amusement and disgust (except for racist jokes, for which we observed no mediating role of amusement).

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