scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Salahshour
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Fixed Point ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Enhancement Factors ◽  
Shed Light

AbstractThe evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the evolution of cooperation? To shed light on these questions, here, I consider a population of individuals who possibly play two consecutive rounds of public goods game, with different enhancement factors. Importantly, individuals have independent strategies in the two rounds. However, their strategy in the first round affects the game they play in the second round. I consider two different scenarios where either only first-round cooperators play a second public goods game, or both first-round cooperators and first-round defectors play a second public goods game, but in different groups. The first scenario can be considered a reward dilemma, and the second can be considered an assortative public goods game but with independent strategies of the individuals in the two rounds. Both models show cooperators can survive either in a fixed point or through different periodic orbits. Interestingly, due to the emergence of a correlation between the strategies of the individuals in the two rounds, individuals develop consistent personalities during the evolution. This, in turn, helps cooperation to flourish. These findings shed new light on the evolution of cooperation and show how consistent cooperative and defective personalities can evolve and play a positive role in solving social dilemmas.

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

Donating money is not the only way to sustain cooperation in public goods game

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (12) ◽  
pp. 1750149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tong Chen ◽  
Zheng-Hong Wu ◽  
Le Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Time Model ◽  
Research Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Better Than

Most of the previous studies research cooperation mainly based on donating money in social public goods games. Owing to the lack of income, some people prefer to donate time instead of money to promote the activity, in our daily life. Motivated by this fact, we here investigate the influence of the encouragement of donating time on the evolution of cooperation based on village opera. In our study, we set up two models: one is money-only model (MOM). Donating money is the only choice in MOM. The other is money–time model (MTM). Besides donating money, donating time is an alternative in MTM. Through numerical simulations, we find that compared to MOM, MTM has a faster speed to reach cooperation equilibrium and cost advantage to sustain the same cooperation level, without the effects of income, reputation, satisfaction, emotion and maximum nonmonetary input. However, it should be noted that MTM is better than MOM in a moderate interval of general budget [Formula: see text]. Our results provide stark evidence that the encouragement of donating time can promote and sustain cooperation better than only donating money.

Diversity of game strategies promotes the evolution of cooperation in public goods games

2010 ◽  
Vol 90 (6) ◽  
pp. 68005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyan Zhang ◽  
Jianlei Zhang ◽  
Guangming Xie ◽  
Long Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249217
Author(s):  
Jakob Hackel ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Akira Goto ◽  
Alfred Taudes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Asymmetric Effect ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Incentives ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Real Effort

Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players’ real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.

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