The Brain and Higher Mental Function

1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme C. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Mental Function ◽  
Emotional Life ◽  
Core Set ◽  
Reticular System ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Critical evaluation of biological theories of psychiatric disorder requires an understanding of current concepts of higher mental function and its related biology. Both the nature of the topic and the rapidity of advances in the field make it difficult to obtain an updated synthesis. Part I of this paper attempts to provide that by reviewing current concepts of the mind/body relationship, emotion, arousal, attention, consciousness and motivation. Part II considers those concepts in relation to recent work on the structure and function of the reticular, limbic and anterior cerebral systems. It is concluded that the model of the limbic system as subserving emotional life could now perhaps be set aside in favour of the model of a core set of chemically identified neurons in the reticular system being necessary but not sufficient to subserve higher mental function whilst also subserving other integrating functions for which no mental terminology is required. The problem of developing an eclectic theory of higher mental function that will embrace these concepts is discussed.

scholarly journals Soul searching: a brief history of the mind/body debate in the neurosciences

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Dolan
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
The Self ◽  
History Of Neuroscience ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
The Way

✓Anatomical and physiological understandings of the structure and function of the brain have worked to establish it as the “seat of the soul.” As an organ of reflection, meditation, and memory, the brain becomes synonymous with what defines the “self” through the existence of consciousness—of mind. Thus, the brain has been associated with a range of transcendent concepts—the soul, spirit, mind, and consciousness—that all relate in fundamental ways to each other both in terms of their perceived location within the brain and because of the way each works ultimately to define the person to whom the brain belongs. In this article, the author provides a brief exploration of how interrelated these categories have been when seen in the context of ancient, Renaissance, early modern, and modern philosophical and medical concerns; how the brain has variously been perceived as home to these intimate states of being; and how practitioners from the neurosciences have reflected on these questions. The author provides novel insights into the interrelationships of philosophy, theology, and medicine by examining these issues through the lens of the history of neuroscience.

scholarly journals Mapping Meditative States and Stages with Electrophysiology: Concepts, Classifications, and Methods

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poppy Schoenberg ◽  
David R Vago
Keyword(s):  
Structure And Function ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Biological Structure ◽  
Contemplative Practices ◽  
States Of Consciousness ◽  
Neurobiological Substrates ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Exploration of human consciousness remains a final frontier within basic neuroscience; that is, how the finite biological structure and function of the brain gives rise to the seemingly infinite expanse that encompasses the terrain of the mind. Contemporary mindfulness and other contemplative practices across historical and post-modern traditions involve systematic forms of mental training that allow the practitioner to develop the mind in very specific and quantifiable ways. Some fundamental questions pertain to this scientific enquiry; (1) how to concisely classify discrete and developmentally-specific “mind states” of consciousness that are in line with the subtle complex phenomenology of experience so to yield ontological quantifications? (2) what measures best represent such classification/quantification systems? (3) can the present electrophysiological purview map developmentally-specified mind states and stages to neurobiological substrates, based on extant contention (i.e. discrete EEG band functionality, phenomenological significance, and underlying mechanisms) regarding the interpretation of EEG physiology?

scholarly journals Everything you wanted to know about neuroimaging and psychiatry, but were afraid to ask

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Martinelli ◽  
Sukhwinder S. Shergill
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Brain Structure ◽  
Imaging Techniques ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Everyday Clinical Practice ◽  
Brain Structure And Function ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Brain

SummaryRecent years have seen a dramatic increase in the advances and applications of medical imaging techniques. Tools with familiar acronyms such as MRI, EEG/MEG and PET/SPECT have provided invaluable information not only about the brain structure and function associated with psychiatric disorders, but increasingly about the mechanisms underpinning these disorders. This evolving understanding of the specific pathophysiology of mental disorder paves the way for improvement in the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of the disorders managed in everyday clinical practice. This article gives an overview of the main neuroimaging approaches, contemporary applications of this technology to psychiatric disorder and signposts to the exciting possibilities for the future.

Sensory cortex and the mind-brain problem

1978 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Puccetti ◽  
Robert W. Dykes
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Physical Structure ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Rule Out

AbstractOne of the implicit, and sometimes explicit, objectives of modern neuroscience is to find neural correlates of subjective experience so that different qualities of that experience might be explained in detail by reference to the physical structure and processes of the brain. It is generally assumed that such explanations will make unnecessary or rule out any reference to conscious mental agents. This is the classic mind-brain reductivist program. We have chosen to challenge the optimism underlying such an approach in the context of sensory neurophysiology and sensory experience. Specifically, we ask if it is possible to explain the subjective differences among seeing, hearing, and feeling something by inspecting the structure and function of primary visual, auditory, and somesthetic cortex.After reviewing the progress in localization of sensory functions over the past two centuries and examining some aspects of the structure and function of somesthetic, auditory, and visual cortex, we infer that one cannot explain the subjective differences between sensory modalities in terms of present day neuroscientific knowledge. Nor do present trends in research provide grounds for optimism.At this point we turn to three philosophical theories to see what promise they hold of explaining these differences. A brief discussion of each – identity theory, functionalism, and eliminative materialism – suggests that none adequately accounts for the facts of the situation, and we tentatively conclude that some form of dualism is still a tenable hypothesis.

