Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl W. Spurgin
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Way

Abstract:In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

Moral Progress for Evolved Rational Creatures

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-238
Author(s):  
William J. FitzPatrick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Adaptive Plasticity ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Naturalistic Account ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Way

Abstract Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have developed a rich ‘biocultural theory’ of the nature and causes of moral progress (and regress) for human beings conceived as evolved rational creatures with a nature characterized by ‘adaptive plasticity’. They characterize their theory as a thoroughly naturalistic account of moral progress, while bracketing various questions in moral theory and metaethics in favor of focusing on a certain range of more scientifically tractable questions under some stipulated moral and metaethical assumptions. While I am very much in agreement with the substance of their project, I wish to query and raise some difficulties for the way it is framed, particularly in connection with the claim of naturalism. While their project is clearly naturalistic in certain senses, it is far from clear that it is so in others that are of particular interest in moral philosophy, and these issues need to be more carefully sorted out. For everything that has been argued in the book, the theory on offer may be only a naturalistic component of a larger theory that must ultimately be non-naturalistic in order to deliver the robust sort of account that is desired. Indeed, there are significant metaethical reasons for believing this to be the case. Moreover, if it turns out that some of the assumptions upon which their theory relies require a non-naturalist metaethics (positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts) then even the part of the theory that might have seemed most obviously naturalistic, i.e., the explanation of how changes in moral belief and behavior have come about, may actually require some appeal to non-naturalistic elements in the end.

Moral justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
The Way

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.

The Concept of Well-Being

1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Standard Of Living ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Subject

The concept of well-being is central to the subject matter of moral philosophy as well as economics. According to some moral theorists (particularly utilitarians) morality is about the maximization of social well-being. According to others, notably John Rawls (1972) we ought to give particular priority to the worst off members in society. Both these and other moral positions, whatever the priority they attach to different members of society in arriving at moral judgements, require an account of well-being or advantage. The concern with well-being is thus of foundational importance in moral philosophy, even if well-being is not thought of as all that matters. Furthermore, those who want to distinguish ‘morality’ from ‘self-interest’ must furnish us with an account of human interests, so that we can distinguish the moral realm from that of self-interest or prudence. The concerns of moral philosophers, here, clearly overlap with those of economists. Economists (particularly in welfare and development economics) are much concerned with questions of how well people are doing, with their ‘standard of living’ or ‘quality of life’. However, there are very different ways of thinking about each of these ideas. Indeed, we need to discriminate between different views of the quality of life and to decide which is the most appropriate for the purposes of moral theory and the normative parts of economics.

Macintyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 125-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dobson
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Feminist Thought ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
Cultural Force

Andrew Wicks recently reflected “On The Practical Relevance of Feminist Thought to Business.” Part of his reflection focussed on my contributions to this subject. In critiquing my work, Wicks notes the similarity between my views on business and those of Alasdair MacIntyre. He goes on to give a brief overview of our position as he sees it. Wicks’s overview, although insightful, is misleading in certain key respects. My purpose in this response, therefore, is to clarify MacIntyre’s views on business. In doing this I will, by default, clarify my own.MacIntyre himself might be surprised by the frequency with which his name appears in the business-ethics discourse. Although, over a period spanning nearly fifty years, he has written prolifically on the subject of ethics, he has only, as far as I am aware, written two brief articles directly addressing the subject of business ethics. Why then should we in business or in business ethics concern ourselves with his views? I think our interest in MacIntyre stems from our interest in virtue ethics, specifically our interest in the applicability of the virtues to business. When it comes to virtue ethics MacIntyre is recognized as an authority, if not the authority. Even his fiercest detractors would, I hope, admit that he has been largely responsible for the resurrection of classical philosophy in the latter half of this century. His book After Virtue, in which he criticizes modernity and praises a classical virtue-based approach to ethics, is undoubtedly one the most influential books on moral philosophy written this century. Indeed, as postmodernism gains steam as a cultural force, its full influence is perhaps yet to be determined. If MacIntyre’s critique of modernity proves correct, then much of business-ethics theory—not to mention moral theory in general—would be discredited. Thus interest in MacIntyre’s thesis, from many quarters, is understandable.

Obligation and Assent in Hobbes's Moral Philosophy

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
Rosamond Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of

AbstractIn the history of moral and political philosophy, Hobbes has a bad reputation. Among other things, he has been a favorite whipping boy of moral theorists who wanted to criticize egoism. He has been so disparaged that philosophers who actually draw on his insights avoid acknowledgment of their debt and advise their similarly inspired friends to follow a similarly guarded course, all presumably to protect their own reputations. In what follows, I want to raise the question of whether Hobbes's critics have been engaged in combat with a straw man.1 Is Hobbes's moral theory a classic example of egoism? This is not a new question, but, in my opinion, the answers that have been generated to date are not satisfactory. The issue turns on his account of obligation, and the question is whether Hobbesian obligation is merely a detailed and interesting version of calculating prudent self-interest or whether it involves something that ranks as a moral foundation.2 What is at stake is the status of his Laws of Nature. Are they just a list of calculated best bets, guidelines for action, advice that can be ignored if it should ever turn out to be convenient or more prudent to do something else instead? Or, are the Laws of Nature moral commandments that may not be breached regardless of the personal advantage that could be had through a violation?

scholarly journals Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Theory Building ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Moral Diversity ◽  
First Order ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Moral Theorizing

The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In this article, I move beyond traditional first-order moral theorizing and, based on multilevel social contract theory (Moehler 2018, 2020a), develop a practically sound notion of moral agency for morally diverse societies. The interrelational and dynamic notion of integrated moral agency developed in this article demands that agents actively exercise their rational and affective capacities, are receptive to the capacities of others, and are aware of the type of moral interaction in which they engage with others. The notion of integrated moral agency helps agents to reconcile conflicting first-order moral directives and to maximally protect agents’ autonomy in morally diverse societies.

Stupid Goodness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Paradise Lost ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Way

In Paradise Lost, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, this chapter argues that stupid goodness is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The chapter examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is—between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able to articulate them? Can moral inarticulacy be good, and if so, what is the value of moral articulacy? And, thirdly, can moral philosophy help us to be good? The chapter argues that morality has an inarticulacy-accepting part, an articulacy-encouraging part, an articulacy-surpassing part, and an articulacy-discouraging part. Along the way, an account is proposed of what it is to respond to the reasons that make up the substance of morality.

scholarly journals Is there Such a Thing as a Good Profit? Taking Conventional Ethics Seriously

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marja K. Svanberg ◽  
Carl F. C. Svanberg
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Christian Ethics ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Profit Motive ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper will show that if we take conventional ethics seriously, then there is no moral justification for business profits. To show this, we explore three conventional ethical theories, namely Christian ethics, Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics. Since they essentially reject self-interest, they also reject the essence of business: the profit motive. To illustrate the relationship, we will concretize how the anti-egoist perspective expresses itself in business and business ethics. In business, we look at what many businesses regard as proof of their virtue. In business ethics, we look at what many business ethicists say about the relationship between morality and self-interest and, thus, the profit motive. Ultimately, we will argue that conventional ethics can, at most, only justify the means of business (i.e., aspects of running a business), but not the end of business (i.e., profits).

scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

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