scholarly journals Research on manufacturer encroachment with advertising and design of incentive advertising: A game-theoretic approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yalan Hong
Keyword(s):  
Advertising Effectiveness ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
Decision Power ◽  
First Mover

This paper studies the advertising decision regarding a supply chain with manufacturer encroachment. It is assumed that the manufacturer and the retailer have different quantity decision power so as to explore how the first-mover advantage affect the advertising decision and the manufacturer encroachment. It is known that the manufacturer encroachment usually makes the retailer worse off. Our results show that (1) the retailer can benefit from encroachment when the manufacturer’s direct selling cost is high and the manufacturer does not have first-mover advantage of quantity decision; (2) the manufacturer can benefit from encroachment if his advertising effectiveness is high; (3) the encroachment may lead to a lose-lose result if the manufacturer has the first-mover advantage and his advertising effectiveness is not relative high; (4) the manufacturer may be worse off if his direct selling cost is intermediate no matter who has the first-mover advantage of quantity decision. Thus, the manufacturer should be more careful about the relationship between him and the retailer. Additionally, we consider two ways of advertising cooperation. Results shows that which type of cooperation is better depends on the relative advertising effectiveness. Furthermore, we propose an incentive cooperative advertising scheme which makes all players get higher profits.

Equilibrium and incentives for supervisor–postgraduate collaborations: A game-theoretic approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1729-1747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Juzhi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Educational System ◽  
Collaborative Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Postgraduate Students ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

In most universities, supervisors collaborate with their postgraduate students in writing papers. As a consequence, the relationship between supervisors and postgraduates in the collaborative work becomes the most important one among various relationships between them. In this paper, using a game model, we show that in the current educational system of China, there is a dilemma between supervisors and their postgraduates for their collaborative work – in most cases, either the supervisor or the students will not spend any effort in their joint work. After that, we also investigate whether the two common incentive strategies, i.e., (i) incentives to students, and (ii) incentives to faculties, can solve this dilemma. Our results show that a university can solve the problem by either (i) just using strong incentives to postgraduate students, or (ii) by using a combination of a normal incentive to students and a strong incentive to faculties. Also, we find that when the incentives to the students and to the faculties are below a certain level, all incentives will be just in vain – neither can they improve the serious relationship between supervisors and their postgraduates, nor can they improve the paper quality.

scholarly journals Cross-Sale In Integrated Supply Chain System

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 277
Author(s):  
Bin Shao ◽  
Kunpeng Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Distribution Channels ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Integrated Supply Chain ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
First Mover

In this article, we study two manufacturers, each producing a single substituting product, selling the products through their own centralized distribution channels, and also using each others distribution channel at their choice. Distribution channels are also substitutable. Using price competition and a game theoretic approach, we find that the same products can be sold at a higher price in the cross-sale channel than in its own centralized distribution channel. The first mover in doing a cross-sale doesnt necessarily enjoy the advantage in terms of higher profit. Not only manufacturers can charge higher prices for their own and cross-sold product from their competitor, but also cross-sale increases the profits of both manufacturers; and most importantly, cross-sale improves the systems profit dramatically.

scholarly journals Teorie principála a agenta a její využití při popisu vztahu volič–zástupce

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 215-242
Author(s):  
Jaroslava Pospíšilová
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
New Research ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theory Of Democracy ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This review article is focused on the rising framework of principal-agent analysis in political science. It aims to map the most influential studies and answer the question of whether this concept is adequate to describe the quality of the relationship between voters and their representatives. It is obvious that using the principal-agent framework leads to oversimplification. The economic theory of democracy is not a new model; nevertheless, using the game theoretic approach requires several adjustments. The adaptation of the main premises of the concept to the political reality should open new research questions with respect to the voter–elected officials relationship. Most principal–agent studies in empirical political science are focused on all links in the delegation chain but the first one. In my opinion, the link between voters and their representatives in a democracy is the fundamental one. Describing it using the tools of principal-agent theory could help scholars better understand current changes in the structure of political parties and voter behaviour.

scholarly journals Balancing Large-Scale Wildlife Protection and Forest Management Goals with a Game-Theoretic Approach

Forests ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 809
Author(s):  
Denys Yemshanov ◽  
Robert G. Haight ◽  
Ning Liu ◽  
Rob Rempel ◽  
Frank H. Koch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Wildlife Protection ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Profit Maximizing ◽  
Forest Lands ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

When adopted, wildlife protection policies in Canadian forests typically cover large areas and affect multiple economic agents working in these landscapes. Such measures are likely to increase the costs of timber for forestry companies operating in the area, which may hinder their acceptance of the policies unless harvesting remains profitable. We propose a bi-level wildlife protection problem that accounts for the profit-maximizing behavior of forestry companies operating in an area subject to protection. We consider the regulator with a wildlife protection mandate and forestry companies licensed to harvest public forest lands. We depict the relationship between the regulator and forestry companies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. The leader sets the protected area target for each license area and the followers adjust their strategies to maximize payoffs while meeting the protection target set by the leader. The leader’s objective is to maximize the area-wide protection of spatially contiguous habitat while accounting for the followers’ profit-maximizing behavior. We apply the approach to investigate habitat protection policies for woodland caribou in the Churchill range, Ontario, Canada. We compare the game-theoretic solutions with solutions that do not consider the forest companies’ objectives and also with solutions equalizing the revenue losses among the companies.

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