The role of GABAA receptor biogenesis, structure and function in epilepsy

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 863-867 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mizielinska ◽  
S. Greenwood ◽  
C.N. Connolly
Keyword(s):  
Gabaa Receptor ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Inhibitory Synapses ◽  
Normal Brain ◽  
Synaptic Targeting ◽  
Acid Type ◽  
Normal Brain Function ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Brain

Maintaining the correct balance in neuronal activation is of paramount importance to normal brain function. Imbalances due to changes in excitation or inhibition can lead to a variety of disorders ranging from the clinically extreme (e.g. epilepsy) to the more subtle (e.g. anxiety). In the brain, the most common inhibitory synapses are regulated by GABAA (γ-aminobutyric acid type A) receptors, a role commensurate with their importance as therapeutic targets. Remarkably, we still know relatively little about GABAA receptor biogenesis. Receptors are constructed as pentameric ion channels, with α and β subunits being the minimal requirement, and the incorporation of a γ subunit being necessary for benzodiazepine modulation and synaptic targeting. Insights have been provided by the discovery of several specific assembly signals within different GABAA receptor subunits. Moreover, a number of recent studies on GABAA receptor mutations associated with epilepsy have further enhanced our understanding of GABAA receptor biogenesis, structure and function.

Normal ageing and the brain

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-28
Author(s):  
CS Breathnach
Keyword(s):  
Cerebral Cortex ◽  
Imaging Techniques ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Ageing Population ◽  
Cell Shrinkage ◽  
Ageing Processes ◽  
Normal Ageing ◽  
And Function ◽  
Ageing Brain ◽  
The Brain

AbstractInterest in the psychiatric aspects of old age predated the institution of geriatrics as a clinical discipline, but the systematic study of the ageing brain only began in the second half of this century when an ageing population presented a global numerical challenge to society. In the senescent cerebral cortex, though the number of neurons is not reduced, cell shrinkage results in synaptic impoverishment with consequent cognitive impairment. Recent advances in imaging techniques, combined with burgeoning knowledge of neurobiological structure and function, have increased our understanding of the ageing processes in the human brain and permit an optimistic approach in the application of the newer insights into neuropsychology and geriatric psychiatry.

scholarly journals Culture Wires the Brain

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise C. Park ◽  
Chih-Mao Huang
Keyword(s):  
Brain Structure ◽  
Cultural Psychology ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Neural Function ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Neural Structure ◽  
Cultural Experiences ◽  
Brain Structure And Function ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Brain

There is clear evidence that sustained experiences may affect both brain structure and function. Thus, it is quite reasonable to posit that sustained exposure to a set of cultural experiences and behavioral practices will affect neural structure and function. The burgeoning field of cultural psychology has often demonstrated the subtle differences in the way individuals process information—differences that appear to be a product of cultural experiences. We review evidence that the collectivistic and individualistic biases of East Asian and Western cultures, respectively, affect neural structure and function. We conclude that there is limited evidence that cultural experiences affect brain structure and considerably more evidence that neural function is affected by culture, particularly activations in ventral visual cortex—areas associated with perceptual processing.

Mental illness: The collision of meaning with mechanism

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-289
Author(s):  
Steven E. Hyman ◽  
Doug McConnell
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Gene Regulation ◽  
Human Brain ◽  
Lived Experience ◽  
Clinical Encounter ◽  
Structure And Function ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
And Function ◽  
Human Brains ◽  
The Brain

‘Mental illness: the collision of meaning with mechanism’ is based on the views of psychiatry that Steven Hyman articulated in his Loebel Lectures—mental illness results from the disordered functioning of the human brain and effective treatment repairs or mitigates those malfunctions. This view is not intended as reductionist as causes of mental illness and contributions to their repair may come from any source that affects the structure and function of the brain. These might include social interactions and other sources of lived experience, ideas (such as those learned in cognitive therapy), gene sequences and gene regulation, metabolic factors, drugs, electrodes, and so on. This, however, is not the whole story for psychiatry on Hyman’s view; interpersonal interactions between clinicians and patients, intuitively understood in such folk psychological terms as selfhood, intention, and agency are also critical for successful practice. As human beings who are suffering, patients seek to make sense of their lives and benefit from the empathy, respect, and a sense of being understood not only as the objects of a clinical encounter, but also as subjects. Hyman’s argument, however, is that the mechanisms by which human brains function and malfunction to produce the symptoms and impairments of mental illness are opaque to introspection and that the mechanistic understandings necessary for diagnosis and treatment are incommensurate with intuitive (folk psychological) human self-understanding. Thus, psychiatry does best when skillful clinicians switch between an objectifying medical and neurobiological stance and the interpersonal stance in which the clinician engages the patients as a subject. Attempts to integrate these incommensurate views of patients and their predicaments have historically produced incoherent explanations of psychopathology and have often led treatment astray. For example, privileging of folk psychological testimony, even when filtered through sophisticated theories has historically led psychiatry into intellectually blind and clinically ineffective cul-de-sacs such as psychoanalysis.

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