Academic Rational Beliefs Scale--Revised

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Warren ◽  
Nicole A. Stargell ◽  
Shenika J. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs

Reasoning to the Best Explanation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs

The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the viability of reasoning to the best explanation as a fundamental source of epistemically rational beliefs and a potentially useful weapon for use in responding to the skeptic. After making some important distinctions among various forms of explanationism, I’ll reach a somewhat pessimistic conclusion about the prospects for explanationist epistemologies solving fundamental epistemological problems. Explanationist epistemologies don’t seem to be fundamental sources of epistemically rational beliefs. As a result, fundamental epistemological problems, such as the threat of skepticism, are not solved by appeals to reasoning to the best explanation. We must look elsewhere for philosophically satisfying responses to these problems.

Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Dahlman ◽  
Alex Stein ◽  
Giovanni Tuzet
Keyword(s):  
Evidence Theory ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Legal Evidence ◽  
The Core ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Evidence Law ◽  
Core Issues ◽  
The Bayesian Approach

Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law presents a cross-disciplinary overview of the core issues in the theory and methodology of adjudicative evidence and factfinding, assembling the major philosophical and interdisciplinary insights that define evidence theory, as related to law, in a single book. The volume presents contemporary debates on truth, knowledge, rational beliefs, proof, argumentation, explanation, coherence, probability, economics, psychology, bias, gender, and race. It covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory, and inference to the best explanation. The volume’s contributions come from scholars spread across three continents and twelve different countries, whose common interest is evidence theory as related to law.

Asset price volatility and trading volume with rational beliefs

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho-Mou Wu ◽  
Wen-Chung Guo
Keyword(s):  
Trading Volume ◽  
Asset Price ◽  
Price Volatility ◽  
Rational Beliefs

scholarly journals Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Pugh
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Informed Consent ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Decision Making Capacity ◽  
Important Relationship ◽  
Legal Judgments ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
New Framework

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics, and the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as an uncontroversial claim in this sphere. Yet, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship between rationality and autonomy. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether ‘… the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’. This book brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, the author develops a new framework for thinking about the concept, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in personal autonomy. Furthermore, the account outlined here allows for a deeper understanding of different forms of controlling influence, and the relationship between our freedom to act, and our capacity to decide autonomously. The author contrasts his rationalist account with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and outlines the revisionary implications it has for various practical questions in bioethics in which autonomy is a salient concern, including questions about the nature of informed consent and decision-making capacity.

Rational beliefs

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Cherniak
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Irrational Beliefs ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Entire Structure ◽  
Naturalize Epistemology ◽  
Philosophical Questions

To the extent that a belief is rational, it ought to be held, other things being equal; irrational beliefs should not be held. From traditional epistemological perspectives, the obligation here is narrow, concerning only good reasons for acceptance that constitute sufficient justification or warrant. Recent epistemological trends broaden the viewpoint to include also practical considerations that enter into other rational decisions, such as best use of the agent’s limited resources. A related but weaker conception of rationality appears in philosophy of mind as a necessary coherence requirement on personal identity – roughly, ‘No rationality, no agent’. Such agent-constitutive rationality standards are more lenient than normative epistemic standards, since agents’ belief sets can and often do fall short of epistemically uncriticizable rationality without the agents thereby ceasing to qualify as having minds. Finally, at the widest perspective, long-standing sceptical lines of challenge to rationality of the entire structure of human belief-forming procedures conclude that we can never have the slightest good reason to accept even our most central beliefs. Recent approaches that ‘naturalize’ epistemology into a branch of science tend to exclude such general doubts as insignificant or meaningless; but if distinctively philosophical questions in fact do not fully reduce to regular scientific ones, sceptical-type rationality challenges may instead remain a permanent part of the human condition.

The Irrational and Rational Beliefs

2013 ◽  
pp. 43-54
Author(s):  
Raymond A. Digiuseppe ◽  
Kristene A. Doyle ◽  
Windy Dryden ◽  
Wouter Backx
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Irrational And Rational Beliefs

HOW RATIONAL BELIEFS AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS AFFECT PEOPLE'S INFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank W. Bond ◽  
Windy Dryden
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Irrational Beliefs ◽  
Irrational Belief ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Behaviour Therapy ◽  
Principal Mechanism ◽  
Primary Mechanism ◽  
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy ◽  
Functional Content

Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) hypothesizes that the functionality of inferences is primarily affected by the preferential and demanding nature of rational and irrational beliefs, respectively. It is then, secondarily, influenced by the functional and dysfunctional contents to which rational and irrational beliefs, respectively, refer. This hypothesis was tested by asking 96 participants to imagine themselves holding one of four specific beliefs: a rational belief with a preference and a functional content, an irrational belief with a demand and a dysfunctional content, a rational belief with a functional content and no preference, and an irrational belief with a dysfunctional content and no demand. Participants imagined themselves holding their belief in an imaginary context, whilst rating the extent of their agreement to 14 functional and dysfunctional inferences. Contrary to REBT theory, results indicated that rational and irrational beliefs had the same magnitude of effect on the functionality of inferences, whether they referred to a preference/demand+contents, or only contents. The discussion maintains that preferences and demands may not constitute the principal mechanism through which rational and irrational beliefs affect the functionality of inferences. Instead, consistent with Beck's cognitive therapy, belief contents may constitute this primary mechanism.

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