scholarly journals David Lewis’ idea of the fictional state of affairs as a description of possible world and the problem of legal norms

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (0) ◽  
pp. 157
Author(s):  
Marek Jakubiec
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
State Of Affairs

The International Legal Personality of the Individual

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
The Individual ◽  
International Legal Personality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Second World

This book scrutinizes the relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of the individual as a matter of positive international law. By testing four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical and existing international legal norms that govern individuals, the book argues that the common narrative about the development of the role of the individual in international law is flawed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to States alone until the Second World War, only to transform during the second half of the twentieth century to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is—and always was—solely contingent upon the interpretation of international legal norms. It follows, of course, that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international and national legal norms turns exclusively on the nature of their respective sources. Against the background of these insights, the book shows how present-day international lawyers continue to allow an idea, which was never more than a scholarly invention of the nineteenth century, to influence the interpretation and application of contemporary international law. This state of affairs has significant real-world ramifications as international legal rights and obligations of individuals (and other non-State entities) are frequently applied more restrictively than interpretation without presumptions regarding ‘personality’ would merit.

Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.

On Necessary Gratuitous Evils

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Michael James Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Standard Position ◽  
State Of Affairs

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

Possible Worlds and Annstrong's Combinatorialism

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-612
Author(s):  
Jaegwon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Simple Form ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Combinatorial Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
David Armstrong ◽  
The Way

At the outset of his instructive and thought-provoking paper, ‘The Nature of Possibility,’ Professor David Armstrong gives a succinct description, in itself almost complete, of his ‘combinatorial theory’ of possibility. He says: ‘Such a view traces the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations - allthe combinations which respect certain simple form- of given, actual elements’ (575). We can perhaps start a bit further back than this. In explaining the idea of a ‘possible world,’ some philosophers begin with the idea of ‘things being a certain way’ or ‘the way things are.’ From this idea a leap is made to ‘things might have been a certain other way’ or ‘ways things could have been.’ And here we already have possible worlds, or so some philosophers assure us: David Lewis, for example, says his talk of possible worlds is nothing but a ‘permissible paraphrase’ of this familiar and innocent-sounding locution, ‘ways things could have been.'

scholarly journals International Experience of Protecting Persons in the Field of Public Administration: What Relevance of Application under Ukrainian Law?

Justicia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (40) ◽  
pp. 3-10
Author(s):  
Vitalii Oleksandrovych Serohin ◽  
Yuliia Anatoliivna Melikhova ◽  
Mark Mykolayovych Voronov ◽  
Maryna Volodymyrivna Romanenko
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Public Institution ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Level Of Economic Development ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

The analysis and comparison of successful experience of foreign countries on compensation of the damage caused by the subject of public administration to the private person is carried out, possibilities of its use in Ukraine are defined. It is pointed out that in order to achieve the effective functioning of the public administration system, which would respect all fundamental rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals, Ukraine needs to pay attention to the state of affairs in this area in Western Europe and North America. Emphasis is placed on the fact that only a state that properly complies with the legislation related to the protection of individuals in the performance of public administration tasks and responsibilities of public administration, can create and maintain a high level of economic development and social welfare. In particular, this applies to the legal norms of national and international law, which in one way or another regulate the procedures for compensation (or compensation) to individuals by the state (its representative bodies) in the case when the first damage or damage from the state, related to public administration. The author's definitions of the terms "public administration", "compensation" and "methods of compensation" are offered. In addition, the systems of functioning of such a state and public institution as a mechanism of state compensation for damage caused to individuals are studied and compared, and the impact of the quality of functioning of such a mechanism on the overall efficiency of the state system is analyzed.

scholarly journals Russia, the 1990s: Metamorphoses of the Emerging Polity

2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-98
Author(s):  
L. E. Bliakher
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Political Center ◽  
Regional Community ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
Last Stage ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Federal Center

The article attempts to examine the era of the 1990s through the prism of communication in the system “center — regions”. The author interprets the epoch itself as a special, chaotic state of affairs. The political structures and instruments inherited by the new Russia from the Soviet times did not disappear, but lost their foundation (which corresponded to the model of Russian power described by Yuri Pivovarov), transformed into the mode of an autonomous drift along unauthorized trajectories. The new foundation (“the path of civilized countries”) came into conflict with the structures and instruments themselves. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the rejection of that foundation deprived the political center of its legitimacy, since it was perceived and legitimized as a driver of the transition from socialism into the world of “civilized countries”. The article shows that it was the space of dialogue (bargaining) between the center and the regions that combined the principles of the Russian power and a new legitimizing foundation stemming from the “civilized countries” The author identifies three stages of such a dialogue. During the first stage, there was no adaptation, and the dialogue ended with a violent confrontation. As a result, two parallel realities emerged — the reality of legal norms and declarations and the reality of survival. The second stage, labeled by the author as “taming Europe”, witnessed democratic procedures uniting with the practices of the Russian power and recreation of the distributive economy at the regional level. At the same time, the dual legitimacy of the regional rulers — from the regional community and from the federal center — bound the country’s territory much stronger than enforcement agencies or future “spiritual staples”. The last stage, which is usually considered to take place after the 1990s, is associated with the transfer of practices that have developed in the regions to the center. However, according to the author’s conclusion, this is not the end of the constituent era and the formation of the polity, but a continuation of the quest.

