Conscience as a higher moral capacity

The article is devoted to the psychological analysis of the concept “conscience”, which is considered in connection with the psychological model of spiritual capacities [the author’s previous works of 2010, 2016]. Conscience is described as a higher moral capacity related to the moral component/level of this model. The psychological frame of considering conscience within the psychological model of spiritual capacities allows emphasising its spiritual nature; explaining the dual nature of its manifestation – rationality/irrationality; showing its connection with higher meanings and absolute values, as well as spiritual and moral qualities, spiritual altruistic orientation, moral feelings and moral experience; noting its interaction with the higher capacities of all three components/levels of the model of spiritual capacities – moral, mental, transcendent. Conscience is interpreted as a regulator of moral behaviour, as a spiritual mentor, guiding a person on the path from the egocentric “I” to the spiritual “I”. Thanks to conscience, a person rises to the highest level of personality functioning – a spiritual one, at which it manifests itself as a spiritual personality, focused on the principles of absolute morality.

Moral Psychology and Cultivating the Self

This chapter offers a selection of writings concerning Zhu Xi’s account of the psychological workings of human beings that explains how their nature (xing性‎), heart-mind (xin心‎), and the feelings (qing情‎) are integrated with one another. It also includes material that addresses Zhu’s naturalistic explanation of moral capacity of humans and the proper course and method of self-cultivation. Zhu’s moral psychology presents a “synthesis” of the various cosmological and ethical ideas forwarded by his Northern Song neo-Confucian predecessors. He argued that by conceptualizing and embodying the all-pervading pattern-principle of things in the world one achieved integrity and unity in one’s own person, thereby fully realizing one’s humanity.

PERMAINAN ULAR TANGGA DALAM MENGINGKATKAN KEMAMPUAN MORAL ANAK

- Moral religion is important to develop because it will become the basis or foundation of childrenin navigating life. From the observation of the age of 3-4 years at KOBER PGRI Bayah, it was found thatchildren's abilities in the aspects of religious moral development were relatively low. Based on the thinkingabout the factors causing the low moral capacity of the child's religion are: (1) teacher's body language is stilldifficult so that the presentation of learning is less interesting; (2) the use of methods that are less varied; (3)the lack of teaching aids owned; (4) avoiding children's interest in religious moral learning. This research usesClassroom Action Research. The results of the study show how to learn that can improve the moral capacityof religious children aged 3-4 years at KOBER PGRI Bayah, Lebak Regency. The success rate for activitiesis very significant. In the pre-cycle activities of the average percentage of 38.67% increased to 55.67% in thefirst cycle, and increased to 90.33% in the second cycle.Keywords - kemampuan moral agama, game ular tangga

The Cold War and the Invention of Free Agency

This chapter focuses on Benson’s contributions as a vocal political activist in the 1950s and 1960s through his assumption of the presidency of the Church in the mid-1980s. In particular, it grapples with his elaboration of the notion of “free agency,” a foundational principle of Mormon theology enunciated in the Book of Mormon and Joseph Smith’s teachings, which emphasized individual moral capacity and responsibility. Benson in particular rearticulated this idea to emphasize dual, and seemingly contradictory, principles: a moralistic libertarian political philosophy, which asserted that too much government was morally corrupting and a threat to “free agency,” and at the same time, loyalty and commitment to the institution of the LDS church. This chapter shows how Benson developed the notion of free agency from the Mormon tradition and the central place it assumed in Mormon theology by the end of his career.

Emmanuel Levinas

Emmanuel Levinas, twentieth-century French phenomenologist and ethical/political philosopher, critically reappraises the meaning, grounds, and significance of intelligibility in relation to the irreducible transcendence and alterity of the other person conceived as my moral responsibility for you, rather than in ontology, epistemology, or aesthetics. Based in original phenomenological studies of human sensibility as vulnerable and mortal, as both suffering and moral capacity to alleviate suffering, Levinas finds in ethics the ultimate guidance for achieving mental health and a new approach to psychopathology beyond such standards as integral coherence or conformity to conventions. Human dignity is attained or regained through the obligations of moral responsibility to and for the other person, and ultimately, based thereupon, in responsibility to and for all others by contributing to the attainment of social justice.

Islamist Women's Agency and Relational Autonomy

Mainstream conceptions of autonomy have been surreptitiously gender‐specific and masculinist. Feminist philosophers have reclaimed autonomy as a feminist value, while retaining its core ideal as self‐government, by reconceptualizing it as “relational autonomy.” This article examines whether feminist theories of relational autonomy can adequately illuminate the agency of Islamist women who defend their nonliberal religious values and practices and assiduously attempt to enact them in their daily lives. I focus on two notable feminist theories of relational autonomy advanced by Marina Oshana and Andrea Westlund and apply them to the case of Women's Mosque Movement participants in Egypt. I argue that feminist conceptions of relational autonomy, centered around the ideal of self‐government, cannot elucidate the agency of Women's Mosque Movement participants whose normative ideal involves perfecting their moral capacity.

Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility

This chapter discusses an important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free will debates, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This chapter disentangles three strands of Strawson’s argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson’s view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson’s view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The chapter concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed.