Higher Oil Prices and the World Economy: The Adjustment Problems

1977 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-150
Author(s):  
Lawrence H. Officer
1986 ◽  
Vol 117 ◽  
pp. 20-29

Fuller data confirm the impression which we formed in May that OECD countries' total output did not change much in the first quarter. It probably increased by about ¼ per cent, with even this small rise attributable wholly to stock movements in the US. Final demand in the US fell and there were declines in total output in a number of countries, including Japan, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland and possibly Italy (for which there are conflicting estimates), white France achieved only marginal growth. The fall was notably severe in Germany, where construction suffered badly in the cold winter. This probably had a wider impact also, and, in North America at least, the initial effect of the slump in oil prices seems to have been depressive, with drilling activity sharply reduced, especially in the US. There may also have been a tendency for expenditure, perhaps on investment in particular, to be deferred in the expectation of falling prices and interest rates.


1990 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 3-6

Our forecasts, like those of the Treasury published in the Autumn Statement, are based on the assumption that oil prices will fall back next year, as the crisis in the Gulf is resolved. We describe briefly below what might be the consequences, for the world economy and for Britain, if oil prices were to be $45 a barrel for the foreseeable future, as might happen as a result of a long war.In Chapter I our main forecasts assume the continuation of existing economic policies, which we interpret as being consistent with a gradual move towards economic and monetary union. In Chapter III we consider some of the alternative policy options which might be considered if the Labour Party wins the next election.


1989 ◽  
Vol 128 ◽  
pp. 20-39
Author(s):  
R.J. Barrell ◽  
Andrew Gurney

Our February forecast suggested that developments in the short term would be dominated by fears of accelerating inflation and policy responses to them. This has indeed been the case. In Japan, Germany and the US wholesale prices have begun to rise relatively rapidly. Although commodity prices, especially of metals and minerals and of developed country foods, have fallen in recent weeks, at least in dollar terms they remain high and oil prices appear to have hit temporary peaks at the beginning of the quarter. These developments are the result of demand pressure. Our equations for real commodity prices, which were reported in the August 1988 issue of the Review, do have rather strong influences from world industrial production in then. As commodity prices are more timely than figures for demand and output they have often been early indicators of rising demand and we believe that they are currently, and correctly, filling this role.


2015 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. F2-F2

Following growth of 3.4 per cent each year in 2012–14, the world economy will grow by 3.2 per cent in 2015 and 3.8 per cent in 2016.Growth has been slightly weaker than expected so far in 2015 and inflation remains well below target in almost all developed countries.But deflation does not appear to be embedded and low oil prices, combined with accommodative monetary policies, should provide a boost to growth in most oil importing countries.


Author(s):  
Michael Kumhof ◽  
Dirk Muir

This paper, using a six-region dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the world economy, assesses the output and current account implications of permanent oil supply shocks hitting the world economy. For modest-sized shocks and conventional production technologies, the effects are modest. But for larger shocks, for elasticities of substitution that decline as oil usage is reduced to a minimum, and for production functions in which oil acts as a critical enabler of technologies, output growth could drop significantly. Also, oil prices could become so high that smooth adjustment, as assumed in the model, may become very difficult.


1989 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 22-37
Author(s):  
R.J. Barrell ◽  
Andrew Gurney

Our recent forecasts have warned of growing inflationary pressures in the world economy. The policy response to these has been robust, and interest rates have risen markedly over the last year; consequently there are now signs that inflationary pressures are receding. Chart 1 illustrates the recent interest-rate developments, and chart 2 recent and prospective inflation rates for the major 4 economies. Oil prices have weakened over the last three months, and commodity prices, especially those for metals and minerals, have been falling.


2008 ◽  
Vol 205 ◽  
pp. 8-13
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell

In interesting times several things may happen simultaneously, and they may have connected roots. The financial turmoil that developed initially in the US banking sector had its roots in financial innovation that had made available cheap finance and increased demand for housing. This wave of low cost finance had spread to Europe, and house prices rose in a correlated way. The increase in demand in the world economy that resulted from strong growth in lending and high asset values helped raise output growth outside the OECD, and this in turn put upward pressure on oil prices. Markets sometimes work slowly, and the effects of the increase in demand on prices appear to be coming through just as the asset bubble is collapsing. The sequence of events was not inevitable, as low personal sector saving in the US and the UK as well as elsewhere could have been offset by tighter fiscal policy, and better prudential regulation of lenders would also definitely have helped. The desire to move financial regulation from the central bank, as in the UK, may have been for good, competition based, reasons, but it has meant that financial sector oversight has not taken account of the macroeconomic implications of a wave of lending that rested on risky financial innovation and therefore it has not properly addressed the issue of systemic risk (see Barrell and Davis, 2005). The resulting financial turmoil has meant that banks have made losses, and have been unable to trust each other's solvency when making deals. As a result three month interbank rates have risen well above central bank intervention rates, as can be seen in figure 1.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naushad Khan ◽  
Shah Fahad ◽  
Mahnoor Naushad ◽  
Shah Faisal
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 48-48

The world economy is expected to grow by 3.0 per cent in 2016, down from the 3.2 per cent predicted in the February Review. Growth this year is therefore forecast to be the slowest since the 2009 recession, before picking up to 3.5 per cent in 2017.The growth downgrade is mainly due to disappointing performances in the United States and Japan. Among the emerging market economies, growth has been also been revised down for Brazil and Russia.A moderate strengthening of growth is forecast for 2017 and beyond, supported by accommodative monetary policies, lower oil prices and the gradual normalisation of conditions in stressed emerging market economies.


1990 ◽  
Vol 133 ◽  
pp. 24-49
Author(s):  
R.J. Barrell ◽  
Andrew Gurney ◽  
Stephen Dulake

Uncertainties over the prospects for the oil price mean that the short-term forecast is subject to a wider margin of error than usual. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could lead to a reduction of world oil production by at least eight per cent immediately and has already produced a significant rise in oil prices. Our central forecast assumes that in the short term oil prices will stay firmer, but that in the longer run there will be no major change in oil market conditions. We have assumed that oil prices (or more precisely the arithmetic average of Brent and Dubai spot prices) will be around $25 per barrel in the second half of 1990, but that they will fall thereafter. This should leave crude oil prices in the range $20–22 per barrel by the end of 1991. Annex I to the chapter investigates the effects of an oil price rise on the world economy, and looks in particular at the distribution of the effects across the major economies. The conclusion of the Annex is that a 25 per cent rise in oil prices is likely to raise inflation in the major seven economies by only a quarter to a half a per cent in the short run, and to lower output by up to a half per cent.


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