Weak Universal Egoism as a Non-ethical System

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-509
Author(s):  
George R. Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Ethical System ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
State Of Affairs

In his “Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning; Ethical Egoism as a Moral Theory”, Jesse Kalin defines ethical egoism as “the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest”, by which he means that each person is ‘rationally justified in’ or ‘has conclusive reasons for’ acting thus, and not that ‘it is good', or that ‘it is desirable', or that ‘it conduces to any intrinsically desirable state of affairs', for each to act only self-interestedly.In this way, Kalin seeks to formulate an egoism which he takes to be rational, insofar as, in the interests of consistency, the egoist holds a principle applicable to all, and yet is not committed, ex hypothesi, to valuing collective goods or states of affairs which would tend to compromise his own interests (e.g. everyone's actually acting egoistically).

Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning: Ethical Egoism as A Moral Theory

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Kalin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Principle ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Logical Flaw ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Ethical egoism, when summarized into a single ethical principle, is the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest. The criticisms standardly advanced against this view try to show either that it is subject to some fatal logical flaw or else that, even if logically coherent, it can give no account of the basic parts of morality. Both these objections are mistaken, however, and it is the point of this paper to make this clear. Central to my argument is the distinction drawn in Section 1 between two kinds of moral reasoning and hence two kinds of moral reasons. I call these ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’ (the latter could be termed ‘conventional’ or ‘institutional’ without much change of meaning). Both are present in the writings of contemporary moral philosophers but have not been emphasized or seen as crucial.

scholarly journals Agent-Relative Restrictions and Agent-Relative Value

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Stephen Emet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Relative Value ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Commonsense Morality

In this article I pose a challenge for attempts to ground all reasons in considerations of value. Some believe that all reasons for action are grounded in considerations of value. Some also believe that there are agent-relative restrictions, which provide us with agent-relative reasons against bringing about the best state of affairs, on an impartial ranking of states of affairs. Some would like to hold both of these beliefs. That is, they would like to hold that such agent-relative restrictions are compatible with a teleological theory, one that grounds all reasons for action in considerations of value. This is what I will argue is problematic. I will argue that agent-centered restrictions will not fit into a teleological theory. If the correct moral theory is a teleological one, then there are no agent-relative restrictions. If there are agent-relative restrictions, then teleology is false. My argument challenges a particular project, of showing that all ethical theories are broadly consequentialist. The attraction of this project is that it promises to preserve what is thought to be compelling about consequentialism—its teleology and maximizing—while also preserving elements of commonsense morality—such as agent-relative restrictions—that have typically been thought of as distinctly non-consequentialist in nature. If my argument is correct, then this promise cannot be fulfilled.

SUBSTANTIVE MORAL THEORY

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common

Philosophy can serve two roles in relation to moral thinking: first, to provide a meta-ethical commentary on the nature of moral thought, as the methodology or the philosophy of science provides a commentary on the nature of scientific thought; and second, to build on the common presumptions deployed in people's moral thinking about moral issues, looking for a substantive moral theory that they might support. The present essay addresses the nature of this second role; illustrates it with substantive theories that equate moral obligations respectively with requirements of nature, self-interest, benevolence, reason and justifiability; and outlines a novel competitor in which the focus is shifted to requirements of co-reasoning and respect.

scholarly journals Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem

2008 ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Holger Leerhoff
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Bradley’S Regress ◽  
State Of Affairs

In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.

scholarly journals PURE TIME PREFERENCE IN INTERTEMPORAL WELFARE ECONOMICS

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Paul Kelleher
Keyword(s):  
Real Number ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Theoretical Question ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Decisive Objection

Abstract:Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question concerns the rate of pure time preference, i.e. the evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at different times. This article criticizes the standard philosophical account of pure time preference, arguing that it ascribes to economists a methodological commitment they need not accept. The article then evaluates three further objections to pure time preference, concluding that it might still be defensible under certain circumstances. I close by articulating a final argument that, if sound, would constitute a decisive objection to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal welfare economics.

Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl W. Spurgin
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Way

Abstract:In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 319-346
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Perceptual Skills ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Crucial Component ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency.

Agent-neutral Consequentialism from the Inside-out: Concern for Integrity without Self-indulgence

Utilitas ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ridge
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Inside Out ◽  
Stephen Darwall

Consequentialists are sometimes accused of being unable to accommodate all the ways in which an agent should care about her own integrity. Here it is helpful to follow Stephen Darwall in distinguishing two approaches to moral theory. First, we might begin with the value of states of affairs and then work our way ‘inward’ to our integrity, explaining the value of the latter in terms of their contribution to the value of the former. This is the ‘outside-in’ approach, and Darwall argues that it is well-suited to defending consequentialism. Alternatively, we might begin with the perspective of a virtuous agent's concern for her integrity, and then work our way ‘outward’, building a conception of the value of states of affairs from this perspective. On this ‘inside-out’ account there is a kind of agent-centred concern each agent should have for her own integrity simply because it is her own. The inside-out approach therefore suggests a possible rationale for a non-consequentialist moral theory, in so far as such a fundamental egocentric concern for one's own integrity seems alien to consequentialism's commitment to the agent-neutrality of value. If this is correct then the consequentialist should explain why we should prefer the outside-in approach to its rival. I argue that the consequentialist can meet this challenge.

scholarly journals Kognitionsverber og kontrasten mellem indikativ- og infinitivkomplement

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Boye ◽  
Anders Andersen ◽  
Elisabeth Engberg-Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Corpus Studies ◽  
State Of Affairs

Many Danish cognition verbs take both indicative and infinitive complements. We examine what the contrast between the two complement types codes. The literature offers two answers. One is that the contrast has to do with coreferentiality: if the cognition verb’s primary argument is coreferential with the primary argument of the complement, the complement tends to be infinitive; if not, the complement must be indicative. The other answer concerns the contrast between propositions and states-of-affairs: the indicative complement designates a proposition, the infinitive complement a state-of-affairs. Corpus studies support both answers. They also support an analysis of indicatives as proposition markers. But infinitives cannot – straightforwardly – be analysed as state-of-affairs markers.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghan Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agent ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Rational Planning ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Key Concepts

This introduction states key concepts used in the book. First, it defines time biases as systematic preferences about when events happen. Next, it describes the kind of rationality at issue in the book: prudential approbative rationality. This kind of rationality governs what we should approve of or prefer given our self‐interest. On this approach to rationality, preferences are the sorts of attitudes that we can and should support with reasons. Finally, the introduction discusses three principles for rational planning needed for the book’s arguments: (1) Consistency: a prudentially rational agent doesn’t prefer logically inconsistent states of affairs; (2) Success: at any given time, a prudentially rational agent prefers her life going forward to go as well as possible; and (3) Non‐Arbitrariness: at any given time, a prudentially rational agent’s preferences are insensitive to arbitrary differences.

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