Computational Principles

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Pollock
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Mathematical Structure ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
Probability Calculus ◽  
Logical Operators ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
State Of Affairs

Much of the usefulness of probability derives from its rich logical and mathematical structure. That structure comprises the probability calculus. The classical probability calculus is familiar and well understood, but it will turn out that the calculus of nomic probabilities differs from the classical probability calculus in some interesting and important respects. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the calculus of nomic probabilities, and at the same time to investigate the logical and mathematical structure of nomic generalizations. The mathematical theory of nomic probability is formulated in terms of possible worlds. Possible worlds can be regarded as maximally specific possible ways things could have been. This notion can be filled out in various ways, but the details are not important for present purposes. I assume that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds, and I assume that the modal logic of necessary truth and necessary exemplification is a quantified version of S5. States of affairs are things like Mary’s baking pies, 2 being the square root of 4, Martha’s being smarter than John, and the like. For present purposes, a state of affairs can be identified with the set of all possible worlds at which it obtains. Thus if P is a state of affairs and w is a possible world, P obtains at w iff w∊P. Similarly, we can regard monadic properties as sets of ordered pairs ⧼w,x⧽ of possible worlds and possible objects. For example, the property of being red is the set of all pairs ⧼w,x⧽ such that w is a possible world and x is red at w. More generally, an n-place property will be taken to be a set of (n+l)-tuples ⧼w,x1...,xn⧽. Given any n-place concept α, the corresponding property of exemplifying a is the set of (n + l)-tuples ⧼w,x1,...,xn⧽ such that x1,...,xn exemplify α at the possible world w. States of affairs and properties can be constructed out of one another using logical operators like conjunction, negation, quantification, and so on.

scholarly journals Validity and efficacy of international law according to the pure theory of law

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-204
Author(s):  
Arseny A. Kraevsky ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Pure Theory ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Domestic Law

At the beginning of its development, the science of international law was inextricably linked to the doctrine of natural law. The latter was seen as the basis of international law. The very problem of the foundations of international law became acute in the 19th century, when the prevailing legal positivism abandoned the idea of natural law. All proposed solutions were based on the idea of self-obligation of sovereign states. Some of them questioned the very existence of international law, while others required the introduction of explicit fictions. In an attempt to solve this problem, the pure theory of law developed by Hans Kelsen and his students proposed a theory of a hierarchical structure of international and domestic law. The relationship between the levels of the normative system is based on the empowering norms, which transfer the property of legal validity to the lower norms created on their basis. The concept of validity corresponds to the concept of efficacy of the norm. The interrelation of validity and efficacy of legal norms in international law differs significantly from their interrelation in domestic law; the study of this relationship in Kelsen’s theory was the main purpose of this study. The structure of international law according to Kelsen is a pyramid, the highest level of which is customary international law, based on the basic norm of international law that establishes the binding force of international custom. In this case, from the point of view of the pure theory of law, a special role in international law is played by the principle of effectiveness — recognition of the existing factual state of affairs as legitimate. The greater importance of this principle in international law is explained by the absence of a centralized system of coercion in the latter because decentralized legal order does not allow the application of organized sanctions in instances of violation of international legal norms.

Modal operators and functional completeness, II

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. K. Thomason
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Functional Completeness ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Propositional Modal Logic ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Fixed Frame ◽  
State Of Affairs

In the Kripke semantics for propositional modal logic, a frame W = (W, ≺) represents a set of “possible worlds” and a relation of “accessibility” between possible worlds. With respect to a fixed frame W, a proposition is represented by a subset of W (regarded as the set of worlds in which the proposition is true), and an n-ary connective (i.e. a way of forming a new proposition from an ordered n-tuple of given propositions) is represented by a function fw: (P(W))n → P(W). Finally a state of affairs (i.e. a consistent specification whether or not each proposition obtains) is represented by an ultrafilter over W. {To avoid possible confusion, the reader should forget that some people prefer the term “states of affairs” for our “possible worlds”.}In a broader sense, an n-ary connective is represented by an n-ary operatorf = {fw∣ W ∈ Fr}, where Fr is the class of all frames and each fw: (P(W))n → P(W). A connective is modal if it corresponds to a formula of propositional modal logic. A connective C is coherent if whether C(P1,…, Pn) is true in a possible world depends only upon which modal combinations of P1,…,Pn are true in that world. (A modal combination of P1,…,Pn is the result of applying a modal connective to P1,…, Pn.) A connective C is strongly coherent if whether C(P1, …, Pn) obtains in a state of affairs depends only upon which modal combinations of P1,…, Pn obtain in that state of affairs.

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