Passionate thought

1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Losonsky
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Intelligent Behavior

According to a computational view of mind, thinking is identified with the manipulation of internal mental representations and intelligent behavior is the output of these computations. Although Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of mind is taken by many to be a precursor of this brand of cognitivism, this is not the case. For Hobbes, not all thinking is the manipulation of language-like symbols, and intelligent behavior is partly constitutive of cognition. Cognition requires a 'passionate thought', and this Hobbsian synthesis of inner thought and outer behavior suggests a resolution to the contemporary conflict between cognitive theories of mind that make KNOWING THAT primary and pragmatic theories that make KNOWING HOW primary.

Knowing-How and Knowing-That

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl
Keyword(s):  
Knowing How ◽  
Knowing That

Knowing How, Knowing That, Knowing Technology

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Norström
Keyword(s):  
Knowing How ◽  
Knowing That

scholarly journals Intentionality: A philosophical-cognitive approach to mental representations

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 819
Author(s):  
Cleverson Leite Bastos ◽  
Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmolle
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Explanatory Models ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Definition Of

This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. While the explanatory value of both philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psychology should not be underestimated, we must note that not even hard-core neuroscience has been able to pin point what is going on in our minds, let alone come up with a clear cut explanation how it works or a definition of what thought really is. To date, however, intentionality is the best of all explanatory models regarding mental representations.

scholarly journals Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stina Bäckström ◽  
Martin Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Category Distinction

In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize.

scholarly journals Becoming Animal: Karma and the Animal Realm Envisioned through an Early Yogācāra Lens

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 363
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Stuart
Keyword(s):  
South Asian ◽  
Animal Behavior ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Third Century ◽  
Sanskrit Text ◽  
Middle Period ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Buddha

In an early discourse from the Saṃyuttanikāya, the Buddha states: “I do not see any other order of living beings so diversified as those in the animal realm. Even those beings in the animal realm have been diversified by the mind, yet the mind is even more diverse than those beings in the animal realm.” This paper explores how this key early Buddhist idea gets elaborated in various layers of Buddhist discourse during a millennium of historical development. I focus in particular on a middle period Buddhist sūtra, the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra, which serves as a bridge between early Buddhist theories of mind and karma, and later more developed theories. This third-century South Asian Buddhist Sanskrit text on meditation practice, karma theory, and cosmology psychologizes animal behavior and places it on a spectrum with the behavior of humans and divine beings. It allows for an exploration of the conceptual interstices of Buddhist philosophy of mind and contemporary theories of embodied cognition. Exploring animal embodiments—and their karmic limitations—becomes a means to exploring all beings, an exploration that can’t be separated from the human mind among beings.

Can humans form hierarchically embedded mental representations?

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 687-688
Author(s):  
Denise Dellarosa Cummins
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Domain Specificity ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Goal Structure ◽  
Action Sequences ◽  
Intelligent Behavior

Certain recurring themes have emerged from research on intelligent behavior from literatures as diverse as developmental psychology, artificial intelligence, human reasoning and problem solving, and primatology. These themes include the importance of sensitivity to goal structure rather than action sequences in intelligent learning, the capacity to construct and manipulate hierarchically embedded mental representations, and a troubling domain specificity in the manifestation of each.

Why Is Mind-Wandering Interesting for Philosophers?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Metzinger
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Specific Target ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Spontaneous Thought

This chapter explores points of contact between philosophy of mind and scientific approaches to spontaneous thought. While offering a series of conceptual instruments that might prove helpful for researchers on the empirical research frontier, it begins by asking what the explanandum for theories of mind-wandering is, how one can conceptually individuate single occurrences of this specific target phenomenon, and how one might arrive at a more fine-grained taxonomy. The second half of this contribution sketches some positive proposals as to how one might understand mind-wandering on a conceptual level, namely, as a loss of mental autonomy resulting in involuntary mental behavior, as a highly specific epistemic deficit relating to self-knowledge, and as a discontinuous phenomenological process in which one’s conscious “unit of identification” is switched.

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