scholarly journals 2009 human H1N1 influenza (swine flu)

2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 127
Author(s):  
Stephen J Prowse ◽  
John S MacKenzie

The 2009 H1N1 influenza, initially known as swine flu, originated in North America in early 2009. This new strain of influenza A virus (H1N1) came to the attention of the international public health community when several foci of influenza-like illness were identified in Mexico, which had more than 850 cases of pneumonia, of whom 59 had died. Mild cases of influenza-like illness were also reported from Texas and California. Virus isolates were obtained from the cases in California and from samples of cases sent from Mexico to the Canadian National Public Health Laboratory in Winnipeg. Molecular analysis of these virus isolates showed that they were virtually identical and indicated that they represented a completely new, rapidly spreading strain of H1N1 virus, which appeared to have originated in swine. This was the first reassorted influenza virus to emerge since the 1968-1969 pandemic caused by the Hong Kong influenza virus. Under the new International Health Regulations (2005), this rapidly spreading, novel virus was quickly recognised by the World Health Organization as constituting a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, the first such emergency since the new International Health Regulations were introduced in mid-2007.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (91) ◽  
pp. 271-286
Author(s):  
Jovana Blešić

The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the UN specialized agencies. Its work and functions gained even more importance in 2020 with the emergence of the corona virus. The eyes of the entire international community focused on this organization and its Director General. Nowadays, its efficiency has been subject to various forms of criticism. In this paper, the author first provides a brief overview of this organization and its significance. The central part of the paper focuses on the activities of the WHO during the Covid-19 pandemic, through the clarification of the concept of public health emergency of international concern and the use of International Health Regulations. Finally, the author discusses the possible reform of this body. The aim of this paper is to familiarize the readers with the World Health Organization and put its activities in the context of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.



2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 026-033
Author(s):  
Kalina Maria de Medeiros Gomes Simplício ◽  
Giovanni Vargas-Hernández ◽  
Mauro Henrique Bueno de Camargo ◽  
Michelly Fernandes de Macedo

In December 2019, the world watched in disbelief as a viral epidemic, originating in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, took on frightening proportions. On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak of the disease caused by the new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) to be a public health emergency of international importance, the highest level of alert of the Organization, as provided in the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2016). On March 11, 2020, the epidemic was declared a pandemic by the WHO. Despite the rapid distribution of the new virus, many countries were reluctant or slow to comply strictly with the prophylactic methods suggested by those who had already experienced the whole situation of threat to the health of their populations.



2020 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. e2020013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youngmee Jee

To discuss whether the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), World Health Organization (WHO) organized the 15-member International Health Regulations Emergency Committee (EC). On January 22-23 and January 30, 2020, EC convened and discussed whether the situation in China and other countries would constitute PHEIC and issued recommendations for WHO, China and the international community. Based on the recommendations of EC, WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak a PHEIC. One of the purposes of the declaration of PHEIC was to alarm countries with weak public health infrastructures to prepare promptly for emerging infectious diseases (EID) and provide WHO with a framework for proactively supporting those countries. On February 3, 2020, WHO proposed the 2019 COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan, which includes accelerating research and development (R&D) processes as one of three major strategies. On February 11-12, 2020, WHO held the Global Research and Innovation Forum: Towards a Research Roadmap for COVID-19. The fact that a COVID-19 R&D forum was the first meeting convened after the PHEIC declaration testifies to the importance of R&D in response to EID. Korea has demonstrated a remarkable capacity in its laboratory response by conducting high-throughput COVID-19 testing and utilizing innovative drive-through samplings. These measures for early detection and screening of cases should be followed by full efforts to produce research-based evidence by thoroughly analyzing epidemiological, clinical and immunological data, which will facilitate the development of vaccines and therapeutics for COVID-19. It is expected that Korea plays a global partner for COVID-19 research by actively participating in immediate and mid/long-term priorities jointly led by WHO and global partners.



2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 91-95
Author(s):  
Nataliia Hendel

The article analyses the rights of the WHO World Health Assembly in adopting sanitary and quarantine requirements and other measures against the international spread of disease. The content of the WHO World Health Assembly Resolution «COVID-19 Response» and its impact on international cooperation in combating the spread of COVID-19 have been studied. The obligation of the States Parties of the 2005 International Health Regulations to notify and exchange information in case of unexpected or unusual events in the field of public health has been disclosed.



