Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Author(s):  
Nancy E. Snow

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics takes inspiration from Aristotle’s ethical theory. Central to this approach is that virtues, enduring dispositions of character and intellect, are essential, along with external goods, for us to live flourishing lives in accordance with our nature as rational beings. Aristotle’s theory is teleological, for the virtues direct us toward the end or telos of flourishing and enable us to attain it. The theory is naturalistic in the sense that to live a virtuous life is to live a life of natural goodness. This chapter explains these and other ideas by reviewing Rosalind Hursthouse’s view that virtue ethics is a viable alternative to deontology and consequentialism, followed by a discussion of two major themes of Daniel C. Russell’s account of the role of practical reason in virtue ethics. Finally, it turns to ethical naturalism as articulated by Hursthouse, Philippa Foot, and Michael Thompson, with mention of McDowell’s approach.

Dialogue ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Woodcock

ABSTRACTMy aim in this article is to argue that Philippa Foot fails to provide a convincing basis for moral evaluation in her book Natural Goodness. Foot's proposal fails because her conception of natural goodness and defect in human beings either sanctions prescriptive claims that are clearly objectionable or else it inadvertently begs the question of what constitutes a good human life by tacitly appealing to an independent ethical standpoint to sanitize the theory's normative implications. Foot's appeal to natural facts about human goodness is in this way singled out as an Achilles' heel that undermines her attempt to establish an independent framework for virtue ethics. This problem might seem to be one that is uniquely applicable to the bold naturalism of Foot's methodology; however, I claim that the problem is indicative of a more general problem for all contemporary articulations of virtue ethics.


Author(s):  
Christine Swanton

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was groundbreaking but by now has been subject to considerable critical attention. The time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed in this book (TVE) is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the ‘natural goodness’ metaphysics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a ‘hermeneutic ontology’ of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well-known ‘qualified agent’ account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target-centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. The target-centred view, introduced in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (VEP), is much more developed in TVE with discussions of Dancy’s particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean (suitably interpreted). TVE retains the pluralism of VEP but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. Besides the pluralism TVE develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of “dwelling”; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2(2)) ◽  
pp. 11-24
Author(s):  
Dariusz Juruś

In this paper I compare two contemporary moral theories; virtue ethics and the ethics of care. They both reject traditional ethical positions – Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics focuses on the question what person should I be, instead, as in the case of Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, what should I do. It holds that value concepts (good, value) in contrary to deontological concepts (duty, obligation) are fundamental in ethical theory. Ethics of care, in rejecting a position based on justice, emphasises the role of care in human relations. It concentrates on personal relationships like love, friendship and charity. Virtue ethics emphasises the crucial role of individual character in moral life, whereas ethics of care holds that relations between people based on attentiveness, responsiveness and respect are the most important in moral life.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Sticker

Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.


Author(s):  
Don Garrett

This chapter analyzes Spinoza’s ethical theory in the context of his philosophical naturalism, his doctrine that the actual essence of each thing is its striving for self-preservation (conatus), and his psychology of the emotions as it concerns both “bondage to the passions” and the active emotions such as intellectual joy. It explains how Spinoza’s ethical precepts are expressed chiefly through demonstrated propositions about good and evil, virtue, the guidance of reason, and “the free man.” Particular attention is given to questions about (1) the meaning of ethical language, (2) the nature of the good, (3) the practicality of reason, (4) the role of virtuous character, (5) the requirements for freedom and moral responsibility (especially in light of his necessitarianism), and (6) the possibility and moral significance of altruism. The chapter concludes by briefly assessing the significance of Spinoza’s ethical theory and its place in the history of ethics.


1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich H. Loewy

Virtue ethics attempts to identify certain commonly agreed-upon dispositions to act in certain ways, dispositions that would be accepted as ‘good’ by those affected, and to locate the goodness or badness of an act internal to the agent. Basically, virtue ethics is said to date back to Aristotle, but as Alisdair MacIntyre has pointed out, the whole idea of ‘virtue ethics’ would have been unintelligible in Greek philosophy for “a virtue (arete) was an excellence and ethics concerned excellence of character; all ethics was virtue ethics.” Virtue ethics as a method to approach problems in medical ethics is said by some to lend itself to working through cases at the bedside or, at least, is better than the conventional method of handling ethical problems. In this paper I want to explore some of the shortcomings of this approach, examine other traditional approaches, indicate some of their limitations, and suggest a different conceptualization of the approach.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 432-446
Author(s):  
Herman Paul

Abstract In response to Anton Froeyman’s paper, “Virtues of Historiography,” this article argues that philosophers of history interested in why historians cherish such virtues as carefulness, impartiality, and intellectual courage would do wise not to classify these virtues unequivocally as either epistemic or moral virtues. Likewise, in trying to grasp the roles that virtues play in the historian’s professional practice, philosophers of history would be best advised to avoid adopting either an epistemological or an ethical perspective. Assuming that the historian’s virtuous behavior has epistemic and moral dimensions (as well as aesthetic, political, and other dimensions), this article advocates a non-reductionist account of historical scholarship, which acknowledges that the virtues cherished by historians usually play a variety of roles, depending on the goals they are supposed to serve. Given that not the least important of these goals are epistemic ones, the articles concludes that virtue ethical approaches, to the extent that they are focused on the acquisition of moral instead of epistemic goods, insufficiently recognize the role of virtue in the pursuit of such epistemic aims as knowledge and understanding.


Author(s):  
Steven Torrente ◽  
Harry D. Gould

After a long dormancy in the modern era, virtue-based ethical thought has once again become a subject of serious consideration and debate in the field of philosophy. The normative orientation of most International Political Theory, however, still comes primarily from principles-based (deontological) or outcome-based (consequentialist) ethical systems. Virtue ethics differs from focus deontological and consequentialist ethics by emphasizing character, context, and way of life, rather than rule-governed action. This chapter reviews the emergence of contemporary virtue ethics as a challenge to overly abstract, language-based analysis of moral concepts, and its development into a broad and nuanced ethical theory. It then connects virtue ethics to the capabilities approach to human development, which is similarly focused.


Author(s):  
Andrew Pinsent

Abstract As a theological disposition revealed in Scripture, the recognition of hope as an important virtue coincided with the radical transformation in virtue ethics in the early Middle Ages. As the ideals of pagan antiquity gave way to the Christian aspirations for the Kingdom of Heaven, early work on hope was strongly influenced by writers with a monastic background, such as Pope St Gregory the Great. The rise of scholasticism in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, gave an impetus to finding a coherent account of virtue ethics that would incorporate hope along with the other theological virtues and revealed attributes of perfection, such as the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit. This chapter examines, in particular, the attempt of St Thomas Aquinas to develop such an account and the role of hope in this account, drawing from new research in experimental psychology. The chapter concludes by considering briefly the transposition of the medieval account of hope to aspects of contemporary life.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-145
Author(s):  
Anthea R. Lacchia ◽  
Stephen Webster

Abstract. The ethical challenges facing contemporary science range from scientific misconduct to the rightful treatment of people, animals and the environment. In this work, we explore the role of virtue ethics, which concern the character of a person, in contemporary science. Through interviews with 13 scientists, eight of whom are geoscientists, we identify six virtues in science (honesty, humility, philia, innocence, generosity and reticence), paired with vices, and construct a narrative argument around them. Specifically, we employ the narrative structure of the late medieval poem The Divine Comedy, by Dante Alighieri, and draw on its moral universe to explore the scientific virtues. Using this narrative device, we make the case for virtue ethics being a reliable guide for all matters scientific. As such, this work lays out a modern code of conduct for science.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document