The US post‐imperial presidency and transatlantic relations

2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Calleo
Author(s):  
Robert X. Browning

In 1979, a new US cable television network was created. It was called C-SPAN, an acronym reflecting its origin. The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network was created to record public affairs programming and deliver it by cable and satellite into US homes. Cable was a nascent industry at that time. It began mostly as a retransmission of broadcast signals into areas that had poor terrestrial reception. The satellite revolution of the 1970s known as “Open Skies” made it possible for new networks to deliver their signals to home satellite dishes, but more importantly, to cable operators who were offered new exclusive, nonbroadcast networks that they could sell to the local subscribers. Home Box Office, or HBO, was successful delivering movies this way, which allowed commercial-free content offered for a premium. Cable operators were thus interested in this new satellite-delivered content that would distinguish cable and give customers reasons to subscribe. Brian Lamb was one of these network entrepreneurs, who with a background in radio, broadcast television, public affairs, satellite policy, and cable television, envisioned a cable satellite network that would bring unedited, Washington, DC–based public affairs programming delivered over cable television systems to American homes. He convinced some cable television executives, with a complementary entrepreneur spirit, to invest in his idea. The result was a nonprofit network dedicated to public affairs events in their entirety. It would be paid for by monthly, per-home license fees paid by the cable operators to the network in exchange for receiving the television signal. This, however, was just half of the story of the origin of C-SPAN. While Brian Lamb was developing his idea and thinking of how content from Washington, DC, events could be delivered via satellite to cable systems, another group was also working on a similar idea. The year was 1977 and the group was the United States House of Representatives. The mid-1970s were a heady time for the US Congress. President Nixon resigned in 1974 after congressional investigations of the 1972 Watergate break in. Congress passed the far-reaching War Powers Act and Congressional Budget Impoundment Act over presidential vetoes to strengthen Congress over what noted historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote was the “Imperial Presidency.” When the US House of Representatives first televised its proceedings on 19 March 1979, C-SPAN began transmitting the signal via satellite and the new network was available.


2021 ◽  

This volume addresses the international challenges that the US faces in the post-Trump era. Will President Joe Biden succeed in restoring the traditional leadership role of the US? What are the international and domestic hurdles for Biden in advancing his foreign policy agenda? Drawing on a liberal perspective in international relations, the chapters highlight how domestic and international politics are intertwined. Societal interests, partisan polarisation, and executive–legislative relations shape the hegemon’s international role in various policy areas, such as arms control and climate and trade policy, but also regarding the country’s relationships towards friends and foes. The book brings together the expertise of scholars who specialise in the US and transatlantic relations, in celebration of Jürgen Wilzewski. With contributions by Hakan Akbulut, Johannes Artz, Florian Böller, Gordon Friedrichs, Gerlinde Groitl, Steffen Hagemann, Lukas Herr, Katja Leikert, Marcus Höreth, Gerhard Mangott, Marcus Müller, Ronja Ritthaler-Andree, Peter Rudolf, Oliver Thränert, Söhnke Schreyer, David Sirakov, Georg Wenzelburger and Reinhard Wolf.


Author(s):  
Oleg Prikhodko

The European Union is an important player in the U.S. policies aimed at maintaining liberal world order. The US-EU interaction has been shaped by a number of key variables, including international environment, specific goals of the U.S. administrations, institutional maturing of the EU, and a complex interplay of American and European diverging and overlapping interests. President D. Trump’s tenure was the most strained period in the US-EU relations, with an erosion of mutual trust and a ghost of trade war looming large. The Biden administration has reversed the U.S. policy towards the European Union. The US-EU summit held last June signified a return of normality in the relations of the transatlantic partners. Washington and Brussels outlined a broad agenda that embraces security, trade and economic issues, coordination in international affairs (concerning, in particular, Russia, China, and Iran), cooperation in decarbonizing of the world economy and promotion of a climate-friendly environment. A broad web of links between the United States and Europe facilitates their joining efforts in addressing global and regional challenges. Although, the US and the EU reached a series of compromises to mitigate their most acrimonious disagreements (Boeing–Airbus subsidies dispute is a vivid example in this regard), there are still unsettled major issues like a comprehensive free trade treaty unsuccessfully negotiated since the Obama presidency. The “Chinese factor” may turn out to be the most divisive one in the transatlantic relations, since the U.S. tough policy towards Beijing makes the EU countries to take hard decisions they prefer to avoid. While it is premature to predict precise implications of the Biden administration’s policy, one can reasonably expect the EU to become a more helpful partner to Washington in diplomatic and economic affairs.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 9-29
Author(s):  
Ana-Maria Stoian

This paper discusses the importance of norms and values in the transatlantic relations. Beginning with the values that shaped the transatlantic partnership at the end of the Second World War, the analysis questions the redefinition of transatlantic values at the beginning of the 21st century, emphasizing patterns of convergence and divergence. Using a comparative approach, the article presents values, norms and principles explaining the domestic and international behaviour of the US and the EU. The main argument of the paper is that there are not two different sets of values, a European and an American one, but a single transatlantic set of values (a Western one), with some distinct elements and approaches. There is not a great departure from the common matrix of values so that to endanger the US-European relationship indefinitely.


2021 ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Michael Cox

This chapter maps the changing transatlantic relations and underlines how this impacts Brexit and EU-UK relations. It points out that the view of the US government remains influential in European affairs, despite claims about transatlantic divergence. It also mentions the endorsement and encouragement of the Trump Administration of the Brexit project, while the new Biden Administration remain unwavering in its commitment in favour of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement and the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The chapter suggests that Brexit should not just be regarded as a UK-European affair but one of the biggest geopolitical shifts since the Second World War. It discusses the Trump phenomenon and why it represented a threat to both the transatlantic relationship and the European project.


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