2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102
Author(s):  
Anika Klafki

The world is increasingly vulnerable to infectious diseases. Although the fundamental reform of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 was heralded as the beginning of a new era of international health law, the Ebola outbreak 2014 shattered all hopes that the world would now be adequately equipped for epidemic outbreaks of transmissible diseases. The Ebola crisis is perceived as an epic failure on the part of the World Health Organization (WHO). The many dead are a sad testimony to the world's inability to adequately respond to the threat posed by contagions. In reaction to this defeat, policymakers now focus on hands-on initiatives to foster global health instead of reformulating international health law. So far, extensive investments and innovations within the WHO, the United Nations system, and in the private sector have multiplied rapidly. The mushrooming of various health initiatives, however, increases the complexity and reduces the consistency of the current global health landscape. The leadership role of the WHO needs to be restored to provide a coherent response for the next global scale public health emergency. To this end, a fundamental reform of the presently widely neglected international regulatory framework in the field of public law, the IHR, is of vital importance. Keywords: World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, Infectious Diseases, Ebola, Influenza, Public Health, Public Health Emergency



2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 568-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M. Burkle

AbstractIf the Ebola tragedy of West Africa has taught us anything, it should be that the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) Treaty, which gave unprecedented authority to the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide global public health security during public health emergencies of international concern, has fallen severely short of its original goal. After encouraging successes with the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic, the intent of the legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats has shamefully lapsed. Despite the granting of 2-year extensions in 2012 to countries to meet core surveillance and response requirements, less than 20% of countries have complied. Today it is not realistic to expect that these gaps will be solved or narrowed in the foreseeable future by the IHR or the WHO alone under current provisions. The unfortunate failures that culminated in an inadequate response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa are multifactorial, including funding, staffing, and poor leadership decisions, but all are reversible. A rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas has been crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the G20 as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the IHR Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of ongoing failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction worldwide. Practitioners and health decision-makers worldwide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:568–580)



Author(s):  
Anuj K. Pandey ◽  
Sidharth S. Mishra ◽  
Yogesh Wadgave ◽  
Nidhi Mudgil ◽  
Sonal Gawande ◽  
...  

The outbreak of novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was initially noticed in a seafood market in Wuhan city in Hubei Province of China in mid-December 2019 which has now spread to 223 countries/territories/areas worldwide. World Health Organization (WHO) under International Health Regulations (IHR) has declared this outbreak as a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on 30th January 2020 subsequently declared a pandemic on 11th March 2020.



2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (20) ◽  
Author(s):  
N Gill

The latest progress report from the World Health Organization (WHO) states that broadening the requirement to notify WHO, from the present three diseases listed in the regulations (cholera, plague and yellow fever), is central to the revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR) that is under way (1).



2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanan Noman ◽  
Fekri Dureab ◽  
Iman Ahmed ◽  
Abdulwahed Al Serouri ◽  
Taha Hussein ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Yemen that has been devastated by war is facing various challenges to respond to the recent potential outbreaks and other public health emergencies due to lack of proper strategies and regulations, which are essential to public health security. The aim of this study is to assess the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) core capacities under the current ongoing conflict in Yemen. Methods The study simulated the World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool to assess the IHR core capacities in Yemen. Qualitative research methods were used, including desk reviews, in-depth interviews with key informants and analysis of the pooled data. Result Based on the assessment of the three main functions of the IHR framework (prevention, detection, and response), Yemen showed a demonstrated or developed capacity to detect outbreaks, but nevertheless limited or no capacity to prevent and respond to outbreaks. Conclusion This study shows that there has been poor implementation of IHR in Yemen. Therefore, urgent interventions are needed to strengthen the implementation of the IHR core capacities in Yemen. The study recommends 1) raising awareness among national and international health staff on the importance of IHR; 2) improving alignment of INGO programs with government health programs and aligning both towards better implementation of the IHR; 3) improving programmatic coordination, planning and implementation among health stakeholders; 4) increasing funding of the global health security agenda at country level; 5) using innovative approaches to analyze and address gaps in the disrupted health system, and; 6) addressing the root cause of the collapse of the health services and overall health system in Yemen by ending the protracted conflict situation.



2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
G Rodier ◽  
M Hardiman ◽  
B Plotkin ◽  
B Ganter

The adoption of the International Health Regulations (2005) (also referred to as IHR(2005) or the revised Regulations) provides a remarkable new legal tool for the protection of international public health. Upon entry into force on 15 June 2007, Article 2 (‘Purpose and scope‘) provides that the overall focus of the efforts of States Parties (and World Health Organization's efforts) under the revised Regulations will be to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with the public health risks and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic. Health measures under the revised Regulations will be implemented with respect for travellers’ human rights, with several specific new requirements in this area. To comply with the IHR (2005), States Parties (WHO member states that will be bound by the IHR(2005)) will have to have core public health capacities in disease surveillance and response, as well as additional capacities at designated international ports, airports and land crossings. This unique collective commitment will require close collaboration between WHO and the States Parties, but also intersectoral collaboration within the States themselves, including collaboration among different administrative or governmental levels, a particular issue for federal states, and horizontally across ministries and disciplines. Collaboration among States Parties is a key aspect of the revised Regulations, whether among neighbours, or with trading partners, members of regional economic integration organisations or other regional groups, or simply members of the international community. This collaboration is particularly relevant for the Member States of the European Union.



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