The Increasing Role of Practical Reason in theHuman Development Reports

2013 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo F. Crespo
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michail Pantoulias ◽  
Vasiliki Vergouli ◽  
Panagiotis Thanassas

Truth has always been a controversial subject in Aristotelian scholarship. In most cases, including some well-known passages in the Categories, De Interpretatione and Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the predicate ‘true’ for assertions, although exceptions are many and impossible to ignore. One of the most complicated cases is the concept of practical truth in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics: its entanglement with action and desire raises doubts about the possibility of its inclusion to the propositional model of truth. Nevertheless, in one of the most extensive studies on the subject, C. Olfert has tried to show that this is not only possible but also necessary. In this paper, we explain why trying to fit practical truth into the propositional model comes with insurmount­able problems. In order to overcome these problems, we focus on multiple aspects of practical syllogism and correlate them with Aristo­tle’s account of desire, happiness and the good. Identifying the role of such concepts in the specific steps of practical reasoning, we reach the conclusion that practical truth is best explained as the culmination of a well-executed practical syllogism taken as a whole, which ultimately explains why this type of syllogism demands a different approach and a different kind of truth than the theoretical one.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli

Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral value, hence also denying that they may have any role to play in moral agency and moral thinking. In what follows, I will offer a Kantian account of ‘practical reason’ as the seat of moral agency, which recognizes a diversified and complex relation between reason and sensibility.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei N. Krouglov

The sources of Kant’s term Gesinnung and a review of the problems of its translation into English were presented in the first part of this article; the second part examines the novel features that Kant brings to the interpretation of this concept in the critical period. In the Critique of Practical Reason these include the questions of manifestation of Gesinnung in the world, apprehended through the senses, the method of establishing and the culture of truly moral Gesinnung, as well as the problem of the immutability of Gesinnung in the progress towards the good. The new theses that appear in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason are Gesinnung as the internal subjective principle of maxims, on virtue as evidence of the presence of Gesinnung, on act as a manifestation of Gesinnung, on the unintelligibility of Gesinnung in its noumenal, suprasensible character, on the innateness of Gesinnung in the sense that it exists not in time, but in the form of its acceptance by free expression of the will, on the singleness of Gesinnung and its indivisibility into periods, on revolution in Gesinnung as distinct from empirical reform, on the creation of the new human being as distinct from the ancient one as a result of the revolution of Gesinnung, on the link between the revolution in Gesinnung and “conversion” or second birth. After discussing the problem of distinguishing the terms Gesinnung and Denkungsart in translation as well as a review of all the existing variants of translating Kant’s concept of Gesinnung into Russian (aspiration, inclination, intention, virtue, virtuousness, conviction, attitude, mode of thinking, thoughts, mood, disposition and umonastroenie), the author comes to the conclusion that the uniform variant umonastroenie is best suited for Russian translations of Kant’s works.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (34) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Nythamar De Oliveira

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleologywhich seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar asthey help us understand the correlated problems of the unity of reason, the relation of aestheticsand ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history.In this paper, I argue for a teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as tomake sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical,aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty–namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness(Gesetzmäßigkeit, Endzweck, Zweckmäßigkeit) – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (34) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Nythamar De Oliveira

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleologywhich seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantianarticulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar asthey help us understand the correlated problems of the unity of reason, the relation of aestheticsand ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history.In this paper, I argue for a teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as tomake sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical,aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty–namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness(Gesetzmäßigkeit, Endzweck, Zweckmäßigkeit) – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques.


Author(s):  
Robert Stern

This book focuses on the ethics of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905–81), and in particular on his key text The Ethical Demand (1956). The first part of the book provides a commentary on The Ethical Demand. The second part contains chapters on Løgstrup as a natural law theorist; his critique of Kant and Kierkegaard; his relation to Levinas; the difference between his position and the second-person ethics of Stephen Darwall; and the role of Luther in Løgstrup’s thinking. Overall, it is argued that Løgstrup rejects accounts of ethical obligation based on the commands of God, or on abstract principles governing practical reason, or on social norms; instead he develops a different picture, at the basis of which is our interdependence, which he argues gives his ethics a grounding in the nature of life itself. The book claims that Løgstrup offers a distinctive and attractive account of our moral obligation to others, which fits into the natural law tradition.


Author(s):  
John Deigh

The essays in this collection belong to the tradition of naturalism in ethics. Its program is to explain moral thought and action as wholly natural phenomena, that is, to explain such thought and action without recourse to either a reality separate from that of the natural world or volitional powers that operate independently of natural forces. Naturalism’s greatest exponent in ancient thought was Aristotle. In modern thought Hume and Freud stand out as the most influential contributors to the tradition. All three thinkers made the study of human psychology fundamental to their work in ethics. All three built their theories on studies of human desires and emotions and assigned to reason the role of guiding the actions that spring from our desires and emotions toward ends that promise self-fulfillment and away from ends that are self-destructive. The collection’s essays draw inspiration from their ideas and are arranged to follow the lead of Aristotle’s and Hume’s ethics. The first three survey and examine general theories of emotion and motivation. The next two focus on emotions that are central to human sociability. Turning to distinctively cognitive powers necessary for moral thought and action, the sixth and seventh essays discuss the role of empathy in moral judgment and defend Bernard Williams’s controversial account of practical reason. The final five essays use the studies in moral psychology of the previous essays to treat questions in ethics and social philosophy. The treatment of these questions exemplifies the implementation of a naturalist program in these disciplines.


Author(s):  
Nancy E. Snow

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics takes inspiration from Aristotle’s ethical theory. Central to this approach is that virtues, enduring dispositions of character and intellect, are essential, along with external goods, for us to live flourishing lives in accordance with our nature as rational beings. Aristotle’s theory is teleological, for the virtues direct us toward the end or telos of flourishing and enable us to attain it. The theory is naturalistic in the sense that to live a virtuous life is to live a life of natural goodness. This chapter explains these and other ideas by reviewing Rosalind Hursthouse’s view that virtue ethics is a viable alternative to deontology and consequentialism, followed by a discussion of two major themes of Daniel C. Russell’s account of the role of practical reason in virtue ethics. Finally, it turns to ethical naturalism as articulated by Hursthouse, Philippa Foot, and Michael Thompson, with mention of McDowell’s approach.


2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-169
Author(s):  
Bernard Freydberg

Both in Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental (2000) and in his very recent Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental (2012), John Sallis enacts a reconfiguration of the relationship of geometry to elementology, which might be regarded more generally as a rethinking of the relation of mathematics to philosophy. The paper will trace this reconfiguration in two ways: (1) as it lies present but concealed in the history of philosophy, for example, in Descartes’ so-called “dualism” and in Kant’s pure productive imagination, and (2) in its present creative evolution in fractal geometry, as Sallis interprets it. Sallis draws together the mathematical affinity with a fundamental aesthetic drive, likening mathematical patterns to choreographic ones. I conclude by following this strain as it points to specific dance companies, and to my own sense of aesthetic homecoming as presented in my Imagination in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.


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