Possible Worlds and Annstrong's Combinatorialism

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-612
Author(s):  
Jaegwon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Simple Form ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Combinatorial Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
David Armstrong ◽  
The Way

At the outset of his instructive and thought-provoking paper, ‘The Nature of Possibility,’ Professor David Armstrong gives a succinct description, in itself almost complete, of his ‘combinatorial theory’ of possibility. He says: ‘Such a view traces the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations - allthe combinations which respect certain simple form- of given, actual elements’ (575). We can perhaps start a bit further back than this. In explaining the idea of a ‘possible world,’ some philosophers begin with the idea of ‘things being a certain way’ or ‘the way things are.’ From this idea a leap is made to ‘things might have been a certain other way’ or ‘ways things could have been.’ And here we already have possible worlds, or so some philosophers assure us: David Lewis, for example, says his talk of possible worlds is nothing but a ‘permissible paraphrase’ of this familiar and innocent-sounding locution, ‘ways things could have been.'

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Modal Fictionalism ◽  
The Way

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory, the stage view, according to which people and other ordinary objects are instantaneous stages, identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Both counterpart theories invite what has been called ‘the argument from concern’ (Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99 (395): 327–54). Why should I be concerned about my counterparts at other possible worlds or other times? I care about how things might have gone for me—not how they go for other people at other possible worlds; I care about my prospects—not the way go for other people at other times. Jiri Benovsky has argued that while modal counterpart theory can be defended against this style of argument, temporal counterpart theory cannot (Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34). I argue that temporal counterpart theory, like modal counterpart theory, resists the argument from concern.

scholarly journals Powerful Properties, Powerless Laws

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Demarest
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Choice Point ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Categorical Properties ◽  
The World ◽  
Independent Features ◽  
David Armstrong ◽  
The Way

A familiar choice-point in the laws of nature debate is whether the laws do any important metaphysical work. Some philosophers, such as Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, David Armstrong, and Tim Maudlin, argue that the laws have very important metaphysical work to do because the way the world is depends on the laws. Others, such as David Lewis, Barry Loewer, Jonathan Cohen and Craig Callender, and Alexander Bird argue that the laws do not have important metaphysical work to do because the laws depend on the way the world is. According to the traditional formulation of the Best System Account (BSA), the most basic laws of nature (those that are the aim of ideal, final physics) are those propositions which, taken together, constitute the simplest and most informative description of the world. There are two central, but independent, features of this view. One is that the laws are mere systematizations of the fundamental ontology; they are not metaphysically ‘weighty’ and do not govern. The other is that the laws depend upon only categorical properties and relations. In this chapter I explore the consequences of accepting the first feature while rejecting the second. That is, I explore a best sys-tem account of laws that depends upon potencies. (For the purposes of this chapter, I suppose the fundamental properties are potencies: properties that are essentially dispositional.) I argue that a BSA grounded in potencies is preferable to a BSA grounded in categorical properties. Laws of nature, on this view, are those propositions that constitute the simplest and most informative description of potencies.

scholarly journals Philosophy as Synchronic History

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
DANIEL STOLJAR
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
The Way

Abstract Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.

Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.

scholarly journals Mínimo e máximo em estruturas nominais – uma análise semântica

2019 ◽  
pp. 250-264
Author(s):  
Rui Marques
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Possible World

This paper is concerned with the semantics of the portuguese phrases with the form o mínimo/máximo N (‘the minimum N’) and o mínimo/máximo de N (‘the minimum/maximum of N’). Some nouns may occur in both of these constructions, while others might occur in only one of them, and still other nouns might occur only if accompanied by a modal operator. The proposal is made that these facts can be straightforwardly explained by the hypothesis that the first and the second of these syntactic constructions have, respectively, an extensional and an intensional meaning, together with the fact that some nouns have the same denotation in any possible world, while others denote different sets of entities in different possible worlds.

scholarly journals Possible Worlds in Translation: Coleman Barks’s Rendition of a Story from Rumi’s Masnavi

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahid Medhat ◽  
Hossein Pirnajmuddin ◽  
Pyeaam Abbasi
Keyword(s):  
Internal Structure ◽  
English Translation ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Translation Studies ◽  
Original Text ◽  
Main Character ◽  
Source Text ◽  
Narrative Worlds ◽  
The Way

This article applies the theory of possible worlds to the field of translation studies by examining the narrative worlds of original and translated texts. Specifically, Marie-Laure Ryan’s characterization of possible worlds provides an account of the internal structure of the textual universe and the progression of the plot. Based on this account, one of the stories from Rumi’s Masnavi is compared to Coleman Barks’s English translation. The possible worlds of the characters and the unfolding of the plots in both texts are examined to assess the degree of compatibility between the textual universes of the original and the translated texts and how significant this might be. It also examines how readers reconstruct the narrative worlds projected by the two texts. The analysis reveals some inconsistencies in the way the textual universes of the original and translated texts are furnished and in the way readers reconstruct the narrative worlds of the two texts. The inability of translation to fully render the main character results in some loss in terms of the pungency and pithiness of the original text. It is also shown that the source text presents a richer domain of the virtual in comparison, suggesting a higher degree of tellability in the textual universe of the Masnavi’s narrative.

scholarly journals Nonexistence, Vague Existence, Merely Possible Existence

Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (33) ◽  
pp. 427-443
Author(s):  
Iris Einheuser
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Target Object ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Vague Existence

Abstract This paper explores a new non-deflationary approach to the puzzle of nonexistence and its cousins. On this approach, we can, under a plausible assumption, express true de re propositions about certain objects that don’t exist, exist indeterminately or exist merely possibly. The defense involves two steps: First, to argue that if we can actually designate what individuates a nonexistent target object with respect to possible worlds in which that object does exist, then we can express a de re proposition about “it”. Second, to adapt the concept of outer truth with respect to a possible world – a concept familiar from actualist modal semantics – for use in representing the actual world.

Intention‐Based Semantics

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Borg
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Acoustic Properties ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Important Respect ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Intentional Agents ◽  
The Way

There is a sense in which it is trivial to say that one accepts intention- (or convention-)based semantics. For if what is meant by this claim is simply that there is an important respect in which words and sentences have meaning (either at all or the particular meanings that they have in any given natural language) due to the fact that they are used, in the way they are, by intentional agents (i.e. speakers), then it seems no one should disagree. For imagine a possible world where there are physical things which share the shape and form of words of English or Japanese, or the acoustic properties of sentences of Finnish or Arapaho, yet where there are no intentional agents (or where any remaining intentional agents don't use language). In such a world, it seems clear that these physical objects, which are only superficially language-like, will lack all meaning.

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