scholarly journals PURE TIME PREFERENCE IN INTERTEMPORAL WELFARE ECONOMICS

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Paul Kelleher
Keyword(s):  
Real Number ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Mathematical Function ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Theoretical Question ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Decisive Objection

Abstract:Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question concerns the rate of pure time preference, i.e. the evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at different times. This article criticizes the standard philosophical account of pure time preference, arguing that it ascribes to economists a methodological commitment they need not accept. The article then evaluates three further objections to pure time preference, concluding that it might still be defensible under certain circumstances. I close by articulating a final argument that, if sound, would constitute a decisive objection to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal welfare economics.

scholarly journals Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem

2008 ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Holger Leerhoff
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Bradley’S Regress ◽  
State Of Affairs

In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.

scholarly journals Kognitionsverber og kontrasten mellem indikativ- og infinitivkomplement

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Boye ◽  
Anders Andersen ◽  
Elisabeth Engberg-Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Corpus Studies ◽  
State Of Affairs

Many Danish cognition verbs take both indicative and infinitive complements. We examine what the contrast between the two complement types codes. The literature offers two answers. One is that the contrast has to do with coreferentiality: if the cognition verb’s primary argument is coreferential with the primary argument of the complement, the complement tends to be infinitive; if not, the complement must be indicative. The other answer concerns the contrast between propositions and states-of-affairs: the indicative complement designates a proposition, the infinitive complement a state-of-affairs. Corpus studies support both answers. They also support an analysis of indicatives as proposition markers. But infinitives cannot – straightforwardly – be analysed as state-of-affairs markers.

scholarly journals Another Look at Aspect in Thai

MANUSYA ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
Pranee Kullavanijaya ◽  
Walter Bisang
Keyword(s):  
Initial Boundary ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Selection Theory ◽  
Aspect Markers ◽  
State Of Affairs

The aim of the paper is twofold. The first aim is to analyse aspect in Thai in the framework of the selection-theory approach developed by Breu and Sasse (1991). The second aim is to study all possible co-occurrenc;es of each of the three aspect markers: lεεw, kamlaƞ, yùu with the four classes of verbs and with the verbs occurring with other strategies within the five classes of states of affairs. It was found that the selectional approach chosen helped explaining the inceptive-stative state of affairs in Thai clearly. It also pointed out that the Thai aspectuality focused on the initial boundary and terminative boundary of the state of affairs. It is here that combinations of the three aspect markers occur. The study shows that they have certain rules of co-occurances.

On Necessary Gratuitous Evils

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Michael James Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Standard Position ◽  
State Of Affairs

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.

Weak Universal Egoism as a Non-ethical System

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-509
Author(s):  
George R. Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Ethical System ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
State Of Affairs

In his “Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning; Ethical Egoism as a Moral Theory”, Jesse Kalin defines ethical egoism as “the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest”, by which he means that each person is ‘rationally justified in’ or ‘has conclusive reasons for’ acting thus, and not that ‘it is good', or that ‘it is desirable', or that ‘it conduces to any intrinsically desirable state of affairs', for each to act only self-interestedly.In this way, Kalin seeks to formulate an egoism which he takes to be rational, insofar as, in the interests of consistency, the egoist holds a principle applicable to all, and yet is not committed, ex hypothesi, to valuing collective goods or states of affairs which would tend to compromise his own interests (e.g. everyone's actually acting egoistically).

Reasons and Beliefs

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 179-196
Author(s):  
Matteo Morganti ◽  
Attila Tanyi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasons ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
State Of Affairs

The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both (a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and (b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between (a) and (b) can be neutralized.

Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
First Approximation ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Realist View

Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might be accurate or inaccurate. The view of antirealist-expressivism is that such a person is in, or expresses, a conative state of mind, one that consists in a certain kind of attitude or motivational stance toward something, such as an action or a person. Realism holds that moral thoughts have truth conditions and that in some cases these truth conditions are satisfied so that our moral thoughts are true. Antirealist-expressivism holds, to a first approximation, that the distinctive moral content of a moral thought does not have truth conditions.

scholarly journals Können wir uns dazu entscheiden, etwas zu glauben?

2016 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-592
Author(s):  
Simon Walgenbach
Keyword(s):  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Basic Action ◽  
Restricted Sense ◽  
State Of Affairs

In this essay the author argues that, in a restricted sense, we can decide to believe certain propositions. It is conceded that acquiring a belief is not a basic action and possibly not even an action at all. However, this does not entail the impossibility of decisions to believe since not everything we can decide to do is a basic action. In fact, we can often decide to be in a certain state of affairs. Although beliefs normally aim at truth, there are cases in which we can voluntarily seek or avoid irrational states of affairs and thereby influence our attitudes. Bearing this in mind, situations in which we can talk of decisions to belief can be construed easily.

EQUALITY, BENEVOLENCE, AND RESPONSIVENESS TO AGENT-RELATIVE VALUE

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 314-341
Author(s):  
Eric Mack
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Philosophical Issue ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Net Worth ◽  
Social State ◽  
Crucial Question ◽  
Relative Value ◽  
State Of Affairs

Do differences in income or wealth matter, morally speaking? This essay addresses a broader issue than this question seems to pose. But this broader issue is, I believe, the salient philosophical issue which this question actually poses. Let me explain. Narrowly read, the question at hand is concerned only with inequality of income or wealth. It asks us to consider whether inequality of income or wealth as such is morally problematic. On this construal, the question invites us to consider whether the bare fact that Joshua has a greater income or net worth than Rebekah is a morally defective social state of affairs. Is there at least a significant moral presumption on behalf of equality of income or wealth such that, if an inequality of income or wealth obtains vis-à-vis Joshua and Rebekah, that inequality ought to be nullified unless some impressive positive justification for the inequality can be provided? On this narrow reading, the salient issue is whether there exists in particular an egalitarian presumption with respect to income or wealth. But I believe that the genuinely salient issue here is whether there exists in general an egalitarian presumption with respect to whatever factual condition of individuals one is supposed to attend to when assessing social states of affairs. The crucial question is not whether income or wealth or utility or well-being is the condition the unequal distribution of which is as such morally problematic.

scholarly journals A new epistemological case for theism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHE DE RAY
Keyword(s):  
World View ◽  
The State ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
The World ◽  
State Of Affairs

Abstract Relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires one to hold the intuition that the world is ‘intelligible’, that is, such that states of affairs at least generally have explanations for their obtaining. I argue that metaphysical naturalists are rationally required to withhold this intuition, unless they cease to be naturalists. This is because all plausible naturalistic aetiologies of the intuition entail that the intuition and the state of affairs which it represents are not causally connected in an epistemically appropriate way. Given that one ought to rely on IBE, naturalists are forced to pick the latter and change their world-view. Traditional theists, in contrast, do not face this predicament. This, I argue, is strong grounds for preferring traditional theism to naturalism.

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